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iAbstract
This thesis investigates the behaviour that Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies
should adopt as a response to different environments. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD) is a particular topic of game theory that has attracted academic attention due
to its applications in the understanding of the balance between cooperation and com-
petition in social and biological settings.
This thesis uses a variety of mathematical and computational fields such as linear al-
gebra, research software engineering, data mining, network theory, natural language
processing, data analysis, mathematical optimisation, resultant theory, markov mod-
elling, agent based simulation, heuristics and machine learning.
The literature around the IPD has been exploring the performance of strategies in the
game for years. The results of this thesis contribute to the discussion of successful
performances using various novel approaches.
Initially, this thesis evaluates the performance of 195 strategies in 45,600 computer
tournaments. A large portion of the 195 strategies are drawn from the known and
named strategies in the IPD literature, including many previous tournament winners.
The 45,600 computer tournaments include tournament variations such as tournaments
with noise, probabilistic match length, and both noise and probabilistic match length.
This diversity of strategies and tournament types has resulted in the largest and most
diverse collection of computer tournaments in the field. The impact of features on
the performance of the 195 strategies is evaluated using modern machine learning and
statistical techniques. The results reinforce the idea that there are properties associated
with success, these are: be nice, be provocable and generous, be a little envious, be
clever, and adapt to the environment.
Secondly, this thesis explores well performed behaviour focused on a specific set of IPD
strategies called memory-one, and specifically a subset of them that are considered
ii
extortionate. These strategies have gained much attention in the research field and
have been acclaimed for their performance against single opponents. This thesis uses
mathematical modelling to explore the best responses to a collection of memory-one
strategies as a multidimensional non-linear optimisation problem, and the benefits of
extortionate/manipulative behaviour. The results contribute to the discussion that
behaving in an extortionate way is not the optimal play in the IPD, and provide
evidence that memory-one strategies suffer from their limited memory in multi agent
interactions and can be out performed by longer memory strategies.
Following this, the thesis investigates best response strategies in the form of static
sequences of moves. It introduces an evolutionary algorithm which can successfully
identify best response sequences, and uses a list of 192 opponents to generate a large
data set of best response sequences. This data set is then used to train a type of
recurrent neural network called the long short-term memory network, which have not
gained much attention in the literature. A number of long short-term memory networks
are trained to predict the actions of the best response sequences. The trained networks
are used to introduce a total of 24 new IPD strategies which were shown to successfully
win standard tournaments.
From this research the following conclusions are made: there is not a single best strategy
in the IPD for varying environments, however, there are properties associated with the
strategies’ success distinct to different environments. These properties reinforce and
contradict well established results. They include being nice, opening with cooperation,
being a little envious, being complex, adapting to the environment and using longer
memory when possible.
iii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my greatest and utmost gratitude to my
tolerant and supportive supervisor, Dr Vincent Knight, whose guidance, encourage-
ment and jokes have been invaluable throughout my PhD. I am extremely grateful
for our long research meetings, our friendly chats that concluded with me spoiling a
movie/show for you, and our academic trips around the world.
I would also like to thank Dr Jonathan Gillard for his advice through parts of this
work and Dr Marc Harper for his input and commentary in the narrative on the meta
tournaments research.
On a more personal note, I would like to thank my family who have been a source of
great inspiration and motivation throughout life. They never questioned my decisions
and have supported me to the fullest. Except that time when my mother disapproved
of me travelling to New York alone. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to
my friends Nicki Verdeli, Kostas Soulanis and Chris Athanasiou, for their continuous
support and friendship throughout my years in Cardiff. Their homemade meals, in-
spirational talks about not getting anxious and competitive games of UNO have been
vital in the completion of this PhD.
I would also like to thank my colleagues Waleed Ali, Asyl Hawa, Geraint Palmer, Chris
Seaman, Lorenzo De Biase, Henry Wilde and Emily O’Riordan for their company and
endless coffee breaks. Finally, I would like to thank Mrs Joanna Emery for making my
academic journey in Cardiff University possible, and the professional services staff of
the School for Mathematics for their continuous help the past four years with filling
forms, booking rooms, resolving IT issues and preparing coffee and biscuits.
iv
vDissemination of Work
Publications (4 Published & 5 In preparation)
1. 2018: Reinforcement learning produces dominant strategies for the It-
erated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Marc Harper, Vincent Knight, Martin Jones,
Georgios Koutsovoulos, Nikoleta E. Glynatsi, Owen Campbell - PLOS One -
Preprint arXiv:1707.06307
2. 2018: An evolutionary game theoretic model of rhino horn devalua-
tion. Nikoleta E. Glynatsi, Vincent Knight, Tamsin Lee. Ecological Modelling -
Preprint arXiv:1712.07640
3. 2017: Evolution reinforces cooperation with the emergence of self-
recognition mechanisms: an empirical study of the Moran process for
the Iterated Prisoner’s dilemma. Vincent Knight, Marc Harper, Nikoleta E.
Glynatsi, Owen Campbell - PLOS ONE - Preprint arXiv:1707.06920
4. 2016: An open framework for the reproducible study of the Iterated
prisoner’s dilemma. Vincent Knight, Owen Campbell, Marc Harper et al -
Journal of Open Research Software
In preparation
1. 2019: Properties of Winning Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Strategies.
Nikoleta E. Glynatsi, Vincent A. Knight and Marc Harper - In preparation to be
submitted - Preprint arXiv:2001.05911
2. 2019: A bibliometric study of research topics, collaboration and influ-
ence in the field of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Nikoleta E. Gly-
natsi and Vincent A. Knight - Submitted to Palgrave Communications - Preprint
arXiv:1911.06128
vi
3. 2019: Game Theory and Python: An educational tutorial to game the-
ory and repeated games using Python. Nikoleta E. Glynatsi and Vincent
A. Knight - Submitted to the Journal of Open Source Education - Available on
GitHub Nikoleta-v3/Game-Theory-and-Python
4. 2019: A theory of mind: Best responses to memory-one strategies.
The limitations of extortion and restricted memory. Nikoleta E. Glynatsi
and Vincent A. Knight - Under review at Scientific Reports Nature - Preprint
arXiv:1911.12112
5. 2019: Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Vincent Knight, Marc Harper, Nikoleta E. Gly-
natsi, Jonathan Gillard - In preparation to be submitted - Preprint arXiv:1904.00973
Talks & Posters
Invited Talks (Keynotes)
• How does a smile make a difference?, PyCon UK, Cardiff, 2018.
• The Fallacy of Meritocracy, PyCon Balkan, Belgrade, 2019.
Others
• Accessing open research literature with Python - PyCon Namibia, Namibia 2017.
• Writing tests for research software - PyCon Namibia, Namibia 2017.
• Optimisation of short memory strategies in the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma -
Wales Mathematics Colloquium, Gregynog Hall 2017.
• PIP INSTALL AXELROD (poster) - Euroscipy, Erlangen Germany 2017.
• Arcas: Using Python to access open research literature - Euroscipy, Erlangen
Germany 2017.
• A trip to earth science with python as a companion - PyConUK, Cardiff 2017.
• The power of memory (poster) - SIAM UKIE Annual Meeting, Southampton
2018.
• Rhinos with a bit of Python - PyConNA, Namibia 2018.
• Memory size in the Prisoners Dilemma - Wales Mathematics Colloquium, Greg-
ynog Hall 2018.
• Memory size in the Prisoners Dilemma - SIAM UKIE National Student Chapter,
Bath University 2018.
• Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and testing for extortion in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (poster) - STEM for Britain, London 2019.
• Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and testing for extortion in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma - 18th International Conference on Social Behaviour, Sedona,
Arizona 2019.
• An introduction to Time Series - Joint workshop between CUBRIC & Mathe-
matics Departments, Cardiff 2019.
Software development
• Arcas, an open source package designed to help users collect academic articles’
metadata from various prominent journals and pre print serves. Contribution:
Main developer.
• Axelrod-Python library, an open source framework decided to the study of the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Contributions: Implementation of spatial tourna-
ments functionality, implementation/addition of strategies (from the literature)
to the library, reviewing of code contributed by other contributors.
• SymPy, a Python library for symbolic mathematics. Contributions: Imple-
mentation of Dixon’s and Macaulay’s resultants which were developed for my
manuscript “A theory of mind: Best responses to memory-one strategies. The
limitations of extortion and restricted memory”.
• Pandas, an open source library providing high-performance, easy-to-use data
structures and data analysis tools. Contribution: Fix bug which converted
missing values to strings.
vii
viii
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgements iii
Dissemination of Work v
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Brief history of the IPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Research questions & Thesis structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Software development & Best practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.1 Version control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.2 Virtual environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.3 Automated testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.4 Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.5 Summary of software written . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 A literature review of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Origins of the Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Axelrod’s tournaments and intelligently designed strategies . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Memory-one strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Evolutionary dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Structured strategies and training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6 Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 A bibliometric study of research topics, collaboration and influence
in the field of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 33
ix
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.2 Co-authorship network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.3 Topic modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Preliminary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Research topics in the Prisoner’s Dilemma research . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Analysis of co-authorship network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 A meta analysis of tournaments and an evaluation of performance
in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Top ranked strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Evaluation of performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.5 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and the limits of
memory in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 87
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2 Quadratic form utility of the IPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Best responses to memory-one players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.4 Reactive strategies & Resultant theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4.1 Resultant theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5 Numerical experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5.1 Bayesian optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5.2 SSE method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5.3 Best response memory-one strategies for N = 2 . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.4 Longer memory best responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.6 Stability of defection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.7 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6 Best response sequences in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 119
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 Iterated Prisoner Dilemma Strategies as sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
x6.3 Genetic algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.4 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4.1 Parallelisation and stochastic results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.4.2 The collection of best response sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.5 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7 Training long short-term memory networks produces successful Pris-
oner’s Dilemma strategies 141
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.2 Artificial, recurrent and long short-term memory neural networks . . . . 143
7.3 Training LSTM networks to predict best response sequences . . . . . . . 150
7.3.1 Building the networks with Keras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.3.2 High performance training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3.3 Training data sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3.4 Training and validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.4 Validation of LSTM based strategies using a meta tournament analysis . 161
7.4.1 Fingerprinting the LSTM based strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.4.2 Stochastic LSTM strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.5 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8 Conclusions 189
8.1 Research summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.3 Complementary research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.4 Future research directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Appendices 223
A Centrality measures distributions 223
A.1 Distributions for G and G¯ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
A.2 Distributions for topic networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
B List of strategies 225
B.1 List of strategies considered in Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
B.2 List of strategies considered in Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
B.3 List of strategies considered in Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
C Further analysis on features importance 233
C.1 Correlation coefficients of strategies features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
C.2 Multivariate linear regressions on median score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
C.3 Evaluation based on clustering and random forest. . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
D Table of parameters (per Chapter) 243
List of Figures
1.1 Structure of this thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 The depth of exploration whilst reporting on the research question. . . . 8
1.3 An example of a pull request on GitHub. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 An example of an environment file. The name of the specific environment
is called opt-mo and it corresponds to the environment associated with
Chapter 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Example of a function implemented withing the package opt_mo which is
the package that has been developed to carry out the research of Chapter 5. 14
1.6 An example of using the function simulate_match_utility given by
Figure 1.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Natural selection favours defection in a mixed population of Cooperator
(s) and Defector (s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Spatial neighbourhoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 A graphical representation of the lookup table strategy described in [36],
and a demonstration of the changes a strategy exhibits during training. 27
2.4 A graphical representation of the strategies Fortress3 and Fortress4.
Finite state machines consist of a set of internal states. Fortress3 con-
sists of 3 states and Fortress4 of 4 states. There are transition arrows
associated with the states. Each arrow is labelled with A/R where A is
the opponent’s last action and R is the player’s response. . . . . . . . . 28
xi
xii
2.5 Finite state machine representations of Tit For Tat. A machine consists
of transition arrows associated with the states. Each arrow is labelled
with A/R where A is the opponent’s last action and R is the player’s
response. Finite state machines consist of a set of internal states. In (a)
Tit For Tat finite state machine consists of 1 state and in (b) of 2. . . . 29
2.6 Pavlov fingerprinting with Tit For Tat used as the probe strategy. Figure
was generated using [7]. The figure illustrates the average score Pavlov
achieved against Tit For Tat with varying noise parameters. In the
bottom right Pavlov plays against Tit For Tat without noise and achieves
a score of 2.7. In the top left Pavlov plays against Tit For Tat when
both its actions are flipped with a probability of 1, and achieves a score
of 0.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7 Transitive fingerprint of Tit For Tat against a set of 50 random oppo-
nents with varying cooperation rate. The figure illustrates the cooper-
ation rate of Tit For Tat against the set of 50 random opponents over
40 turns. In the bottom right Tit For Tat plays against a Random
strategy that cooperates with a probability 1 and achieves a coopera-
tion rate of 1. In fact Tit For Tat has a cooperation rate of 1 against
the given strategy over all 40 turns. When Tit For Tat competes against
a Random strategy that cooperates with a probability 0 (following the
opening move), it achieves a cooperation rate of 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Example of using the library Arcas to communicate the API of the pub-
lisher PLOS. The query is for a single article with the word “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” in the title. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Example of using the library Arcas to communicate the API of the pub-
lisher Nature. The query is for a single article with the word “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” in the title. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Python Code. Arcas includes a function which standarises the results of
the queries regarding the API. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Arxiv class implementation in Arcas. It includes the code necessary for
Arcas to query the API of arXiv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5 Ieee class implementation in Arcas. It includes the code necessary for
Arcas to query the API of IEEE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6 Unit tests for the Arxiv class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
xiii
3.7 Unit tests for the Ieee class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.8 Number of articles published on the PD 1951-2018 (on a log scale), with
a fitted exponential line, and a forecast for 2017-2022. . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.9 Distribution of number of papers per author (on a log scale). . . . . . . 47
3.10 Collaboration index over time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.11 Coherence for LDA models over the number of topics. . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.12 Number of articles per topic over the years (on a logged scale). . . . . . 51
3.13 Maximum percentage contributions (c∗) over the time periods, for the
LDA models for the entire data set for n equal to 5, 6 and the optimal
number of topics over time. The optimal number of topics are based on
the coherence score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.14 G the co-authorship network for the IPD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.15 G¯ the largest connected component of G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 Tit For Tat’s r distribution in tournaments. Lower values of r correspond
to better performances. The best performance of the strategy has been
in standard tournaments where it achieved a r¯ of 0.34. . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 r distributions of the top 15 strategies in different environments. A lower
value of r¯ corresponds to a more successful performance. A strategy’s
r distribution skewed towards zero indicates that the strategy ranked
highly in most tournaments it participated in. Most distributions are
skewed towards zero except the distributions with unrestricted noise,
supporting the conclusions from Table 4.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Normalised rank r distributions for top 6 strategies in noisy tournaments
over the probability of noisy (pn). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Normalised rank r distributions for top 6 strategies in probabilistic end-
ing tournaments over pe. The 6 strategies start of with a high median
rank, however, their ranked decreased as the the probability of the game
ending increased and at the point of pe = 0.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5 r distributions for best performed strategies in the data set [100]. A
lower value of r¯ corresponds to a more successful performance. . . . . . 75
4.6 Distributions of CC to C and DD to C for the winners in standard
tournaments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 Cr distributions of the winners in noisy and in probabilistic ending tour-
naments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
xiv
4.8 Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners
of standard tournaments. A value of Cr/Cmean = 1 imply that the
cooperating ratio of the winner was the same as the mean cooperating
ratio of the tournament. An SSE distribution skewed towards 0 indicates
a extortionate behaviour by the strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.9 Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of
noisy tournaments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.10 Cr/Cmean distributions over intervals of pn. These distributions model
the optimal proportion of cooperation compared to Cmean as a function
of (pn). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.11 Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of
probabilistic ending tournaments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.12 Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of
noisy probabilistic ending tournaments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.13 Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners over
the tournaments of the entire data set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 Markov Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2 Simulated and empirical utilities for p = (0, 1, 0, 1) and p = (0, 23 ,
1
3 , 0)
against (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , q4) for q4 ∈ {0, 119 , 219 , . . . , 1819 , 1}. uq(p) is the theoretic
value given in Theorem 1, and Uq(p) is simulated numerically using APL. 94
5.3 The utilities of memory-one strategies (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , p4) for p4 ∈ {0, 119 , 219 , . . . , 1819 , 1}
against the 10 memory-one strategies described in [271]. 110
∑10
i=1 u
(i)
q (p)
is the theoretic value given in Theorem 1, and 110
∑10
i=1 U
(i)
q (p) is simu-
lated numerically using APL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.4 The difference between the average utility against the opponents from [271]
and the utility against the average player of the strategies in [271] of a
player p = (p1, p2, p1, p2). A positive difference indicates that condition
(5.12) does not hold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.5 Example code for calculating the Sylvester matrix associated with f =
p21 + p1p2 + 2p1 + p2 − 1 and g = p21 + 3p1 − p22 + 2p2 − 1 using [202].
The matrix is calculated for p2 whilst p1 is handled as a coefficient, and
thus the determinant is expressed in p1. In order for the system to have
a common root, p1 must be ∈ {−3, 0, 1}. By substituting these values
of p1, each at a time, in f and g gives the roots for p2. . . . . . . . . . . 103
xv
5.6 Code example of calculating Sq for a given opponent. The function
reactive_best_response.get_candidate_reactive_best_responses
retrieves the set Sq for a reactive strategy against a list of opponents.
The set includes 0, 1 and to roots of the partial derivatives 0.277 and
0.696. An imaginary solution has also been calculated, however, it is
ignored in the next step which calculates the best response. . . . . . . . 104
5.7 Code example of estimating the best response reactive strategy from a
given Sq set and a given list of opponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.8 The utility of a p = (p1, p2) reactive player against q = (0.513, 0.773, 0.870, 0.008)
for changing values of p1 and p2. The point marked with X is the point
identified as the best response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.10 Code example of using [202] to calculate Dixon’s resultant. f, g and
h have a common root (x = 1, y = −1). The determinant of Dixon’s
matrix falls to zero which confirms that the system has a common root. 105
5.9 Screenshot of the pull request made to SymPy for integrating the source
code of the multivariate resultants to the project’s codebase. The details
of the pull request as well as the conversation with the project’s main
contributors can be found at: https://github.com/sympy/sympy/pull/
14370. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.11 Utility over time of calls using Bayesian optimisation. The opponents
are q(1) = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) and q
(2) = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). The best response obtained
is p∗ = (0, 1150 , 0, 0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.12 Distributions of opponents’ probabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.13 SEE distributions for best response in tournaments without and with
self interactions for N = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.14 Distributions of p∗ for best response in tournaments without and with
self interactions. The medians, denoted as p¯∗, for tournaments are p¯∗ =
(0, 0, 0, 0), and for evolutionary settings p¯∗ = (0, 0.19, 0, 0). . . . . . . . . 113
5.15 Distributions of opponents’ probabilities for longer memory experiment. 114
5.16 Utilities of Gambler and best response memory-one strategies for 130
different pair of opponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
xvi
5.17 A. For q1 = (0.2219, 0.8707, 0.2067, 0.9186), q2 = (0.4884, 0.6117, 0.7659, 0.5184)
and q3 = (0.2968, 0.1877, 0.0807, 0.7384), Equation (5.33) and Equa-
tion (5.34) hold and Defector takes over the population.
B. For q1 = (0.9670, 0.5472, 0.9726, 0.7148), q2 = (0.6977, 0.2160, 0.9762, 0.0062)
and q3 = (0.2529, 0.4349, 0.7738, 0.1976), Equation (5.33) fails and De-
fector does not take over the population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1 Generic flow diagram of a GA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2 Source code for the function get_initial_population implemented in
sequence_sensei which is used to create an initial population of a given
size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3 Example of using get_initial_population to generate a population of
K = 10 and N = 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.4 Source code of the crossover function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.5 An example of using crossover function to crossover S1 and S2 . . . . 127
6.6 Mutation example of S3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.7 Source code of the mutation function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.8 An example of using the mutation function to mutate S3. . . . . . . . . 128
6.9 Simulating a match between Cycler and Cooperator and Cycler and Tit
For Tat. The class Cycler takes a given sequence as an input argument
in a string format ('DDDCCCDDCC'). Once a match has been simulated
with the play method the average score per turn is obtained using the
final_score_per_turn method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.10 Example code of using seeding to generate different plays of Random.
The value of seed changes to {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the seed is set with the
command axl.seed(seed) before simulating the game. This initialises
the pseudo random generator that define what moves Random will take.
The above code snipped will always have the same output each time it
is repeated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.11 Diagrammatic representation of the best response sequences collection
process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.12 The highest score in a population over the generations for Tit For Tat,
Grudger, FSM 16 and Aggravater. The selected trials capture the
results of all the 18 trials for the given set of opponents. . . . . . . . . . 135
xvii
6.13 The highest score in a population over the generations for Tit For Tat,
Grudger, FSM 16 and Aggravater up to gi = 500. . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.14 The maximum score a sequence achieved against Champion with seed
9 over the generations. Each line represents a different GA trial. Only
the GAs with pm = 0.01 have been included. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.15 The maximum score a sequence achieved against Random - seed= 1
over the generations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.16 A graphical representation of best response sequences. The best response
sequences have been sorted based on their total number of cooperations.
Thus the top rows of the plots are dominated by best response sequences
that mainly defect and the bottom rows by sequences that mainly coop-
erate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.1 A generic representation of an ANN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.2 Graphical representation of a feed forward network. . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.3 Graphical representation of a RNN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.4 An LSTM hidden layer at time step t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.5 Graphical representation of an LSTM network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.6 An example of a networks input and output of t = 204. The last action
of Adaptive as well as the first action of the best response sequence are
discarded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.7 A graphical representation of the StoS LSTM network. . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.8 A graphical representation of the StoP LSTM network. . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.9 Python code for implementing the StoS LSTM with Keras. . . . . . . . 154
7.10 Python code for implementing the StoP LSTM with Keras. . . . . . . . 155
7.11 Loss function and accuracy of the networks based on the StoS network,
over the number of epochs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.12 Loss function and accuracy of the networks based on the StoP network,
over the number of epochs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.13 Implementation of the LSTMPlayer class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.14 Normalised rank distributions for the strategies which are based on the
StoS LSTM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.15 Normalised rank distributions for the strategies which are based on the
StoP LSTM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
xviii
7.16 The cumulative distribution function (CFD) for the r distributions for
the LSTM strategies based on the StoS network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.17 The cumulative distribution function (CFD) for the r distributions for
the LSTM strategies based on the StoP network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.18 Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS net-
work when Tit For Tat is the probe strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.19 Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP net-
work when Tit For Tat is the probe strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.20 Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS net-
work when Pavlov is the probe strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.21 Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP net-
work when Pavlov is the probe strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.22 Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS net-
work against the list of opponents from [271]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.23 Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP net-
work against the list of opponents from [271]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.24 Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS net-
work against the list of opponents from [44]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.25 Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP net-
work against the list of opponents from [44]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.26 Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS net-
work against a list of Random opponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.27 Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP net-
work against a list of Random opponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.28 Transitive fingerprints for the top performing LSTM strategies against
a list of manually selected strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.29 Implementation of the StochasticLSTMPlayer class. . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.1 Distributions of betweenness centrality in G and G¯ . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
A.2 Distributions of closeness centrality in G and G¯ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
A.3 Distributions of betweenness centrality in topics’ networks. . . . . . . . 224
A.4 Distributions of closeness centrality in topics’ networks. . . . . . . . . . 224
C.1 Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for standard tournaments 233
C.2 Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for noisy tournaments . . 234
C.3 Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for probabilistic ending
tournaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
C.4 Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for noisy probabilistic
ending tournaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
C.5 Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for data set . . . . . . . 235
C.6 Importance of features in standard tournaments for different clustering
methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
C.7 Importance of features in noisy tournaments for different clustering meth-
ods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
C.8 Importance of features in probabilistic ending tournaments for different
clustering methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
C.9 Importance of features in noisy probabilistic ending tournaments for
different clustering methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
C.10 Importance of features over all the tournaments for different clustering
methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
List of Tables
1.1 An overview of published works that introduced dominating IPD strate-
gies in their respective environments. These strategies were either explic-
itly calculated, intelligently designed, or were developed through training
methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 A summary of the GitHub repositories, source code and data archives
associated with the thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Summary of [103] per provenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Keywords for each topic when n = 6. The highlighted keywords are
overlapping keywords between topics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Keywords for each topic and the document with the most representative
article for each topic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Topic modelling result for the cumulative data set over the periods . . 53
3.5 Network metrics for G and G¯ respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
xix
xx
3.6 Network metrics for auction games and price of anarchy networks re-
spectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.7 Collaborativeness metrics for cumulative graphs, G˜ ⊆ G . . . . . . . . . 58
3.8 Collaborativeness metrics for cumulative graphs’ main clusters, G˜ ⊆ G¯ . 59
3.9 Network metrics for topic networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.10 The 10 most central authors based on betweenness and closeness cen-
tralities for G and G¯. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.11 The 10 most central authors based on betweenness centrality for topics’
networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.12 The 10 most central authors based on closeness centrality for topics’
networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 Data collection; parameter values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Output result of a single tournament. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Top performances for each tournament type based on r¯. The results of
each type are based on 11,420 unique tournaments. The results for noisy
tournaments with pn < 0.1 are based on 1,151 tournaments, and for
probabilistic ending tournaments with pe < 0.1 on 1,139. The top ranks
indicate that trained strategies perform well in a variety of environments,
but so do simple deterministic strategies. The normalised medians are
close to 0 for most environments, except environments with noise not
restricted to 0.1 regardless of the number of turns. Noisy and noisy
probabilistic ending tournaments have the highest medians. . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Top performances over all the tournaments. The top ranks include
strategies that have been previously mentioned. The set of Retaliate
strategies occupy the top spots followed by BackStabber and Double-
Crosser. The distributions of the Retaliate strategies have no statis-
tical difference. PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise 05 and Evolved HMM
5 are trained strategies introduced in [125] and Nice Meta Winner
and NMWE Memory One are strategies based on teams. Grudger is
a strategy from Axelrod’s original tournament and Forgetful Fool Me
Once is based on the same approach as Grudger. . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
xxi
4.5 The features which are included in the performance evaluation analy-
sis. Stochastic, makes use of length and makes use of game are APL
classifiers that determine whether a strategy is stochastic or determinis-
tic, whether it makes use of the number of turns or the game’s payoffs.
The memory usage is calculated as the number of turns the strategy
considers to make an action (which is specified in the APL) divided by
the number of turns. The SSE (introduced in [166]) shows how close
a strategy is to behaving as a ZDs, and subsequently, in an extortion-
ate way. The method identifies the ZDs closest to a given strategy and
calculates the algebraic distance between them, defined as SSE. More
details on the measure are presented in Chapter 5. A SSE value of 1
indicates no extortionate behaviour at all whereas a value of 0 indicates
that a strategy is behaving as a ZDs. The rest of the features considered
include the cooperating ratio of a strategy, the minimum (Cmin), max-
imum (Cmax), mean (Cmean) and median (Cmedian) cooperating ratios
of each tournament. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Correlations between the features of Table 4.5 and the normalised rank
and the median score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 Results of multivariate linear regressions with r as the dependent vari-
able. R squared is reported for each model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.1 SSE of best response memory-one for N = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.1 The interactions of a 10 turns match between S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C}
and Cooperator as well as the average score per turn achieved by each
strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.2 The interactions and average score per turn of a 10 turns match between
S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Tit For Tat. . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 The interactions and average score per turn of a 10 turns match between
S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Random. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.4 The interactions and average score per turn of a 10 turns match between
S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Random. The actions make by
Random are different to that of Table 6.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
xxii
6.5 The parameters of the GA. The GA is performed a total of 18 times
for each opponent. More specifically, it is performed for each possible
combination of the parameters values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.6 An example of an exported summary. The specific output is for the oppo-
nent Alternator. Alternator is a deterministic strategy, consequently,
the value of seed is NaN. The values of the different GA parameters
are recorded in the summary, as well as the details of each member of
each generation. The sequences’ genes were recorded in 0 and 1, where
0 → D and 1 → C. The best responses sequences are the individuals
that have the maximum score at gi = 2,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.7 An example of an exported summary for a stochastic strategy. The
column seed does not have a value of NaN anymore but has captured
the seed that was used to generate the specific play of the stochastic
opponent. The members’ genes are also recorded for each generation.
Note that 0→ D and 1→ C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.8 Best response sequences to a number of opponents that do not react
to the history of the match. The best response to such strategies are
to always defect. This was successfully captured by the best sequence
collection process of this Chapter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.9 Best response sequences to strategies Tit For Tat, Grudger and Hard
Tit For Tat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.10 Best response sequence to TF1 introduced in [164]. The strategy per-
forms a handshake in the first three moves. The hand shake is the
sequence CDC. If the opponent plays that same then the strategies go
into mutual cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.11 Best responses sequences estimated by the data collection process. Note
that 0 corresponds to defection and 1 to cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.1 The actions of the strategy Adaptive against one of the best response
sequences to the strategy. Note that 0→ D and 1→ C. . . . . . . . . . 150
7.2 Training data sets used to train the LSTM networks. The IPD standard
tournament with the 218 opponent has been carried out using APL
version 3.10.0. The results are available at [107]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.3 Number of epochs for each of the LSTM networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
xxiii
7.4 The median normalised ranks of the 24 LSTM strategies over the stan-
dard tournaments. A r¯ closer to 0 indicates a more successful performance.163
7.5 Statistics summary of the r distributions for the strategies based on the
StoS network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.6 Statistics summary of the r distributions for the strategies based on the
StoP network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.7 Median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns that was repeated
50 times. The LSTM strategy corresponds to the strategy based on the
StoS network trained against all strategies with po = 1. . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.8 Median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns that was repeated
50 times. The LSTM strategy corresponds to the strategy based on the
StoP network trained against the representative strategies with po = 1. . 182
7.9 Median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns that was repeated
50 times. The LSTM strategy corresponds to the strategy based on the
StoP network trained against the basic strategies with po = 1. . . . . . . 183
7.10 Median scores of a standard tournament with the three best performing
LSTM strategies. The tournament is of 200 turns and of 50 repetitions. 184
7.11 The median normalised ranks of the 24 LSTM strategies that make
stochastic decisions. A r¯ closer to 0 indicates a more successful perfor-
mance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
C.1 Results of multivariate linear regressions with the median score as the
dependent variable. R squared is reported for each model. . . . . . . . . 236
C.2 Accuracy metrics for random forest models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
D.1 The parameters used throughout the thesis per Chapter. . . . . . . . . . 244
xxiv
xxv
List of Algorithms
4.1 Tournaments’ result summary collections algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.1 Construction of Sylvester matrix [15] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 Basic pseudo-code for Bayesian optimisation. As given in [87] . . . . . . . 108
5.3 Best response dynamics algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.1 GA for estimating best response sequences to a given opponent Q. . . . . 124
6.2 Create initial population of individuals S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.1 Standard tournament result summary collection algorithm . . . . . . . . 163
xxvi
1Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory is a field that makes use of mathematical tools and logic to model and
analyse situations of conflict, cooperation, and competition. One of the most well-
known examples of a strategic game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, consisting of two players
which can either cooperate or defect. A more realistic version of the game is that
of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma where the two players play more than once in
succession. The players remember the previous actions taken and change their strategy
accordingly.
The world is surrounded by situations of conflict, and understanding the emergent
outcome of interactions between two players can have a significant impact in economical
and political sciences.
In 1984 “The evolution of Cooperation” was published by Robert Axelrod introducing
the usage of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and computer modelling in studying
situations of conflict. Axelrod explored the optimal behaviour of players in round robin
tournaments using computer strategies. Many tournaments have followed Axelrod’s,
and today the literature and various codebases contain hundreds of strategies. The
aim of all these strategies has been to capture the best behaviour when playing the
game.
This thesis aims to reinforce the understanding of optimal behaviour in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma for a variety of environments. It summarises, evaluates and builds upon
previous literature. It does not only contribute to the discussion of dominant behaviour
but also provides new mathematical results for the continued understanding of the
questions raised throughout.
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This introductory Chapter is set as follows:
• section 1.1 introduces the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
• section 1.2 covers a brief literature review.
• section 1.3 formalises the research questions and sets out the structure of the
thesis.
• section 1.4 presents the software development techniques used throughout the
thesis.
1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game theory was formalised in 1944 [214] and is the study of interactions as games. A
game is a model of interacting decision makers referred to as players. Each player has
a set of possible actions, and the game captures the interactions of the players’ actions
by allowing each player’s payoffs to be dependant on the actions of all players. More
precisely, as given in [229], the formal definition of a game is as follows:
Definition 1.1.1. A game consists of
• a set of players,
• for each player, a set of actions and
• for each player, payoff functions mapping the set of all actions to a numerical
value.
One of the most well known games is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) originally described
in [83]. The PD is a two player non-cooperative game which illustrates aspects of
political philosophy and morality; how selfishness will lead to an ‘inefficiency’ of the
outcome even though selflessness can be evolutionarily advantageous.
More specifically, in the PD each player has two actions, to either be selfless and
cooperate, denoted as (C), or to be selfish and defect, denoted as (D). Each decision is
made simultaneously and independently. The players’ payoffs are generally represented
by Equation (1.1). Both players receive a reward for mutual cooperation, R, and
a payoff P for mutual defection. A player that defects while the other cooperates
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receives a payoff of T , whereas the cooperator receives S.
Sp =
R S
T P
 Sq =
R T
S P
 (1.1)
It is assumed that two cooperating players do better than two defecting ones, and thus,
the payoff of two cooperating players is larger than the payoff of two defecting players;
R > P . A player, however, has the temptation to deviate, as that player will receive a
higher payoff T than that of mutual cooperation R whilst the cooperator’s payoff S is
smaller than P . In consequence, the payoffs are constrained by Equation (1.2).
T > R > P > S (1.2)
A second constraint which ensures that a social dilemma arises, is that the sum of the
utilities to both players is best when they both cooperate, Equation (1.3).
2R > T + S (1.3)
An equivalent representation of the PD is the donation game. In the donation game
each player can cooperate by providing a benefit b to the other player at a cost c
with b > c > 0. Thus, the players’ payoffs for the donation game are as given by
Equation (1.4).
Sp =
b− c c
b 0
 Sq =
b− c b
c 0
 (1.4)
This thesis studies the PD as given by Equation (1.1). There are numerical experiments
presented in the following Chapters. These have been carried out using the payoff values
of R = 3, P = 1, T = 5 and S = 0, which are the values most commonly used in the
literature [13,39,45,47,75,85,125,159,164,177,246,271].
In non-cooperative games the players interact in order to achieve their best possible
outcome. A best response strategy is a strategy that maximises the utility of a player
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given a known strategy of the other player. A solution concept commonly used in game
theory is the Nash equilibrium [213] which is a pair of best response strategies at which
neither of the players has a reason to deviate.
In the PD due to constraint (1.2) it never benefits a player to cooperate. A player
that cooperates receives either a payoff of R or S depending on the action of the
other player, whereas if a player defects they receive either T or P , and T > R and
P > S. Once both players defect neither have a reason to change their decision. Thus,
in the PD mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium and defection is the best response
strategy.
The game can be studied in a manner where prior outcomes matter. The repeated
form of the game is called the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) and it differs from
the original concept of a PD because participants can learn about the behavioural
tendencies of their opponent. In the IPD defecting is no longer necessarily the dominant
action, and identifying a best response is not always trivial.
1.2 Brief history of the IPD
In the 1980’s Robert Axelrod studied the best way of behaving in the IPD by run-
ning a series of computer tournaments with two collections of strategies [39]. These
strategies were written/submitted by researchers. Axelrod performed an evolutionary
tournament [35] and two round robin tournaments [33, 34]. The strategy that took
over the population and won both tournaments was the strategy Tit For Tat. Axel-
rod’s results demonstrated the robustness of the strategy in those environments and
subsequently the robustness of reciprocal behaviour. These results, however, did not
consider the success of the strategy in other environments. This became more evi-
dent as further competitions and mathematical formulations introduced new dominant
strategies. A brief summary of selected works and their dominant strategies are given
by Table 1.1.
More details on these works will be presented in Chapter 2, and following Chapters 2
and 3 it will become evident that the literature on the IPD is rich, and new strategies
and competitions are being published every year. The question, however, still remains
the same: what is the best way to play the game?
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Year Reference Environment Dominating Strategies
1980 [33] Round robin tournament with 13 participants Tit For Tat
1980 [34] Round robin tournament with a probabilistic ending and 13 participants Tit For Tat
1984 [35] Ecological tournament with 64 participants Tit For Tat
1987 [44] Round robin & ecological tournament with 12 participants Gradual
1991 [47] Round robin tournament with noise and 13 participants Nice and Forgiving
2005 [159] Varied with 223 participants Varying
2012 [271] Round robin tournament with 13 participants Generous zero-determinants
2016 [165] Round robin tournament with 130 participants Heuristically trained strategies
2017 [125] Round robin tournament with 200 participants Heuristically trained strategies
Table 1.1: An overview of published works that introduced dominating IPD strategies
in their respective environments. These strategies were either explicitly calculated,
intelligently designed, or were developed through training methods.
1.3 Research questions & Thesis structure
This thesis contains eight Chapters, which together attempt to answer the research
question:
What behaviour should an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategy adopt as a
response to different environments to achieve a high average score against a list
of opponents?
Initially, Chapter 2 provides a condensed literature review which summarises the al-
ready established results of the literature. Chapter 2 separates the reviewed manuscripts
under different research topics identified manually. To complement the manual sepa-
ration of articles under research topics, Chapter 3 automatically partitions 2,422 IPD
articles using data mining, machine learning and natural language processing. The
data set of 2,422 articles’ metadata has been collected using a bespoke research soft-
ware tool, which was written for this work but has since been used by others. The data
set is further analysed using network theoretic approaches to explore the behaviour of
authors.
There are four Chapters to the thesis which explore best behaviour using original
approaches. Namely, Chapter 4 analyses a set of 45,600 computer tournaments of
distinct types and evaluates 195 strategies’ performance. Chapter 5 explores best
response strategies to environments of memory-one opponents and Chapter 6 explores
best response strategies in the form of static sequences of moves to a collection of
opponents. Finally Chapter 7, uses the data set of best response sequences generated
in Chapter 6 to train an IPD strategy using a recurrent neural network.
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The eight Chapters of the thesis and their role is illustrated in Figure 1.1. An arrow
between one Chapter and another implies that the work described in one serves as
motivation for the other.
2. Literature Review
1. Introduction
3. Bibliometric Study of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma
5. Best Response
Memory-one Strategies
6. Best Re-
sponse Sequences
4. Meta Analy-
sis of Tournaments
7. Long Short-Term
Memory Networks
Figure 1.1: Structure of this thesis.
A summary of each Chapter is given below:
• Chapter 1 has contextualised the main research question of this thesis. Back-
ground of game theory and the PD has been given, and the structure of the
remainder of the thesis has been outlined.
• Chapter 2 provides a literature review for the PD and a manual classification of
the reviewed papers under research topics. The manually identified research top-
ics include evolutionary dynamics, intelligently designed strategies and structured
strategies which have undergone training.
• Chapter 3 presents a bibliometric analysis of 2,422 IPD articles. It uses natural
language processing to identify five research topics, and a graph theoretic ap-
proach to quantify the collaborativeness of the field. The five identified topics
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are human subject research, biological studies, strategies, evolutionary dynamics
on networks and modelling problems as a PD.
• Chapter 4 generates and analyses a set of 45,600 computer tournaments. It eval-
uates 195 strategies, many of which are well known strategies from the literature.
It presents the top performing strategies and analyses their salient features. The
results show that there is not yet a single strategy that performs well in diverse
IPD scenarios, nevertheless there are several properties that heavily influence the
best performing strategies. These are: be nice, be provocable and generous, be a
little envious, be clever, and adapt to the environment.
• Chapter 5 explores best responses to a collection of memory-one strategies as
a multidimensional non-linear optimisation problem. It presents a closed form
algebraic expression for the utility of a memory-one strategy against a given set
of opponents, a compact method of identifying its best response to that given set
of opponents whilst having a theory of mind, and it introduces a well designed
framework that allows the comparison of an optimal memory-one strategy and
a more complex strategy which has a larger memory. The results add to the
literature that has shown that extortionate play is not always optimal, by showing
that optimal play is often not extortionate.
• Chapter 6 explores the problem of IPD best responses in the form of sequences.
It heuristically identifies the best response sequence against 192 strategies, and
generates a data set of 750 best response sequences of 205 turns. The Chapter
mainly serves as a foundation for Chapter 7 but does present a novel heuristic
and a study of its performance.
• Chapter 7 uses the data set of best response strategies obtained from Chapter 6 to
train a type of recurrent neural network to predict best response sequences. The
recurrent neural network used is the long short-term memory network (LSTM)
which has gained a lot of attention in the machine learning literature but not in
the IPD literature. A total of 8 were trained which were then used to introduce
24 distinct IPD strategies. It is demonstrated that a set of these strategies can
win standard tournaments and the best LSTM performers on average rank at the
top 25% of any standard tournament.
• Chapter 8 summarises the work of the previous chapters, and indicates possible
directions of future work, identifying further research questions that have arisen.
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Chapters 4-7 explore behaviour in the IPD. The disparity between the approaches is
their depth, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Chapter 4 explores best responses by analysing
a data set of tournaments and evaluating the performance of pre-designed strategies.
The exact opposite is done in Chapter 5 where for a given set of two memory-one
opponents a best response strategy is calculated explicitly. Similarly, a best responses
sequence against a given opponent is calculated in Chapter 6, but this is done using a
heuristic method. Finally, Chapter 7 uses a machine learning algorithm to generate an
well performed strategy based on recurrent networks without any manual input.
4. Meta Analy-
sis of Tournaments
7. Long Short-Term
Memory Networks
6. Best Re-
sponse Sequences
5. Best Response
Memory-one Strategies
d
e
p
th
Figure 1.2: The depth of exploration whilst reporting on the research question.
Most Chapters of the thesis make use of parameters. There are instances that the
same symbol is used in different Chapters to denote different parameters with different
meanings. The parameters of each Chapter alongside a brief exploration per Chapter
is given in the Appendix D.
1.4 Software development & Best practices
A survey conducted by the Software Sustainability Institute at 15 Russell Group Uni-
versities showed that 92% of the researchers questioned use software intensively in their
work, and 70% said that “It would not be practical to conduct my work without soft-
ware” [131]. Similarly, the research of this thesis heavily relies on software. As with
all research there is an obligation to ensuring the correctness and reproducibility of
the results and the software decisions throughout this thesis have been driven by these
requirements.
For the research of each Chapter (excluding Chapters 2 and 8) source code and analysis
code have been developed. All code is written in the open source language Python, has
been made public via GitHub and has one of the most flexible and permissive licences,
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the MIT licence. Essentially, the code developed for the thesis is available for inspec-
tion, testing, and modification which enables and encourages greater understanding of
the underlying methodology, increases model confidence, and provides an extendable
framework which can be used by others.
Two themes arise as vital in research software development: reproducibility and sus-
tainability. To reassure the reproducibility and sustainability of the software, and
subsequently the research described in the thesis, several methods of best practice [11,
49,66,70] were considered and implemented during development. Namely:
• Version control
• Virtual environments
• Automated testing
• Documentation
These will be discussed in the following subsections.
1.4.1 Version control
Version control, is a system which records all files that make up a project (down to
the line) over time, tracking their development. It also provides the ability to recall
previous versions of files. This type of system is essential for ensuring reproducibility
of scientific research [254,293].
A good version control system has the following features as stated in [250]:
• Backup and restore: Files can be saved as they are edited and have the facility
to jump to a previous version.
• Synchronisation: Source code files can be shared and users can update their
codebase with the latest version.
• Undo changes: Changes made to the code can be undone by going back to a
version that was saved in the past.
• Track changes: Messages are attacked to file changes in order to track the how
and why the code evolved over time.
• Track ownership: File changes are tagged with the user’s name who made the
changes.
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• Sandboxing: The ability to make temporary changes in an isolated area, called
a sandbox, to test and try out code before it is checked in.
• Branching and merging: This is akin to a larger sandbox. Users can branch a
copy of the code into a separate area and modify it in isolation (tracking changes
separately). Later, the work can be merged back into the original codebase.
There are a number of popular tools for version control, these include Git [94], Sub-
version [18], and Mercurial [201]. The version control system chosen to carry out the
software development here is Git.
There are several services that host Git servers online and allow users to work with
Git publicly. These services are essential for reproducibility as they make not only
the source code for the computer programmes available online but also the history of
its development. Such services are GitHub [95], SourceForge [265], GitLab [97], and
BitBucket [31]. GitHub is the chosen service for the thesis which integrates well with
Git.
An important feature of GitHub is that it fosters collaboration between users. It is a
social service which allows users to comment and raise issues on each other’s repos-
itories. Moreover, it encourages collaboration and code contributions by other users
through pull request features. An example of a pull request on a GitHub repository is
given by Figure 1.3. In Figure 1.3 it is shown how changes are tagged with a user and
a short message describing the alternations made to the codebase.
Figure 1.3: An example of a pull request on GitHub.
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The code for Chapters’ 3-7 is hosted on individual GitHub repositories, Table 1.2. The
source code for each repository has been packaged and has been archived on Zenodo [59].
Zenodo is a platform where code, data and other project elements can be permanently
archived. Zenodo does this by assigning projects a Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
which makes the work citable.
1.4.2 Virtual environments
The source code of each repository has Python libraries as dependencies. Though
several of these projects use the same libraries, the versions of these libraries can differ.
Tracking software dependencies is of paramount importance in order to ensure the
reproducibility of computer code.
There are several tools for keeping dependencies required by different projects sepa-
rated. The tool used here are Python virtual environments. More specifically, the
Anaconda virtual environments which integrate easily with the programming language
Python. Anaconda [16] is a free and open-source distribution of the Python and R
programming languages for scientific computing, that aims to simplify package man-
agement and deployment. Package versions are managed by the package management
system conda.
The Anaconda distribution manager: conda allows users to create, export, list, remove,
and update environments that have different versions of Python and/or packages in-
stalled in them. Switching or moving between environments is called activating the
environment. An environment can be shared and kept under version control as a file.
An example of such a file is given by Figure 1.4.
Each Chapter’s repository includes an environment file detailing the dependencies of
the source code and their versions.
1.4.3 Automated testing
Testing code is of considerable importance in order to ensure the robustness, correctness
and sustainability of the computer code. The standard method of testing code is
through automated testing using test suits that run parts of the code and assert whether
they are behaving as expected.
Two types of tests are described in [232], functional tests that assert the code’s func-
tionality, and unit tests that help ensure the code is clean and free of bugs.
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name: opt-mo
channels:
- defaults
dependencies:
- python=3.6.7
- numpy=1.15.4
- pandas=0.23.4
- pip:
- attrs==19.1.0
- axelrod==4.4.0
- black==18.9b0
- sympy==1.2.0
- scikit-optimize==0.5.2
- jupyter==1.0.0
- jupyter-console==5.2.0
- ipython==6.4.0
- pytest==4.0.1
- pytest-cov==2.7.1
- sqlalchemy==1.2.17
- fsspec==0.3.3
Figure 1.4: An example of an environment file. The name of the specific environment
is called opt-mo and it corresponds to the environment associated with Chapter 5.
Functional tests aim to test how the whole application functions from the perspective
of the outside user. They feed in basic input and test whether the end product/final
behaviour is as expected. Unit tests assert that small chunks of code behave as ex-
pected, and they test the application from the point of the programmer. Unit tests are
isolated from the rest of the code and are modular. There are two types of unit tests:
pure and integrated tests.
Pure unit tests are written to test only one function or method. Thus, if a pure unit
test was to fail then it should be due to problems with the specific part of the code it
is testing only, and not any other bit of code. Pure unit tests are fast and readable,
however, they do not test how well functions and methods integrate with one another.
This is tested by writing unit tests that rely on other parts of the code that are not
explicitly being tested. This type of unit test is called integrated tests.
Automated tests, which include functional and unit tests, have been implemented for
the repositories associated with the thesis. This was done using the Python library
pytest which makes it easy to write automated tests in a few lines and to check
for code coverage. Coverage is a measure used to describe how much of the code is
executed (covered) by the testing suite. Coverage is tested using a plugin to pytest,
the pytest-cov.
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To regularly test code which aims to be merged back into the original codebase con-
tinuous integration (CI) systems are used. CIs perform the tests suite and the cover-
age checks every time a new version of the codebase is made available (“pushed”) on
GitHub. The benefits of using a CI are identifying bugs quickly, reducing problems
when merging in contributions from collaborators, and adding transparency to the de-
velopment process. There are two CIs that have been used in the repositories listed in
Table 1.2. These are Travis [279] and GitHub Actions [96].
1.4.4 Documentation
Software documentation is written text or illustration that accompanies computer soft-
ware or is embedded in the source code. The documentation either explains how the
software operates or how to use it.
Each repository associated with the thesis includes a detailed README file. These con-
tain installation instructions for the corresponding packaged source code and demon-
strate how to run the associated test suite. The source code for each repository has
been written in a modular way and meaningful names have been given to all variables,
functions, methods and classes. Each function, method and class includes a docstring.
A docstring is a series of sentences used to document a specific segment of code.
The repositories also include a series of Jupyter Notebooks [153] that are used to carry
out the analysis of each Chapter, and serve as demonstration of the source code’s
usage.
1.4.5 Summary of software written
As previously stated the codebases for Chapters 3-7 have been written following best
practices, have been packaged, are available on GitHub and have been archived on Zen-
odo. These practices have been followed to ensure the correctness, reproducibility and
sustainability of the source code and research described throughout the thesis.
To ensure the reproducibility of the work the data sets used in several of the following
Chapters have also been archived and are available online. The details for the source
code and data sets for each Chapter are summarised in Table 1.2.
Throughout the thesis, parts of the source code and examples of the code’s usage are
going to be presented in the corresponding Chapters. Two types of code snippets are
used in this thesis to present code. Firstly code snippets that demonstrate the source
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GitHub url Source code archive Data archive
Chapter 3 https://github.com/Nikoleta-v3/bibliometric-study-of-the-prisoners-dilemma [110] [101–103]
Chapter 4 https://github.com/Nikoleta-v3/meta-analysis-of-prisoners-dilemma-tournaments [99] [100,105]
Chapter 5 https://github.com/Nikoleta-v3/Memory-size-in-the-prisoners-dilemma [111] [104]
Chapter 6 & 7 https://github.com/Nikoleta-v3/Training-IPD-strategies-with-RNN [98] [106,108,109]
Table 1.2: A summary of the GitHub repositories, source code and data archives
associated with the thesis.
code of a specific piece of software as shown in Figure 1.5, and code snippets that
demonstrate the usage as shown in Figure 1.6. These can be distinguish by the three
arrows, >>>, which are only found in the usage code snippets. The three arrows are
followed by a command. It demonstrates that the command is executed in a Python
interpreter, and the result of executing the command is the one in the following lines
without the arrows. The code snippets can also be distinguish by their background
color. The usage snippets have a lighter background.
1 import axelrod as axl
2
3 def simulate_match_utility(player, opponent, turns=500, repetitions=200):
4 """
5 Returns the simulated utility of a memory one player against a single opponent.
6 """
7 total = 0
8 players = [axl.MemoryOnePlayer(vector) for vector in [player, opponent]]
9 for rep in range(repetitions):
10 match = axl.Match(players=players, turns=turns)
11 _ = match.play()
12
13 total += match.final_score_per_turn()[0]
14
15 return total / repetitions
Figure 1.5: Example of a function implemented withing the package opt_mo which is
the package that has been developed to carry out the research of Chapter 5.
1 >>> import opt_mo
2 >>> opt_mo.utility.simulate_match_utility([1, 0, 1, 0], [1, 1, 1, 1])
3 3.0
Figure 1.6: An example of using the function simulate_match_utility given by Fig-
ure 1.5.
The results of this thesis heavily rely not only on the projects of Table 1.2 but also on the
open source package Axelrod-Python library (APL). APL [7] is an open source project
for simulating rounds of the IPD which contains a large collections of strategies. APL
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has several capabilities which include performing different types of tournaments. Its
documentation is found at http://axelrod.readthedocs.io/. The specific version
of APL used in each Chapter will be mentioned at the start of each Chapter.
This thesis itself is hosted on a GitHub repository at https://github.com/Nikoleta-
v3/Thesis. It is written in the document preparation system LATEX, and automated
tests have been setup to test that the document compiles, spelling is correct, every time
an updated version of the document is pushed to GitHub. The usage code examples
of this thesis are also automatically tested. Each command beginning with the symbol
>>> is executed each time the document is pushed to GitHub. The test executes the
commands and checks that the outcome is the same as the one following the command
in the code snippets.
1.5 Chapter summary
This Chapter has introduced the IPD which is the strategic game used in this thesis.
It has presented a review of the Axelrod’s tournaments in the 1980s, and presented a
list of tournaments that have been performed ever since.
The research questions of this thesis and how each Chapter contributes to these ques-
tions have been outlined. The research of this thesis heavily reliefs on software. The
software includes already established packages and packages that have been developed
specifically for this thesis. These have been developed following best practices. A
number of best practices were introduced in section 1.4.
The software packages and the data sets used in the following Chapters have been
archived and made available online. This reassures that all the results presented in the
following Chapters are reproducible. The developed packages as well as this thesis are
being hosted on GitHub repositories and are being tested using automated tests.
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Chapter 2
A literature review of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 introduced the PD as the main game theoretic model that will be used
throughout this thesis, and presented a brief literature review of the research this
thesis is building upon. This Chapter provides a more detailed literature on the PD.
The aim of this Chapter is to provide a concrete summary of the existing literature and
to identify research topics in the field of the PD. This is achieved by partitioning the
literature in five different sections each reviewing a different aspect of research. The
Chapter is structured as follows:
• section 2.2 presents the origin of the PD and reviews the early publications in
the field and the use of human subject research.
• section 2.3 presents the pioneering computer tournaments of Axelrod and reviews
IPD strategies of intelligent design.
• section 2.4 discusses the emergence, or not, of cooperative behaviour in evolu-
tionary dynamics.
• section 2.5 defines structured strategies in the IPD, the notion of training and
discusses related papers.
• section 2.6 reports on educational and research software used for simulating the
PD game.
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2.2 Origins of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The origin of the PD goes back to the 1950s in early experiments conducted at
RAND [83] to test the applicability of games described in [214]. The game received
its name later the same year. According to [280], Albert W. Tucker (the PhD super-
visor of John Nash [213]), in an attempt to deliver the game with a story during a
talk described the players as prisoners and the game has been known as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma ever since.
The early research on the IPD was limited. The only source of experimental results
was through human subject research where pairs of participants simulated plays of the
game, and human subject research had disadvantages. Humans could behave randomly
and in several experiments both the size and the background of the individuals were
different, thus comparing results of two or more studies became difficult.
The main aim of these early research experiments was to understand how conditions
such as the gender of the participants [81, 184, 187], the physical distance between the
participants [259], the effect of their opening moves [278] and even how the experi-
menter, by varying the tone of their voice and facial expressions [91], could influence
the outcomes and subsequently the emergence of cooperation. An early figure that
sought to understand several of these conditions was the mathematical psychologist
Anatol Rapoport. The results of his work are summarised in [239].
Rapoport was also interested in conceptualising strategies that could promote interna-
tional cooperation. Decades later he would submit the winning strategy (Tit For Tat)
of the first computer tournament, run by Axelrod. These tournaments and several
strategies that were designed by researchers, such as Rapoport, are introduced in the
following section.
2.3 Axelrod’s tournaments and intelligently designed strate-
gies
As discussed in section 2.2, before 1980 a great deal of research was done in the field,
however, as described in [37], the political scientist Axelrod believed that there was no
clear answer to the question of how to avoid conflict, or even how an individual should
play the game. Combining his interest in artificial intelligence and political science
Axelrod created a framework for exploring these questions using computer tournaments
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and made the study of cooperation of critical interest. As described in [240], “Axelrod’s
new approach has been extremely successful and immensely influential in casting light
on the conflict between an individual and the collective rationality reflected in the
choices of a population whose members are unknown and its size unspecified, thereby
opening a new avenue of research”.
The first reported computer tournament took place in 1980 [33]. Axelrod asked re-
searchers to design a strategy with the purpose of winning an IPD tournament. A
total of 13 strategies were submitted, written in the programming languages Fortran
or Basic. Each competed in a 200 turn match against all 12 opponents, itself and a
player that played randomly (called Random). This type of tournament is referred to
as a round robin. The tournament was repeated 5 times to get a more stable estimate of
the scores for each pair of play. Each participant knew the exact number of turns and
had access to the full history of each match. Furthermore, Axelrod performed a pre-
liminary tournament and the results were known to the participants. This preliminary
tournament is mentioned in [33] but no details were given.
The winner of the tournament was determined by the total average score and not by
the number of matches won. The strategy that was announced the winner was the
strategy submitted by Rapoport, Tit For Tat. The success of Tit For Tat came as a
surprise. It was not only the simplest submitted strategy, it would always cooperates on
the first round and then mimic the opponent’s previous move, but it had also won the
tournament even though it could never beat any player it was interacting with.
In order to further test the results Axelrod performed a second tournament in 1980 [34].
The second tournament received much more attention and had a total of 62 entries. The
participants knew the results of the previous tournament and the rules were similar
with only a few alterations. The tournament was repeated 5 times and the length
of each match was not known to the participants. Axelrod intended to use a fixed
probability (referred to as ‘shadow of the future’ [38]) of the game ending on the next
move. However, 5 different number of turns were selected for each match 63, 77, 151,
308 and 401, such that the average length would be around 200 turns.
Nine of the original participants competed again in the second tournament. Two
strategies that remained the same were Tit For Tat and Grudger. Grudger is a
strategy that will cooperate as long as the opponent does not defect, submitted by
James W. Friedman. The name Grudger was given to the strategy in [180]. The
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strategy goes by many names in the literature such as Spite [44], GrimTrigger [42] and
Grim [285]. New entries in the second tournament included Tit for Two Tats submitted
by John Maynard Smith and KPavlovC. KPavlovC, is also known as Simpleton [239]
or just Pavlov [218]. The strategy is based on the fundamental behavioural mechanism
win-stay, lose-shift. Pavlov is heavily studied in the literature and similarly to Tit
For Tat had many variants trying to build upon its success, for example PavlovD and
Adaptive Pavlov [177].
Despite the larger size of the second tournament none of the new entries managed to
outperform the simpler designed strategy. The winner was once again Tit For Tat.
Axelrod concluded that the strategy’s robustness was due to four properties, which he
adapted into four suggestions on doing well in an IPD:
• Do not be envious by striving for a payoff larger than the opponent’s payoff.
• Be “nice”; Do not be the first to defect.
• Reciprocate both cooperation and defection; Be provocable to retaliation and to
apologies.
• Do not be too clever by scheming to exploit the opponent.
Being provocable to apologies refers to a strategy’s ability to go from a DC to C, which
is also referred to as forgiveness. The only way Tit For Tat would end up in DC is if it
had received a defection and then retaliated. Subsequently, Tit For Tat would forgive
an opponent that apologises (in a DC round) by returning to cooperation.
The success of Tit For Tat, however, was not unquestionable. Several papers showed
that stochastic uncertainties severely undercut the effectiveness of reciprocating strate-
gies and such stochastic uncertainties have to be expected in real life situations [203].
For example, in [209] it is proven that in an environment where noise (a probability
that a player’s move will be flipped) is introduced two strategies playing Tit For Tat re-
ceive the same average payoff as two Random players. Hammerstein, pointed out that
if by mistake, one of two Tit For Tat players makes a wrong move, this locks the two
opponents into a hopeless sequence of alternating defections and cooperations [258].
The poor performance of the strategy in noisy environments was also demonstrated in
tournaments. In [47, 75] round robin tournaments with noise were performed, and Tit
For Tat did not win. The authors concluded that to overcome the noise more generous
strategies than Tit For Tat were needed. They introduced the strategies Nice and For-
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giving and Omega Tit For Tat respectively. A second type of stochastic uncertainty is
misperception, where a player’s action is made correctly but it is recorded incorrectly
by the opponent. In [294], a strategy called Contrite Tit For Tat was introduced that
was more successful than Tit For Tat in such environments. The difference between
the strategies was that Contrite Tit For Tat was not so fast to retaliate against a
defection.
Several works extended the reciprocity based approach which has led to new strategies.
For example Gradual [44] which was constructed to have the same qualities as those
of Tit For Tat except one, Gradual had a memory of the game since the beginning of
it. Gradual recorded the number of defections by the opponent and punished them
with a growing number of defections. It would then enter a calming state in which it
would cooperates for two rounds. In a tournament of 12 strategies, including both Tit
For Tat and Pavlov, Gradual managed to outperformed them all. A strategy with
the same intuition as Gradual is Adaptive Tit For Tat [282]. Adaptive Tit For Tat
does not keep a permanent count of past defections, it maintains a continually updated
estimate of the opponent’s behaviour, and uses this estimate to condition its future
actions. In the exact same tournament as in [44] with now 13 strategies Adaptive Tit
For Tat ranked first.
Another extension of strategies was that of teams of strategies [73,74,246] that collude
to increase one member’s score. In 2004 Graham Kendall led the Anniversary Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament with a total of 223 entries. In this tournament par-
ticipants were allowed to submit multiple strategies. A team from the University of
Southampton submitted a total of 60 strategies [246]. All these were strategies that
had been programmed with a recognition mechanism by default. Once the strategies
recognised one another, one would act as leader and the other as a follower. The fol-
lower plays as a Cooperator, cooperates unconditionally and the leader would play as
a Defector gaining the highest achievable score. The followers would defect uncondi-
tionally against other strategies to lower their score and help the leader. The result
was that Southampton had the top three performers. Nick Jennings, who was part
of the team, said that “We developed ways of looking at the Prisoner’s Dilemma in a
more realistic environment and we devised a way for computer agents to recognise and
collude with one another despite the noise. Our solution beats the standard Tit For
Tat strategy” [284].
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2.3.1 Memory-one strategies
A set of strategies that have received a lot of attention in the literature are memory-
one strategies. In [219], Nowak and Sigmund proposed a structure for studying simple
strategies that remembered only the previous turn, and moreover, only recorded the
move of the opponent. These are called reactive strategies and they can be represented
by using three parameters (y, p1, p2), where y is the probability to cooperate in the
first move, and p1 and p2 are the conditional probabilities to cooperate given that the
opponent’s last move was a cooperation or a defection. For example Tit For Tat is
a reactive strategy and it can be written as (1, 1, 0). Another reactive strategy well
known in the literature is Generous Tit For Tat [221] (1, 1, 13).
In [220], Nowak and Sigmund extended their work to include strategies which consider
the entire history of the previous turn to make a decision. These are called memory-one
strategies. If only a single turn of the game is taken into account and depending on
the simultaneous moves of the two players there are only four possible states that the
players could be in. These are:
• Both players cooperated, denoted as CC.
• First player cooperated while the second one defected, denoted as CD.
• First player defected while the second one cooperated, denoted as DC.
• Both players defected, denoted as DD.
A memory-one strategy can be denoted by the probabilities of cooperating after each
state and the probability of cooperating in the first round, (y, p1, p2, p3, p4). For exam-
ple Pavlov’s memory-one representation is (1, 1, 0, 0, 1). Though reactive and memory-
one strategies have to specify their move in the first round, the opening move is a
transient effect and has no affect on the game in long run [262]. Consequently, reac-
tive strategies can be described as an element ∈ R2 and memory-one strategies as an
element ∈ R4.
Memory-one strategies made an impact when a specific subset of memory-one strategies
were introduced called zero-determinant strategies (ZDs) [234]. The American Mathe-
matical Society’s news section [136] stated that “the world of game theory is currently
on fire” and in [271] it was stated that “Press and Dyson have fundamentally changed
the viewpoint on the Prisoner’s Dilemma”. ZDs are a set of extortionate strategies that
can force a linear relationship between the long-run scores of both themselves and the
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opponent, therefore ensuring that the opponent will never do better than them. Press
and Dyson suggested that the ZDs were the dominant set of strategies in the IPD, and
as memory did not benefit them then they argued that memory is not beneficial for
any strategy. In [13, 125, 133–136, 163, 166, 175, 230, 271–273] the effectiveness of ZDs
is questioned. Namely, [272, 273] showed that memory-one strategies must be forgiv-
ing to be evolutionarily stable and [69, 125, 133, 163, 166, 175, 230] demonstrated that
longer-memory strategies have an advantage over short memory strategies. Memory-
one strategies and their limitations are also studied in this thesis, more specifically in
Chapter 5.
This section of the literature review covered the original computer tournaments of
Axelrod, the early success of Tit For Tat in these tournaments and large number of
IPD strategies. Though Tit For Tat was considered to be the most robust basic strategy,
reciprocity was found to not be enough in environments with uncertainties. There are
at least two properties, that have been discussed in this section, for coping with such
uncertainties; generosity and contrition. Generosity is letting a percentage of defections
go unpunished, and contrition is lowering a strategy’s readiness to defect following
an opponent’s defection. The strategies covered in this section are all strategies of
intelligent design. They have been designed by researchers and not surfaced from an
indirect process, such strategies are covered in section 2.5.
In the later part of this section a series of new strategies which were built on the
basic reciprocal approaches were presented, followed by memory-one strategies, the
zero-determinant strategies. Though the ZDs can be proven to be robust in pairwise
interactions they were found to be lacking in evolutionary settings and in computer
tournaments. Evolutionary settings and the emergence of cooperation under natural
selection are covered in the next section.
2.4 Evolutionary dynamics
As yet, the emergence of cooperation has been discussed in the contexts of the one shot
PD game (Chapter 1) and the IPD round robin tournaments (section 2.3). In the PD it
is known that cooperation will not emerge; furthermore, in a series of influential works
Axelrod demonstrated that reciprocal behaviour favours cooperation when individuals
interact repeatedly. But does natural selection favour cooperation? Understanding the
conditions under which natural selection can favour cooperative behaviour is important
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in understanding social behaviour amongst intelligent agents [55].
Imagine a mixed population of cooperators and defectors where every time two in-
dividuals meet they play a game of PD. In such population the average payoff for
defectors is always higher than cooperators. Under natural selection the frequency of
defectors will steadily increase until cooperators become extinct (Figure 2.1). Natural
selection favours defection in the PD, however, there are several mechanisms that allow
the emergence of cooperation in an evolutionary context which will be covered in this
section.
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Figure 2.1: Natural selection favours defection in a mixed population of Cooperator
(s) and Defector (s).
In the later sections of [34], Axelrod discusses an ecological tournament that he per-
formed using the 62 strategies of the second tournament to understand the reproduc-
tive success of Tit For Tat. In an ecological tournament the prevalence of each type of
strategy in each round is determined by that strategy’s success in the previous round.
The competition in each round becomes stronger as weaker performers are reduced
and eliminated. The ecological simulation concluded with a handful of nice strategies
dominating the population whilst exploitative strategies had died off. That was be-
cause the weaker strategies which were being exploitative were becoming extinct, and
exploitative strategies were loosing their prey.
This new result led Axelrod to study the IPD in an evolutionary context based on sev-
eral of the approaches established by the biologist J. Maynard Smith [266–268]. Smith
was a fundamental figure in evolutionary game theory and a participant of Axelrod’s
second tournament. The biological applications of the new evolutionary approach [35]
won Axelrod and his co-author William D. Hamilton the Newcomb-Cleveland prize of
the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1981. In [35] pairs of
individuals from a population played the IPD. The number of interactions between the
pairs were not fixed, but there was a probability defined w, where 0 < w < 1, that the
pair would interact again. This was referred to as the importance of the future of the
game. It was shown that for a sufficient high w Tit For Tat strategies would become
common and remain common because they were “collectively stable”. Axelrod argued
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that collective stability implied evolutionary stability (ESS) and that when a collec-
tively stable strategy is common in a population and individuals are paired randomly,
no other rare strategy can invade. However, Boyd and Lorderbaum in [55] proved that
if w is large enough then no pure strategy is ESS because it can always be invaded by
any pair of other strategies. This was also independently proven in [236].
These conclusions were made in populations where the individuals could all interact
with each other. In 1992, Nowak and May considered a structured population where
an individual’s interactions were limited to its neighbours. More specifically, in [185]
they explored how local interaction alone can facilitate population wide cooperation
in a one shot PD game. The two deterministic strategies Defector and Cooperator
were placed onto a two dimensional square array where the individuals could interact
only with the immediate neighbours. The number of immediate neighbours could be
either fourth, six or eight, as shown in Figure 2.2, where each node represents a player
and the edges denote whether two players will interact. This topology is referred to as
spatial topology. Each cell of the lattice is occupied by a Cooperator or a Defector
and at each generation step each cell owner interacts with its immediate neighbours.
The score of each player is calculated as the sum of all the scores the player achieved
at each generation. At the start of the next generation, each lattice cell is occupied
by the player with the highest score among the previous owner and their immediate
neighbours.
Figure 2.2: Spatial neighbourhoods
Limited/Local interactions proved that as long as small clusters of cooperators form,
where they can benefit from interactions with other cooperators while avoiding interac-
tions with defectors, global cooperation will continue. Thus, local interactions proved
that even for the PD cooperation can emerge. Moreover in [225], whilst using the
donation game (Equation (1.4)), it was shown that cooperation will evolve in a struc-
tured population as long as the benefit to cost ratio b/c is higher than the number of
neighbours.
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In structured populations local interactions that can dynamically change were consid-
ered by Zhang and coworkers [299]. Graphs with a probability of rewiring connections
were considered, and the rewire could be with any given node in the graphs and not
just with immediate neighbours. Zhang et al concluded that “making new friends”
may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also they
must be selected carefully and one should keep their number limited. Finally, in [69] it
was shown that cooperation can evolve as a stable strategy in large social groups when
there are sufficient interactions on each round and players are able to base future play
on their observations of other players’ past actions (have a large memory).
Another approach for increasing the likelihood of cooperation by increasing of assor-
tative interactions among cooperative agents, include partner identification methods
such as reputation [147, 222, 276], communication tokens [205] and tags [63, 124, 205,
242].
This section considered papers on evolutionary dynamics and mechanisms that ensure
the emergence, or not, of cooperation. The emergence of cooperation using such mech-
anisms has not only been explored using only the PD but also other games such as the
public goods game [154]. The following section focuses on strategy archetypes, training
methods and strategies obtained from training.
2.5 Structured strategies and training
This section covers strategies that are different to that of intelligent design discussed in
section 2.3. These are strategies that have been through a training process using generic
strategy archetypes. For example, in [36] Axelrod explored deterministic strategies that
took into account the last 3 plays of both players. As discussed in section 2.3.1, for
each turn there are 4 possible outcomes, CC,CD,DC,DD, thus for 3 turns there are a
total of 4×4×4 = 64 possible combinations. Therefore, the strategy can be defined by
a series of 64 C’s/D’s, corresponding to each combination; this type of strategy is called
a lookup table. A graphical representation of the look up table strategy in [36] is given
by Figure 2.3a. In [36] lookup tables were trained using a genetic algorithm [168]. A
training process includes making random changes to a given instant of the lookup table,
Figure 2.3b. The strategy which corresponds to the new altered instant is evaluated in
a given setting set by the experiment, and if the utility of the strategy has increased this
change is kept and its genes are passed on to a new generation of strategies. A genetic
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algorithm is not the only heuristic method which can be used for training strategies,
realistically any heuristic method can be used.
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(a) A graphical representation of a look up
table player which considers 3 plays of both
players.
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(b) Training a look up table player includes
making changes to the strategy’s responses
to a history.
Figure 2.3: A graphical representation of the lookup table strategy described in [36],
and a demonstration of the changes a strategy exhibits during training.
In 1996 John Miller considered finite state automata as an archetype [204], more specif-
ically, Moore machines [211]. The training process used a genetic algorithm and the
strategies were evaluated in a tournament with noise. Miller’s results showed that even
a small difference in noise (from 1% to 3%) significantly changed the characteristics
of the evolving strategies. The strategies he introduced were Punish Twice, Punish
Once For Two Tats and Punish Twice and Wait. A training combination of finite
state automata and a genetic algorithm was also considered in [29]. In a series of ex-
periments where the size of the population varied, there were two strategies frequently
developed by the training process, and moreover, they were developed only after the
evolution had gone on for many generations. These were Fortress3 and Fortress4.
A graphical representation of the strategies is given by Figure 2.4.
Also, in 1996 the first structured strategies based on neural networks that had been
trained using a genetic algorithm were introduced in [126] by Harrald and Fogel. Har-
rald and Fogel considered a single layered neural network which had 6 inputs. These
were the last 3 moves of the player and the opponent, similar to [36]. Neural networks
have broadly been used since 1996 to train IPD strategies [24, 27, 71, 85] with training
methods such as genetic algorithms [27, 65, 191] and particle swarm optimisation [85].
Chapter 7 of this thesis discusses the training of strategies using neural network in
more details, as the aim of the chapter is to use an extension of a neural network, a
recurrent neural network, to train an IPD strategy.
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Figure 2.4: A graphical representation of the strategies Fortress3 and Fortress4.
Finite state machines consist of a set of internal states. Fortress3 consists of 3 states
and Fortress4 of 4 states. There are transition arrows associated with the states.
Each arrow is labelled with A/R where A is the opponent’s last action and R is the
player’s response.
In [125, 163] both genetic algorithm and particle swarm optimisation were used to
introduce a series of structured strategies based on lookup tables, finite state machines,
neural networks, hidden Markov models [79] and Gambler. Hidden Markov models,
are a stochastic variant of a finite state machine and Gamblers are stochastic variants
of lookup tables. The structured strategies that arised from the training were put up
against a large number of strategies in (1) a Moran process, which is an evolutionary
model of invasion and resistance across time during which high performing individuals
are more likely to be replicated and (2) a round robin tournament with 200 strategies.
The top spots were dominated by the trained strategies of all the archetypes. The
top three strategies were Evolved LookerUp 2 2 2, Evolved HMM 5 and Evolved
FSM 16. In [163] it was demonstrated that these trained strategies would take over
the population in a Moran process. The strategies evolved an ability to recognise
themselves by using a handshake. This recognition mechanism allowed the strategies
to resist invasion by increasing the interactions between themselves, an approach similar
to the one described in section 2.4.
Throughout the different methods of training that have been discussed in this section,
a spectrum of structured strategies can be found. Differentiating between strategies is
not always straightforward. It is not obvious looking at a finite state diagram how a
machine will behave, and many different machines, or neural networks can represent
the same strategy. For example Figure 2.5 shows two finite automata and both are a
representation of Tit For Tat.
To allow for identification of similar strategies a method called fingerprinting was
introduced in [23] by Daniel Ashlock. The method of fingerprinting is a technique for
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(a) Tit For Tat as a finite state machine
with 1 state.
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(b) Tit For Tat as a finite state machine
with 2 states.
Figure 2.5: Finite state machine representations of Tit For Tat. A machine consists of
transition arrows associated with the states. Each arrow is labelled with A/R where
A is the opponent’s last action and R is the player’s response. Finite state machines
consist of a set of internal states. In (a) Tit For Tat finite state machine consists of 1
state and in (b) of 2.
generating a functional signature for a strategy [24]. This is achieved by computing the
score of a strategy against a spectrum of opponents. The basic method is to play the
strategy against a probe strategy with varying noise parameters. In [23] Tit For Tat is
used as the probe strategy. In Figure 2.6 an example of Pavlov’s fingerprint is given.
Fingerprinting has been studied in depth in [24–27]. Another type of fingerprinting is
the transitive fingerprint [7]. The method represents the cooperation rate of a strategy
against a set of opponents over a number of turns. An example of a transitive fingerprint
is given in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: Pavlov fingerprinting with Tit For Tat used as the probe strategy. Figure
was generated using [7]. The figure illustrates the average score Pavlov achieved against
Tit For Tat with varying noise parameters. In the bottom right Pavlov plays against
Tit For Tat without noise and achieves a score of 2.7. In the top left Pavlov plays
against Tit For Tat when both its actions are flipped with a probability of 1, and
achieves a score of 0.5.
This section covered a series of structured strategies based on different archetypes
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Figure 2.7: Transitive fingerprint of Tit For Tat against a set of 50 random opponents
with varying cooperation rate. The figure illustrates the cooperation rate of Tit For
Tat against the set of 50 random opponents over 40 turns. In the bottom right Tit
For Tat plays against a Random strategy that cooperates with a probability 1 and
achieves a cooperation rate of 1. In fact Tit For Tat has a cooperation rate of 1 against
the given strategy over all 40 turns. When Tit For Tat competes against a Random
strategy that cooperates with a probability 0 (following the opening move), it achieves
a cooperation rate of 0.
which have been trained via different training methods. The works discussed in this
section has demonstrated that through these indirect training processes successful IPD
strategies can emerge. This thesis explores both strategies of intelligent design and
trained strategies in more details. The next section covers software that has been
developed with the main aim of simulating the IPD interactions.
2.6 Software
Aside from human subject research the research of the IPD heavily relies on software.
Many academic fields suffer from lack of source code availability and the IPD is not
an exception. Several of the tournaments that have been discussed so far were gen-
erated using computer code, though not all of the source code is available. The code
for Axelrod’s original tournament is known to be lost, and moreover, for the second
tournament the only source code available is the code for the 62 strategies (found on
Axelrod’s personal website [1]).
Several projects, however, are open source and available. Two educational platforms
include [2] and [3]. The “Game of Trust” [2] is an on-line educational platform with
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a graphical user interface that introduces the basics of game theory, the IPD and the
notion of strategies. It attracted a lot of attention due to being “well-presented with
scribble-y hand drawn characters” [138] and “a whole heap of fun” [161]. Secondly, [3]
is a personal project written in PHP with also a graphical user interface. The project
offers a big collection of strategies and allows users to simulate their own tournaments
using the listed strategies.
Two open source projects used for research include [4] and [7]. PRISON [4] is written
in the programming language Java and it was launched in 1998. The project includes
a good number of strategies and has been used in several publications [44,45,192,194].
Axelrod-Python library [7] is another software used in a number of publications [90,
118, 125, 163, 165, 226, 289]. It is written in the programming language Python and
contains the largest collection of strategies in the field. The strategy list of the project
itself has been cited by publications [17, 129, 215]. The Axelrod-Python project has
been implemented following best practices and the tools used in this thesis to simulate
IPD interactions.
2.7 Chapter summary
This Chapter presented a literature review of the IPD. The opening sections focused on
research trends and published works of the field, followed by a presentation of research
and educational software. More specifically, section 2.2 covered the early years of
research. This was when simulating turns of the game was only possible with human
subject research. Following the early years, the pioneering tournaments of Axelrod
were introduced in section 2.3. Axelrod’s work offered the field an agent-based game
theoretic framework to study the IPD. In his original papers he asked researchers to
design strategies to test their performance with the new framework. The winning
strategy of both his tournaments was Tit For Tat. The strategy however came with
limitations which were explored by other researchers, and new intelligently designed
strategies were introduced in order to surpass Tit For Tat with some contributions such
as Pavlov and Gradual.
Soon researchers came to realise that strategies should not just do well in a tournament
setting but should also be evolutionary robust. Evolutionary dynamic methods were
applied to many works in the field, and factors under which cooperation emerges were
explored, as described in section 2.4. This was not done only for unstructured popu-
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lations, where all strategies in the population can interact with each other, but also in
population where interactions were limited to only strategies that were close to each
other. In such topologies it was proven that even in the one shot game, cooperation
can indeed emerge.
Evolutionary approaches can offer many insights in the study of the PD. In evolu-
tionary settings strategies can learn to adapt and take over population by adjusting
their actions; such algorithms can be applied so that evolutionarily robust strategies
can emerge. Algorithms and structures used to train strategies in the literature were
covered in section 2.5. From these training methods several strategies are found, and
to be able to differentiate between them fingerprinting was introduced. The research
of best play and cooperation has been going on since the 1950s, and for simulating
the game software has been developed along the way. This software has been briefly
discussed in section 2.6.
The study of the PD is still an ongoing field research where new variants and new
structures of strategies are continuously being explored [224]. The game now serves
as a model in a wide range of applications, for example in medicine and the study
of cancer cells [20, 158], as well as in social situations and how they can be driven by
rewards [77]. This thesis aims to contribute to the continued understanding of this well
known and widely applied game theoretic model. Many of the papers reviewed in this
Chapter have served as motivation to the research presented in the following Chapters.
In Chapter 4 the performance of several of the strategies mentioned in this Chapter is
evaluated in a large number of tournaments. Chapter 5 explores the set of memory-one
strategies, and Chapters 6 and 7 explore trained strategies based on archetypes such
as sequences and recurrent neural networks.
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Chapter 3
A bibliometric study of research
topics, collaboration and
influence in the field of the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The research reported in this Chapter has led to a manuscript, entitled:
“A bibliometric study of research topics, collaboration and influence in
the field of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma”
Available at: arxiv.org/abs/1911.06128
Associated data sets: [101–103]
Associated codebase: [110]
The manuscript’s abstract is the following:
This manuscript explores the research topics and collaborative behaviour of authors
in the field of the Prisoner’s Dilemma using topic modelling and a graph theoretic
analysis of the co-authorship network. The analysis identified five research topics in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma which have been relevant of the course of time. These are human
subject research, biological studies, strategies, evolutionary dynamics on networks and
modelling problems as a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, the results demonstrated
the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a field of continued interest, and although it is a collaborative
field, it is not necessarily more collaborative than other scientific fields.
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The co-authorship network suggests that authors are focused on their communities
and not many connections across the communities are made. The Prisoner Dilemma
authors also do not influence or gain much information by their connections, unless
they are connected to a “main” group of authors.
The differences between the Chapter and the manuscript include details on the open
source package Arcas which was used for the data collection. The Chapter includes
snippets of its source code, its unit tests and examples of its usage.
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents a bibliometric analysis of the data set “Articles’ meta data on
the Prisoner’s Dilemma” [103]. Chapter 2 presented a review of published works on
the PD, and manually assigned them to different topics. To complement that manual
identification of topics this Chapter presents an automatic approach using natural
language processing. More specifically, the 2,422 articles’ metadata in [103] are used to
extract a list of research topics in the field. Moreover, the list of authors in [103] is also
used to generate a co-authorship network and explore their collaborative behaviour.
The Chapter is structured as follows:
• section 3.2 covers the data collection progress, an introduction to topic modelling
and to co-authorship networks.
• section 3.3 presents a preliminary analysis of the collected data set.
• section 3.4, identifies research topics in the field using natural language process-
ing.
• section 3.5 evaluates the collaborative behaviour of the field based on the publi-
cations of 4,226 authors.
3.2 Methodology
As discussed in [298], bibliometrics (the statistical analysis of published works origi-
nally described by [235]) has been used to support historical assumptions about the
development of fields [237], identify connections between scientific growth and policy
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changes [72], develop a quantitative understanding of author order [257], and to in-
vestigate the collaborative structure of an interdisciplinary field [183]. Most academic
research is undertaken in the form of collaborative effort and as [173] points out, it
is rational that two or more people have the potential to do better as a group than
individually. Indeed this is the very premise of the PD itself. Collaboration in groups
has a long tradition in experimental sciences and it has be proven to be productive
according to [80]. The number of collaborations can be different between research
fields. Understanding collaborative nature of a field is not always an easy task. Several
studies tend to consider academic citations as a measure. A blog post published by
Nature [217] argues that depending on citations can often be misleading because the
true number of citations can not be known. Citations can be missed due to data en-
try errors, academics are influenced by many more papers than they actually cite and
several of the citations are superficial.
A more recent approach to measuring collaborative behaviour, and to studying the
development of a field is to use the co-authorship network, as described in [183]. The
co-authorship network has many advantages as several graph theoretic measures can
be used as proxies to explain author relationships. For example the average degree of
a node corresponds to the average number of an author’s collaborators, and clustering
coefficient corresponds to the extent that two collaborators of an author also collaborate
with each other. In [183], the approach was applied to analyse the development of
the field “evolution of cooperation”, and in [298] to identify the subdisciplines of the
interdisciplinary field of “cultural evolution” and investigate trends in collaboration and
productivity between these subdisciplines. This Chapter builds on the works of [183]
and [298], and extends their methodology as it will be described in section 3.2.2.
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is a topic modelling technique proposed in [53] as a
generative probabilistic model for discovering underlying topics in collections of data.
Applications of the technique include detection in image data [14,68] and detection in
video [216, 290]. Nevertheless, LDA has been applied by several works on publication
data for identifying the topic structure of a subject area. In [143] it was applied to
the publications on mathematical education of the journals “Educational Studies in
Mathematics” and “Journal for Research in Mathematics Education”, in [275] to the
dissertations of the North American library and Information Science and in [51] to
conference papers presented at EvoLang conferences. LDA is the topic modelling tech-
nique used in this thesis to identify research topics. An introduction to the technique
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is presented in section 3.2.3.
The individual techniques of the methodology and their applications to research fields
have been done before [51,183,275,298]. The novelty of this Chapter is the combination
of these techniques and their application to a new data set. A data set that has been
collected from five different sources, whereas the data sets of previous works [183,298]
were from a single source (Web of Science). A bespoke open source software was used
to carry out the data collection. Details of the software and the data collection process
are presented in section 3.2.1.
3.2.1 Data collection
Academic articles are accessible through scholarly databases. Several databases and
collections today offer access through an open application protocol interface (API). An
API allows users to query directly a journal’s database and bypass the graphical user in-
terface. Interacting with an API has two phases: requesting and receiving. The request
phase includes composing a url with the details of the request. For example,
http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query=abs:prisoner’sdilemma&max_
results=1
represents a request message. The first part of the request is the address of the API.
In this example the address corresponds to the API of arXiv. The second part of the
request contains the search arguments. In this example it is requested a single article
that the word “Prisoner’s Dilemma” exists within the article’s title. The format of
the request message is different from API to API. The receive phase includes receiving
a number of raw metadata of articles that satisfies the request message. The raw
metadata are commonly received in extensive markup language (xml) or Javascript
object notation (json) formats [223]. Similarly to the request message, the structure of
the received data differs from journal to journal.
To ensure that the research reported in this Chapter can be reproduced all code used
to query the different APIs has been packaged as a Python library called Arcas. The
source code of the library has been made available online and the package includes
documentation of usage which is available at: http://arcas.readthedocs.io/en/
latest/. Arcas allows users to communicate with a list of APIs by specifying a single
keyword whilst not considering the differences between the requesting and receiving
phases of the APIs.
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Consider the example of retrieving a single article with the word “Prisoner’s Dilemma”
in the title. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the Python code needed to query the publisher
PLOS and Figure 3.2 demonstrates code for querying the API of Nature. The only
distinction between the two code snippets is their respective line 2 where the API is
specified by creating an instance of a class corresponding to the publisher’s API. The
differences between querying the two APIs are visible from lines 6 and 14-onwards.
Lines 6 show the requesting message and lines 14-onwards show the metadata of the
article received by each source.
1 >>> import arcas
2 >>> api = arcas.Plos()
3 >>> parameters = api.parameters_fix(title="Prisoner's Dilemma", records=1)
4 >>> url = api.create_url_search(parameters)
5 >>> url
6 'http://api.plos.org/search?q=title:"Prisoner\'s Dilemma"&rows=1'
7
8 >>> request = api.make_request(url)
9 >>> root = api.get_root(request)
10 >>> article = api.parse(root)
11
12 >>> for key in article[0].keys():
13 ... print(key)
14 id
15 journal
16 eissn
17 publication_date
18 article_type
19 author_display
20 abstract
21 title_display
22 score
Figure 3.1: Example of using the library Arcas to communicate the API of the publisher
PLOS. The query is for a single article with the word “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the title.
There are differences and similarities between the retrievable metadata of each API.
Arcas includes a function which standarises the format of querying results. Figure 3.3
demonstrates the usage of the function.
At the time of writing there are a total of five different APIs implemented within the
project. These five include APIs of four prominent publishers in the field and a preprint
server. Namely these are:
• arXiv [198]; a repository of electronic
preprints. It consists of scientific pa-
pers in the fields of mathematics,
physics, astronomy, electrical engi-
neering, computer science, quantita-
tive biology, statistics, and quanti-
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1 >>> import arcas
2 >>> api = arcas.Nature()
3 >>> parameters = api.parameters_fix(title="Prisoner's Dilemma", records=1)
4 >>> url = api.create_url_search(parameters)
5 >>> url
6 "http://www.nature.com/opensearch/request?&query=dc.title adj Prisoner's Dilemma&maximumRecords=1"
7
8 >>> request = api.make_request(url)
9 >>> root = api.get_root(request)
10 >>> article = api.parse(root)
11
12 >>> for key in article[0].keys():
13 ... print(key)
14 records
15 record
16 recordSchema
17 recordPacking
18 recordData
19 message
20 article
21 head
22 identifier
23 title
24 creator
25 productCode
26 publicationName
27 issn
28 eIssn
29 doi
30 publisher
31 publicationDate
32 volume
33 number
34 startingPage
35 endingPage
36 url
37 genre
38 description
39 copyright
40 aggregationType
Figure 3.2: Example of using the library Arcas to communicate the API of the publisher
Nature. The query is for a single article with the word “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the
title.
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1 >>> import arcas
2 >>> api = arcas.Plos()
3 >>> parameters = api.parameters_fix(title="Prisoner's Dilemma", records=1)
4 >>> url = api.create_url_search(parameters)
5
6 >>> request = api.make_request(url)
7 >>> root = api.get_root(request)
8 >>> article = api.parse(root)
9
10 >>> meta_data = api.to_dataframe(article[0])
11 >>> meta_data.columns
12 Index(['url', 'key', 'unique_key', 'title', 'author', 'abstract', 'doi',
13 'date', 'journal', 'provenance', 'category', 'score', 'open_access'],
14 dtype='object')
Figure 3.3: Python Code. Arcas includes a function which standarises the results of
the queries regarding the API.
tative finance, which all can be ac-
cessed online.
• PLOS [5]; a library of open access
journals and other scientific litera-
ture under an open content license.
It launched its first journal, PLOS
Biology, in October 2003 and pub-
lishes seven journals, as of October
2015.
• IEEE Xplore Digital Library
(IEEE) [142]; a research database for
discovery and access to journal arti-
cles, conference proceedings, techni-
cal standards, and related materials
on computer science, electrical en-
gineering and electronics, and allied
fields. It contains material published
mainly by the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers and other
partner publishers.
• Nature [120]; a multidisciplinary sci-
entific journal, first published on 4
November 1869. It was ranked the
world’s most cited scientific journal
by the Science Edition of the 2010
Journal Citation Reports and is as-
cribed an impact factor of 40.137,
making it one of the world’s top aca-
demic journals.
• Springer [199]; a leading global sci-
entific publisher of books and jour-
nals. It publishes close to 500 aca-
demic and professional society jour-
nals.
Each API has a corresponding class implemented in Arcas. The classes include a series
of methods which allow Arcas to communicate with the APIs. An example of an API
class is given by both Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. These include the classes for the
APIs of arXiv and IEEE. Note that IEEE is an example of an API which requires
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a user to have an access key (line 7 in Figure 3.5). An access key can be required
from the publisher’s website and for the APIs of this Chapter they can be acquired for
free.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 the source code associated with the research projects of
this thesis have been written following a set of best practices. These best practices
include unit testing. There are a series of unit tests that test the functionality and
correctness of each API class. For example, Figure 3.6 displays a test case for the
method to_dataframe of the Arxiv class. Moreover, Figure 3.7 shows several unit
tests which ensure that the request url for IEEE, with different search arguments, is
being generated correctly.
The 2,422 articles metadata explored in this Chapter has been collected using Arcas.
More specifically, articles for which any of the terms “prisoner’s dilemma”, “prisoners
dilemma”, “prisoner dilemma”, “prisoners evolution”, “prisoner game theory” existed
within the title, the abstract or the text are included in the analysis. The data set
has been archived and is available at [103]. Note that the latest data collection was
performed on the 30th November 2018.
3.2.2 Co-authorship network
The relationship between the authors within a field will be modelled as a graph G =
(VG, EG) where VG is the set of nodes and EG is the set of edges. The set VG represents
the authors and an edge connects two authors if and only if those authors have written
together. This co-authorship network is constructed using the data set [103] and the
open source package [123]. The PD network is denoted asG where the number of unique
authors |V (G)| is 4,226 and |E(G)| is 7,642 . All authors’ names were formatted as
their first name and last name (i.e. Martin A. Nowak to Martin Nowak). This was
done to avoid errors such as Martin A. Nowak and Martin Nowak being treated as a
different person. There are some authors for which only their first initial was found.
These entries are left as such.
The collaborativeness of the authors will be analysed using measures such as, isolated
nodes, connected components, clustering coefficient, communities, modularity and av-
erage degree. These measures show the number of connections authors can have and
how strongly connected these people are. The number of isolated nodes is the number
of nodes that are not connected to another node, thus the number of authors that
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1 class Arxiv(Api):
2 def __init__(self):
3 self.standard = 'http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?search_query='
4
5 def to_dataframe(self, raw_article):
6 """A function which takes a dictionary with structure of the arXiv results,
7 transforms it to a standardised format and returns a dataframe."""
8 raw_article['url'] = raw_article.get('id', None)
9
10 for key_one, key_two in [['author', 'name'], ['category', 'category']]:
11 raw_article[key_one] = raw_article.get(key_two, None)
12 if raw_article[key_one] is not None:
13 raw_article[key_one] = raw_article[key_one].split(',')
14
15 raw_article['abstract'] = raw_article.get('summary', None)
16 raw_article['date'] = int(raw_article.get('published', '0').split('-')[0])
17 raw_article['journal'] = raw_article.get('journal_ref', None)
18 if raw_article['journal'] is None:
19 raw_article['journal'] = "arXiv"
20
21 raw_article['provenance'] = 'arXiv'
22 raw_article['title'] = raw_article.get('title', None)
23 raw_article['doi'] = raw_article.get('doi', None)
24 raw_article['key'], raw_article['unique_key'] = self.create_keys(raw_article)
25
26 raw_article['open_access'] = True
27 raw_article['score'] = 'Not available'
28 return self.dict_to_dataframe(raw_article)
29
30 def parse(self, root):
31 """Removing unwanted branches."""
32 branches = root.getchildren()
33 raw_articles = []
34 for record in branches:
35 if 'entry' in record.tag:
36 raw_articles.append(self.xml_to_dict(record))
37 if not raw_articles:
38 raw_articles = False
39 return raw_articles
40
41 @staticmethod
42 def parameters_fix(author=None, title=None, abstract=None, year=None, records=None,
43 start=None, category=None, journal=None, keyword=None):
44 parameters = []
45 if author is not None:
46 parameters.append('au:{}'.format(author))
47 if title is not None:
48 parameters.append('ti:{}'.format(title))
49 if abstract is not None:
50 parameters.append('abs:{}'.format(abstract))
51 if category is not None:
52 parameters.append('cat:{}'.format(category))
53 if journal is not None:
54 parameters.append('jr:{}'.format(journal))
55 if keyword is not None:
56 parameters.append('all:{}'.format(keyword))
57 if records is not None:
58 parameters.append('max_results={}'.format(records))
59 if start is not None:
60 parameters.append('start={}'.format(start))
61 if year is not None:
62 print('arXiv does not support argument year.')
63
64 return parameters
65
66 @staticmethod
67 def get_root(response):
68 root = ElementTree.fromstring(response.text)
69 return root
Figure 3.4: Arxiv class implementation in Arcas. It includes the code necessary for
Arcas to query the API of arXiv.
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1 class Ieee(Api):
2 """
3 API argument is 'ieee'.
4 """
5 def __init__(self):
6 self.standard = 'https://ieeexploreapi.ieee.org/api/v1/search/articles?'
7 self.key_api = api_key
8
9 def create_url_search(self, parameters):
10 """Creates the search url, combining the standard url and various
11 search parameters."""
12 url = self.standard
13 url += parameters[0]
14 for i in parameters[1:]:
15 url += '&{}'.format(i)
16 url += '&apikey={}'.format(self.key_api)
17 return url
18
19 @staticmethod
20 @ratelimit.rate_limited(3)
21 def make_request(url):
22 """Request from an API and returns response."""
23 response = requests.get(url, stream=True, verify=False)
24 if response.status_code != 200:
25 raise APIError(response.status_code)
26 return response
27
28 def parse(self, root):
29 """Parsing the xml file"""
30 if root['total_records'] == 0:
31 return False
32 return root['articles']
33
34 @staticmethod
35 def parameters_fix(author=None, title=None, abstract=None, year=None,
36 records=None, start=None, category=None, journal=None,
37 keyword=None):
38 parameters = []
39 if author is not None:
40 parameters.append('author={}'.format(author))
41 if title is not None:
42 parameters.append('article_title={}'.format(title))
43 if abstract is not None:
44 parameters.append('abstract={}'.format(abstract))
45 if year is not None:
46 parameters.append('publication_year={}'.format(year))
47 if category is not None:
48 parameters.append('index_terms={}'.format(category))
49 if journal is not None:
50 parameters.append('publication_title={}'.format(journal))
51 if keyword is not None:
52 parameters.append('querytext={}'.format(keyword))
53 if records is not None:
54 parameters.append('max_records={}'.format(records))
55 if start is not None:
56 parameters.append('start_record={}'.format(start))
57
58 return parameters
59
60 @staticmethod
61 def get_root(response):
62 root = response.json()
63 return root
Figure 3.5: Ieee class implementation in Arcas. It includes the code necessary for
Arcas to query the API of IEEE.
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1 import arcas
2
3 def test_to_dataframe():
4 dummy_article = {'entry': '\n', 'id': 'http://arxiv.org/abs/0000',
5 'updated': '2011', 'published': '2010', 'title': 'Title',
6 'summary': "Abstract", 'author': '\n', 'name': 'E Glynatsi, V Knight',
7 'doi': '10.0000', 'comment': 'This is a comment.',
8 'journal_ref': 'Awesome Journal', 'primary_category': 'Dummy',
9 'category': None}
10 api = arcas.Arxiv()
11 article = api.to_dataframe(dummy_article)
12
13 assert isinstance(article, pandas.core.frame.DataFrame)
14 assert list(article.columns) == api.keys()
15 assert len(article['url']) == 2
16
17 assert article['url'].unique()[0] == 'http://arxiv.org/abs/0000'
18 assert article['key'].unique()[0] == 'Glynatsi2010'
19 assert article['title'].unique()[0] == 'Title'
20 assert article['abstract'].unique()[0] == 'Abstract'
21 assert article['journal'].unique()[0] == 'Awesome Journal'
22 assert article['primary_category'].unique()[0] == 'Dummy'
23 assert article['category'].unique()[0] == None
24 assert article['score'].unique()[0] == 'Not available'
25 assert article['open_access'].unique()[0] == True
Figure 3.6: Unit tests for the Arxiv class. Tests the functionality of the method
to_dataframe.
1 import arcas
2
3 def test_setup():
4 api = arcas.Ieee()
5 assert api.standard == 'https://ieeexploreapi.ieee.org/api/v1/search/articles?'
6
7 def test_parameters_and_url_author():
8 api = arcas.Ieee()
9 parameters = api.parameters_fix(author='Glynatsi')
10 assert parameters == ['author=Glynatsi']
11
12 url = api.create_url_search(parameters)
13 assert (
14 url ==
15 "https://ieeexploreapi.ieee.org/api/v1/search/articles?author=Glynatsi&apikey=Your key here"
16 )
17
18 def test_parameters_and_url_title():
19 api = arcas.Ieee()
20 parameters = api.parameters_fix(title="Game")
21 assert parameters == ["article_title=Game"]
Figure 3.7: Unit tests for the Ieee class.
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have published alone. The average degree denotes the average number of neighbours
for each nodes, i.e. the average number of collaborations between the authors. A con-
nected component is a maximal set of nodes such that each pair of nodes is connected
by a path [78]. The number of connected components as well as the size of the largest
connected component in the network are reported. The size of the largest connected
component represents the scale of the central cluster of the entire network, as will be
discussed in later parts. Clustering coefficient and modularity are also calculated. The
clustering coefficient, defined as 3 times the number of triangles on the graph divided
by the number of connected triples of nodes, is a local measure of the degree to which
nodes in a graph tend to cluster together in a clique [78]. It shows to which extent the
collaborators of an author also write together.
In comparison, modularity is a global measure designed to measure the strength of
division of a network into communities. The number of communities will be reported
using the Clauset-Newman-Moore method [67]. Also the modularity index is calcu-
lated using the Louvain method described in [54]. The value of the modularity index
can vary between [−1, 1]; a high value of modularity corresponds to a structure where
there are dense connections between the nodes within communities but sparse connec-
tions between nodes in different communities. That means that there are many sub
communities of authors that write together but not across communities.
Two further points are aimed to be explored in this thesis, (1) which people control
the flow of information; as in which people influence the field the most and (2) which
are the authors that gain the most from the influence of the field. To measure these
concepts centrality measures are going to be used. Centrality measures are often used
to understand different aspects of social networks [174]. The two centrality measures
chosen here are closeness and betweenness centrality.
1. In networks some nodes have a short distance to a lot of nodes and consequently
are able to spread information on the network very effectively. A representative
of this idea is closeness centrality, where a node is seen as centrally involved
in the network if it requires only few intermediaries to contact others and thus
is structurally relatively independent. Closeness centrality is interpreted as in-
fluence. Authors with a high value of closeness centrality, are the authors that
spread scientific knowledge easier on the network and they have high influence.
2. Another centrality measure is the betweenness centrality, where the determination
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of an author’s centrality is based on the quotient of the number of all shortest
paths between nodes in the network that include the node in question and the
number of all shortest paths in the network. In betweenness centrality the posi-
tion of the node matters. Nodes with a higher value of betweenness centrality are
located in positions that a lot of information pass through, this is interpreted as
the gain from the influence, thus these authors gain the most from their networks.
3.2.3 Topic modelling
The articles contained in the data set will be classified into research topics using LDA,
a topic modelling technique designed to summarise large collections of documents by a
small number of conceptually connected topics or themes [53,119]. LDA is carried out
using [241].
The input to an LDA is a collection of documents, and the collection of documents con-
sidered here are the articles’ abstracts. The output of an LDA is an N × n matrix - N
rows for N abstracts and n columns for n topics. The cells contain the percentage con-
tributions for each topic for each abstract, cji for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Thus each document/abstract is represented by a distribution over topics, and the
topics themselves are represented by a distribution over words. More specifically, each
topic is described by weights associated with words. For example assume two topics A
and B. Their associated words and weights are:
• Topic A: 0.039×“cooperation”, 0.028×“study” and 0.026×“human”.
• Topic B: 0.020×“cooperation”, 0.028×“agents” and 0.026×“strategies”.
A document with abstract “The study of cooperation in humans” has a cA = 0.039 +
0.028 + 0.026 = 0.093 and cB = 0.020 + 0.0 + 0.0 = 0.020. In essence, LDA maps every
paper to a vector. In this example the document is mapped to [0.093, 0.020]. Each
document has a dominant topic. The dominant topic is the topic with the highest
percentage contribution denoted as c∗. For the given example the dominant topic is
Topic A, and c∗ = cA.
LAD requires that the number of topics is specified in advance before running the
algorithm. The number of topics can be chosen using the coherence value [244] or
through subjective minimisation of the overlapping keywords between two topics. Both
these approaches will be used here. Preceding the analysis of research topics, the next
section presents a preliminary analysis of the collected data set.
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3.3 Preliminary analysis
The data set consists of 2,422 articles with unique titles. In case of duplicates the
preprint version of an article (collected from arXiv) was dropped. Similarly to [183],
76 articles have been manually added throughout the writing of Chapter 2 because
they were of specific interest. These papers include [83] the first publication on the
PD, [225, 271] two well cited articles in the field, and a series of works of Axelrod
[33–36,242].
A more detailed summary of the articles’ provenance is given by Table 3.1. Only 3%
of the data set consists of articles that were manually added and 27% of the articles
were collected from arXiv. The average number of publications is also included in
Table 3.1. Overall an average of 43 articles are published per year on the topic. The
most significant contribution to this appears to be from arXiv with 11 articles per year,
followed by Springer with 9, and PLOS and Nature with 8.
Number of Articles Percentage % Year of first publication Average number of publications per year
IEEE 294 12.14% 1973 5
Manual 76 3.14% 1951 1
Nature 436 18.00% 1959 8
PLOS 477 19.69% 2005 8
Springer 533 22.01% 1966 9
arXiv 654 27.00% 1993 11
Table 3.1: Summary of [103] per provenance.
The data handled here is in fact a time series from the 1950s, the formulation of the
game, until 2018 (Figure 3.8). Two observations can be made from Figure 3.8.
1. There is a steady increase of the number of publications since the 1970s.
2. There is a decrease in 2017-2018. This is due to the data set being incomplete.
Articles that have been written in 2017-2018 have either not being published or
were not retrievable by the APIs at the time of the last data collection.
These observations can be confirmed by studying the time series. Using [150], an ex-
ponential distribution is fitted to the data. The fitted model can be used to forecast
the behaviour of the field for the next 5 years. Even though the time series has indi-
cated a slight decrease, the model forecasts that the number of publications will keep
increasing, thus demonstrating that the field of the PD continues to attract academic
attention.
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Figure 3.8: Number of articles published on the PD 1951-2018 (on a log scale), with a
fitted exponential line, and a forecast for 2017-2022.
There are a total of 4,226 authors in the data set and several of these authors have had
multiple publications collected from the data collection process. The highest number
of articles collected for an author is 83 publications for Matjaz Perc. The distribution
of the number of papers per author is given by Figure 3.9, and it can be seen that
Perc is an outlier. More specifically, most authors have 1 to 6 publications in the data
set.
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81
number of publications
100
101
102
103
Figure 3.9: Distribution of number of papers per author (on a log scale).
The overall collaboration index or the average number of authors on multi-authored
papers is 3.2, thus on average a non single author publication in the PD has 3 authors.
This appears to be quite standard compared to other fields such as cultural evolu-
tion [298], Astronomy and Astrophysics, Genetics and Heredity, Nuclear and Particle
Physics as reported by [190]. There are only a total of 545 publications with a single
author, which corresponds to the 22% of papers. It appears that academic publica-
tions tend to be undertaken in the form of collaborative effort, which is in line with
the claim of [173]. From Figure 3.10 the trend of collaboration index over the years
is given. There are some peaks in the early years 1969 and 1980, however, a steady
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increase appears to happen after 2004. This could be an effect of better communication
tools being introduced around that time which enabled more collaborations between
researchers.
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Figure 3.10: Collaboration index over time.
The collaborativeness of the authors is explored in more detail in section 3.5 using the
co-authorship network. The collaborative behaviour and relative influence of authors
will also be explored in co-authorship networks which correspond to their publications
research topics. These topics are presented in the next section.
3.4 Research topics in the Prisoner’s Dilemma research
In order to identify the topics which are being discussed in the field of the PD, the
LDA algorithm implemented in [241] is applied to the abstracts of the data set. As
mentioned before, the number of topics, which will be denoted as n, needs to be specified
before running the algorithm. The appropriate number of topics is chosen based on
the coherence value [244]. Figure 3.11 gives the coherence values of 18 models where
n ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 19}, and it can be seen than the most appropriate number of topics is 6
with a coherence value of 0.418.
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Figure 3.11: Coherence for LDA models over the number of topics.
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The keywords associated with each topic for n = 6 are given by Table 3.2. Though
n = 6 has the highest coherence score, from Table 3.2 it can be observed that there are
overlapping keywords between the topics. Further manual investigation has revealed
that the separation of topics are the most clear when an n of 5 is considered. The
LDA model for n = 5 has a coherence value 0.406 which is close to 0.418 (the score for
n = 6). Thus, n = 5 is chosen to carry out the LDA.
Topic Topic Keywords
A model, theory, system, base, paper, problem, propose, present, approach, provide, analysis, framework, method, develop, solution
B behavior, social, human, decision, study, experiment, make, suggest, result, behaviour, effect, partner, participant, subject, experimental
C individual, group, good, social, punishment, level, cost, mechanism, dilemma, cooperative, show, base, public, high, society
D game, strategy, player, agent, play, dilemma, state, prisoner, payoff, equilibrium, result, iterate, set, probability, show
E population, evolutionary, dynamic, model, selection, result, evolution, evolve, show, process, size, interaction, cooperator, change, system
F cooperation, network, interaction, structure, study, evolution, find, behavior, cooperative, simulation, rule, spatial, cooperator, promote, result
Table 3.2: Keywords for each topic when n = 6. The highlighted keywords are over-
lapping keywords between topics.
For n = 5 the articles are clustered and assigned to their dominant topic based on the
highest percentage contribution. The keywords associated with a topic, the most rep-
resentative article of the topic (based on the percentage contribution) and its academic
reference are given by Table 3.3. The topics are labelled as A, B, C, D and E, and
more specifically:
• Based on the keywords associated with Topic A, and the most representative
article, Topic A appears to be about human subject research. Several publications
assigned to the topic study the PD by setting experiments and having human
participants simulate the game instead of computer simulations. These articles
include [195] which showed that prosocial behaviour increased with the age of
the participants, [181] which studied the difference in cooperation between high-
functioning autistic and typically developing children, [210] explored the gender
effect in high school students and [46] explored the effect of facial expressions of
individuals.
• Though it is not immediate from the keywords associated with Topic B, investi-
gating the papers assigned to the topic indicate that it is focused on biological
studies. Papers assigned to the topic include papers which apply the PD to ge-
netics [255,264], to the study of tumours [19,256] and viruses [281]. Other works
include how phenotype affinity can affect the emergence of cooperation [295] and
modelling bacterial communities as a spatial structured social dilemma.
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• Based on the keywords and the most representative article Topic C appears to
include publications on PD strategies. Publications in the topic include the in-
troduction of new strategies [272], the search of optimality in strategies [41] and
the training of strategies [144] with different representation methods. Moreover,
publications that study the evolutionary stability of strategies [13] and introduced
methods of differentiating between them [24] are also assigned to C.
• The keywords associated with Topic D clearly show that the topic is focused on
evolutionary dynamics on networks. Publications include [141] which explored
the robustness of cooperation on networks, [287] which studied the effect of a
strategy’s neighbourhood on the emergence of cooperation and [62] which ex-
plored the fixation probabilities of any two strategies in spatial structures.
• The publications assigned to Topic E are on modelling problems as a PD game.
Though Topic B is also concerned with problems being formulated as a PD,
it includes only biological problems. In comparison, the problems in Topic E
include decision making in operational research [227], information sharing among
members in a virtual team [82], the measurement of influence in articles based
on citations [140] and the price spikes in electric power markets [121], and not on
biological studies.
Dominant
Topic
Topic Keywords Most Representative Article Title Reference # Documents % Documents
A social, behavior, human, study,
experiment, cooperative, coopera-
tion, suggest, find, behaviour
Facing Aggression: Cues Differ for
Female versus Male Faces
[93] 496.0 0.2008
B individual, group, good, show,
high, increase, punishment, cost,
result, benefit
Genomic and Gene-Expression
Comparisons among Phage-
Resistant Type-IV Pilus Mutants
of Pseudomonas syringae pathovar
phaseolicola
[264] 309.0 0.1251
C game, strategy, player, agent,
dilemma, play, payoff, state, pris-
oner, equilibrium
Fingerprinting: Visualization and
Automatic Analysis of Prisoner’s
Dilemma Strategies
[264] 561.0 0.2271
D cooperation, network, population,
evolutionary, evolution, interac-
tion, dynamic, structure, cooper-
ator, study
Influence of initial distributions on
robust cooperation in evolutionary
Prisoner’s Dilemma
[61] 556.0 0.2251
E model, theory, base, system, prob-
lem, paper, propose, information,
provide, approach
Gaming and price spikes in electric
power markets and possible reme-
dies
[121] 548.0 0.2219
Table 3.3: Keywords for each topic and the document with the most representative
article for each topic.
Note that whilst for the choice of 5 topics the actual clustering is not subjective (the
algorithm is determining the output) the interpretation above is.
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Thus, the five topics in the PD publications identified by the data set of using an LDA
are:
1. human subject research,
2. biological studies,
3. strategies,
4. evolutionary dynamics on networks,
5. modelling problems as a PD.
These topics nicely summarise the PD research. They highlight the interdisciplinarity
of the field; how it brings together applied modelling of real world situations (Topic B
and E) and more theoretical notions such as evolutionary dynamics and optimality of
strategies.
Figure 3.12 gives the number of articles per topic over time. The topics appear to
have had a similar trend over the years, with topics B and D having a later start.
Following the introduction of a topic its publications have been increasing. There is
no decreasing trend in any of the topics. All topics have been publishing for years and
they still attract the interest of academics. Thus, there does not seem to be any given
topic more or less in fashion.
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Figure 3.12: Number of articles per topic over the years (on a logged scale).
To gain a better understanding regarding the change in the topics over the years, LDA
is applied to the cumulative data set over 8 time periods. These periods are 1951-1965,
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1951-1973, 1951-1980, 1951-1988, 1951-1995, 1951-2003, 1951-2010, 1951-2018. The
number of topics for each cumulative subset is chosen based on the coherence value
and no objective approach is used. As a result, the period 1951-2018 has been assigned
n = 6 which had the highest coherence value instead of 5. The chosen models for each
period including the number of topics, their keywords and number of articles assigned
to them are given by Table 3.4.
But how well do the five topics which were presented earlier fit the publications over
time? This is answered by comparing the performance of three LDA models over the
cumulative periods’ publications. The three models are LDA models for the entire data
set for n equal to 5, 6 and the optimal number of topics over time. For each model the
c∗ is estimated for each document in the cumulative data sets. The performance of the
models are then compared based on:
c¯∗ × n (3.1)
where c¯∗ is the median highest percentage contribution and n is the number of topics
of a given period. A model with more topics will have more difficulty to assign papers.
Thus, Equation (3.1) is a measure of confidence in assigning a given paper to its topic
weighted by the number of topics. The performances are given by Figure 3.13.
The five topics of the PD presented in this manuscript appear to always be less good
at fitting the publications compared to the six topics of LDA n = 6. The difference
in the performance values, Equation (3.1), however are small. The relevance of the
five topics has been increasing over time, and though, the topics did not always fit the
majority of published work over time, there were still papers being published on those
topics.
In the following section the collaborative behaviour of authors in the field, and within
the field’s topics as were presented in this section, are explored using a network theoretic
approach.
3.5 Analysis of co-authorship network
The collaborative behaviour of authors in the field of the PD is assessed using the
co-authorship network, which as introduced in section 3.2 is denoted as G. There are
a total of 947 connected components in G and the largest component has a size of 796
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Period Topic Topic Keywords Num of Documents Percentage of Documents
1951-1965 1 problem, technology, divert, euler, subsystem, requirement, trace, technique, system, untried 3 0.375
1951-1965 2 interpret, requirement, programme, evolution, article, increase, policy, system, trace, technology 2 0.25
1951-1965 3 equipment, agency, conjecture, development, untried, programme, trend, technology, weapon, technique 1 0.125
1951-1965 4 variation, celebrated, trend, untried, change, involve, month, technique, subsystem, research 1 0.125
1951-1965 5 give, good, modern, trace, technique, ambiguity, problem, trend, technology, system 1 0.125
1951-1973 1 study, shock, cooperative, money, part, vary, investigate, good, receive, equipment 12 0.3243
1951-1973 2 cooperation, level, significantly, sequence, reward, provoke, descriptive, principal, display, argue 4 0.1081
1951-1973 3 player, make, effect, triad, experimental, motivation, dominate, hypothesis, instruction, trend 3 0.0811
1951-1973 4 ss, sex, male, female, dyad, design, suggest, college, factor, tend 3 0.0811
1951-1973 5 result, research, format, change, operational, analysis, relate, understanding, decision, money 2 0.0541
1951-1973 6 condition, give, high, treatment, conflict, cc, real, original, replication, promote 2 0.0541
1951-1973 7 group, competitive, show, interpret, scale, compete, escalation, free, variable, individualistic 2 0.0541
1951-1973 8 outcome, strategy, choice, type, pdg, difference, dummy, conclude, compare, consistent 2 0.0541
1951-1973 9 game, difference, pair, approach, behavior, person, weapon, occur, advantaged, differential 2 0.0541
1951-1973 10 response, present, dilemma, influence, cooperate, bias, point, amount, participate, factor 2 0.0541
1951-1973 11 trial, problem, previous, involve, prisoner, experiment, follow, tit, increase, initial 1 0.027
1951-1973 12 matrix, behavior, rational, black, model, research, broad, distance, complex, trace 1 0.027
1951-1973 13 play, finding, individual, noncooperative, white, nature, race, ratio, represent, prisoner 1 0.027
1951-1980 1 play, trial, group, follow, white, interpret, scale, black, trend, small 14 0.25
1951-1980 2 outcome, level, effect, type, dyad, vary, pdg, participate, understanding, arise 9 0.1607
1951-1980 3 game, strategy, cooperation, significant, difference, sentence, text, occur, differential, hypothesis 4 0.0714
1951-1980 4 male, female, find, result, sex, subject, experimental, situation, treatment, computer 4 0.0714
1951-1980 5 research, problem, influence, matrix, format, model, analysis, year, crime, equipment 4 0.0714
1951-1980 6 condition, dilemma, bias, free, attempt, book, year, dummy, prison, design 4 0.0714
1951-1980 7 variable, result, factor, individual, ability, triad, half, migration, change, investigate 3 0.0536
1951-1980 8 show, present, suggest, rational, compete, approach, characteristic, examine, person, conduct 3 0.0536
1951-1980 9 behavior, high, finding, relate, obtain, assistance, ratio, good, weapon, competition 3 0.0536
1951-1980 10 ss, shock, money, competitive, part, difference, pair, amount, man, information 3 0.0536
1951-1980 11 player, conflict, theory, decision, determine, produce, maker, cooperate, specialist, programming 2 0.0357
1951-1980 12 study, prisoner, make, response, experiment, noncooperative, standard, separate, conclude, initial 2 0.0357
1951-1980 13 give, cooperative, choice, cognitive, real, operational, set, subject, ascribe, concern 1 0.0179
1951-1988 1 trial, difference, find, choice, significant, competitive, effect, triad, interact, occur 24 0.2553
1951-1988 2 ss, shock, money, pair, response, part, high, tit, receive, amount 13 0.1383
1951-1988 3 suggest, paper, case, debate, view, achieve, framework, natural, assumption, finitely 10 0.1064
1951-1988 4 prisoner, dilemma, behavior, model, present, involve, person, increase, trust, experiment 8 0.0851
1951-1988 5 game, player, show, approach, repeat, previous, move, tat, related, include 8 0.0851
1951-1988 6 cooperation, level, mutual, equilibrium, standard, provide, information, human, real, question 6 0.0638
1951-1988 7 play, result, male, subject, female, cooperative, sex, experimental, treatment, computer 5 0.0532
1951-1988 8 research, study, variable, ability, factor, conflict, matrix, year, student, interpret 4 0.0426
1951-1988 9 problem, group, small, scale, social, issue, large, base, bias, party 4 0.0426
1951-1988 10 game, strategy, outcome, type, cooperate, ethical, pdg, explain, dependent, separate 4 0.0426
1951-1988 11 give, condition, individual, major, dyad, behaviour, produce, conflict, assistance, collectively 3 0.0319
1951-1988 12 situation, iterate, statement, rational, card, side, paradox, true, consequence, front 2 0.0213
1951-1988 13 inflation, hypothesis, rate, run, change, demand, nominal, cost, output, growth 2 0.0213
1951-1988 14 theory, make, analysis, decision, system, examine, work, soft, lead, hard 1 0.0106
1951-1995 1 strategy, population, evolution, iterate, tit, opponent, evolve, dynamic, set, tat 31 0.1732
1951-1995 2 game, repeat, assumption, rule, person, equilibrium, general, finitely, indefinitely, analyze 24 0.1341
1951-1995 3 inflation, long, rate, hypothesis, run, policy, cost, nominal, demand, programming 20 0.1117
1951-1995 4 condition, outcome, trial, find, difference, cooperation, experiment, level, significant, response 15 0.0838
1951-1995 5 rational, result, receive, statement, money, paradox, shock, iterate, consequence, common 14 0.0782
1951-1995 6 cooperation, show, competitive, high, probability, conflict, simulation, altruism, yield, natural 14 0.0782
1951-1995 7 prisoner, dilemma, give, point, defect, form, cooperator, increase, relate, ethical 10 0.0559
1951-1995 8 player, give, decision, provide, cooperative, game, previous, pair, determine, interact 9 0.0503
1951-1995 9 play, cooperate, result, male, subject, female, time, relationship, suggest, student 8 0.0447
1951-1995 10 problem, group, theory, good, approach, society, large, scale, issue, level 8 0.0447
1951-1995 11 study, situation, behaviour, computer, argue, change, implication, characteristic, real, associate 8 0.0447
1951-1995 12 model, paper, behavior, examine, present, mutual, expectation, develop, type, variable 7 0.0391
1951-1995 13 make, research, system, analysis, choice, work, base, relation, world, wide 6 0.0335
1951-1995 14 individual, social, behavior, standard, choose, evolutionary, partner, payoff, defection, small 5 0.0279
1951-2003 1 game, player, dilemma, prisoner, theory, give, paper, make, group, problem 151 0.4266
1951-2003 2 cooperation, result, play, show, cooperate, condition, cooperative, high, level, time 106 0.2994
1951-2003 3 strategy, model, agent, study, behavior, individual, population, evolutionary, state, player 97 0.274
1951-2010 1 model, theory, paper, base, make, present, problem, provide, human, decision 325 0.3454
1951-2010 2 game, strategy, player, agent, play, dilemma, system, behavior, show, state 322 0.3422
1951-2010 3 cooperation, network, study, population, individual, evolutionary, social, evolution, interaction, structure 294 0.3124
1951-2018 1 model, theory, system, base, paper, problem, propose, present, approach, provide 556 0.2251
1951-2018 2 behavior, social, human, decision, study, experiment, make, suggest, result, behaviour 482 0.1951
1951-2018 3 individual, group, good, social, punishment, level, cost, mechanism, dilemma, cooperative 428 0.1733
1951-2018 4 game, strategy, player, agent, play, dilemma, state, prisoner, payoff, equilibrium 380 0.1538
1951-2018 5 population, evolutionary, dynamic, model, selection, result, evolution, evolve, show, process 351 0.1421
1951-2018 6 cooperation, network, interaction, structure, study, evolution, find, behavior, cooperative, simulation 273 0.1105
Table 3.4: Topic modelling result for the cumulative data set over the periods
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Figure 3.13: Maximum percentage contributions (c∗) over the time periods, for the
LDA models for the entire data set for n equal to 5, 6 and the optimal number of
topics over time. The optimal number of topics are based on the coherence score.
nodes. The largest connected component is going to be referred to as the main cluster
of the network and is denoted as G¯. A graphical representation of both networks is
shown in Figures 3.14-3.15 and a metrics summary is given by Table 3.5.
Based on Table 3.5 an author in G has on average 4 collaborators and a 70% probability
of collaborating with a collaborator’s co-author. An author of G¯ on average is 7% more
likely to write with a collaborator’s co-author and on average has 2 more collaborators.
Moreover, there are only 3.2 % of authors in the PD that has no connection to any
other author.
# Nodes # Edges % Isolated nodes # Connected
components
Size of largest
component
Av. degree # Communities Modularity Clustering coeff
G 4011 7642 3.2 947 796 3.811 967 0.96491 0.701
G¯ 796 2214 0.0 1 796 5.563 25 0.84406 0.773
Table 3.5: Network metrics for G and G¯ respectively.
But how do these compare to other fields? Two more data sets for the topics “price of
anarchy” and “auction Games” have been collected in order to compare the collabora-
tive behaviour of the PD to other game theoretic fields. A total of 3,444 publications
have been collected for auction games and 748 for price of anarchy. Price of anarchy is
a relatively new field, with the first publication on the topic being [167] in 1999. This
explains the small number of articles that have been retrieved. Both data sets have
been archived and are available in [101, 102]. The networks for both data sets have
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Figure 3.14: G the co-authorship network for the IPD.
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Figure 3.15: G¯ the largest connected component of G.
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been generated in the same way as G. A summary of the networks’ metrics are given
by Table 3.6.
# Nodes # Edges # Isolated nodes % Isolated nodes # Connected
components
Size of largest
component
Av. degree # Communities Modularity Clustering coeff
auction games 5165 7861 256 5.0 1272 1348 3.044 1294 0.957 0.622
price of anarchy 1155 1953 4 0.3 245 222 3.382 253 0.965 0.712
Table 3.6: Network metrics for auction games and price of anarchy networks respec-
tively.
The average degrees for the price of anarchy and for auction games are lower than
the PD’s. In auction games an author is more likely to have no collaborators, and in
the price of anarchy there are almost no authors that are not connected to someone.
This could be an effect of the field being introduced in more modern days. Overall,
an author in the PD has on average more collaborators and there are less isolated
authors compared to another well established game theoretic field. These results seem
to indicate that the PD is a relatively collaborative field.
However, both G and G¯ have a high modularity (larger than 0.84) and a large number
of communities (967 and 25 respectively). A high modularity implies that authors
create their own publishing communities but not many publications from authors from
different communities occur. Thus, author tends to collaborate with authors in their
communities but not many efforts are made to create new connections to other commu-
nities and spread the knowledge of the field across academic teams. The fields of both
price of anarchy and auction games also have high modularity, and that could indicate
that is in fact how academic publications are. Thus, the PD is indeed a collaborative
field but perhaps it is not more collaborative than other fields, as there is no effort
from the authors to write with people outside their community.
The evolution of the networks was also explored over time by constructing the network
cumulatively over 51 periods. Except from the first period 1951-1966 the rest of the
periods have a yearly interval (data for the years 1975 and 1982 were not retrieved by
the collection data process). The metrics of each sub network are given by Tables 3.7
and 3.8.
The results, similarly to the results of [183], confirm that the networks grow over
time and that the networks always had a high modularity. Since the first publications
authors tend to write with people from their communities, and that is not an effect of
a specific time period.
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Period # Nodes # Edges % Isolated nodes # Connected components Size of largest
component
Av. degree # Communities Modularity Clustering coeff
1951 - 1966 6 3 0.0 3 2 1.000 3 0.667 0.000
1951 - 1967 8 4 0.0 4 2 1.000 4 0.750 0.000
1951 - 1968 19 15 0.0 8 5 1.579 8 0.684 0.228
1951 - 1969 20 17 0.0 8 6 1.700 8 0.630 0.250
1951 - 1970 22 18 0.0 9 6 1.636 9 0.667 0.227
1951 - 1971 33 28 0.0 13 6 1.697 13 0.827 0.424
1951 - 1972 39 34 0.0 15 6 1.744 15 0.867 0.513
1951 - 1973 42 35 2.4 17 6 1.667 17 0.873 0.476
1951 - 1974 42 35 2.4 17 6 1.667 17 0.873 0.476
1951 - 1976 42 35 2.4 17 6 1.667 17 0.873 0.476
1951 - 1977 44 36 2.3 18 6 1.636 18 0.880 0.455
1951 - 1978 44 36 2.3 18 6 1.636 18 0.880 0.455
1951 - 1979 47 40 2.1 18 6 1.702 18 0.884 0.454
1951 - 1980 47 40 2.1 18 6 1.702 18 0.884 0.454
1951 - 1981 50 46 2.0 18 6 1.840 18 0.889 0.497
1951 - 1983 51 46 3.9 19 6 1.804 19 0.889 0.487
1951 - 1984 53 47 3.8 20 6 1.774 20 0.894 0.469
1951 - 1985 53 47 3.8 20 6 1.774 20 0.894 0.469
1951 - 1986 53 47 3.8 20 6 1.774 20 0.894 0.469
1951 - 1987 56 48 5.4 22 6 1.714 22 0.898 0.443
1951 - 1988 62 52 6.5 25 6 1.677 25 0.909 0.449
1951 - 1989 75 62 6.7 31 6 1.653 31 0.926 0.424
1951 - 1990 79 64 6.3 33 6 1.620 33 0.930 0.403
1951 - 1991 87 69 6.9 37 6 1.586 37 0.937 0.400
1951 - 1992 95 72 10.5 42 6 1.516 42 0.941 0.367
1951 - 1993 106 81 11.3 47 6 1.528 47 0.947 0.366
1951 - 1994 124 95 12.9 56 6 1.532 56 0.955 0.394
1951 - 1995 135 102 12.6 61 6 1.511 61 0.960 0.384
1951 - 1996 142 105 12.7 65 6 1.479 65 0.962 0.365
1951 - 1997 155 115 12.9 71 6 1.484 71 0.966 0.392
1951 - 1998 191 140 11.0 87 6 1.466 87 0.973 0.367
1951 - 1999 221 169 11.3 99 6 1.529 99 0.977 0.397
1951 - 2000 250 195 10.8 110 6 1.560 110 0.979 0.418
1951 - 2001 287 235 10.5 125 7 1.638 125 0.977 0.419
1951 - 2002 335 278 10.7 146 7 1.660 146 0.979 0.428
1951 - 2003 381 310 10.5 168 7 1.627 168 0.982 0.413
1951 - 2004 437 370 9.2 185 10 1.693 185 0.983 0.424
1951 - 2005 532 476 7.7 214 19 1.789 214 0.985 0.458
1951 - 2006 640 603 6.7 246 22 1.884 246 0.987 0.486
1951 - 2007 793 877 5.8 283 25 2.212 283 0.985 0.532
1951 - 2008 948 1170 5.3 318 33 2.468 319 0.985 0.558
1951 - 2009 1108 1442 4.9 356 71 2.603 358 0.982 0.573
1951 - 2010 1300 1936 5.1 402 133 2.978 405 0.965 0.592
1951 - 2011 1560 2375 5.1 472 157 3.045 475 0.970 0.613
1951 - 2012 1837 2865 4.4 534 209 3.119 537 0.969 0.634
1951 - 2013 2149 3420 4.3 603 322 3.183 609 0.965 0.644
1951 - 2014 2481 3971 4.2 683 399 3.201 694 0.962 0.658
1951 - 2015 2938 4877 3.7 765 504 3.320 779 0.965 0.675
1951 - 2016 3469 6532 3.3 850 613 3.766 863 0.964 0.696
1951 - 2017 3735 7072 3.2 895 706 3.787 912 0.964 0.700
1951 - 2018 4011 7642 3.2 947 796 3.811 967 0.966 0.701
Table 3.7: Collaborativeness metrics for cumulative graphs, G˜ ⊆ G
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Period # Nodes # Edges % Isolated nodes Size of largest component Av. degree # Communities Modularity Clustering coeff
1951 - 1966 2 1 0.0 2 1.000 1 0.000 0.000
1951 - 1967 2 1 0.0 2 1.000 1 0.000 0.000
1951 - 1968 5 8 0.0 5 3.200 1 0.000 0.867
1951 - 2002 7 21 0.0 7 6.000 1 0.000 1.000
1951 - 2003 7 21 0.0 7 6.000 1 0.000 1.000
1951 - 2004 10 13 0.0 10 2.600 2 0.376 0.553
1951 - 2005 19 28 0.0 19 2.947 3 0.544 0.730
1951 - 2006 22 35 0.0 22 3.182 4 0.527 0.720
1951 - 2007 25 39 0.0 25 3.120 5 0.558 0.686
1951 - 2008 33 62 0.0 33 3.758 4 0.623 0.736
1951 - 2009 71 148 0.0 71 4.169 6 0.697 0.698
1951 - 2010 133 387 0.0 133 5.820 7 0.726 0.749
1951 - 2011 157 465 0.0 157 5.924 8 0.727 0.725
1951 - 2012 209 611 0.0 209 5.847 11 0.733 0.737
1951 - 2013 322 892 0.0 322 5.540 12 0.780 0.743
1951 - 2014 399 1109 0.0 399 5.559 15 0.794 0.742
1951 - 2015 504 1368 0.0 504 5.429 24 0.811 0.751
1951 - 2016 613 1677 0.0 613 5.471 21 0.819 0.761
1951 - 2017 706 1935 0.0 706 5.482 29 0.830 0.772
1951 - 2018 796 2214 0.0 796 5.563 25 0.845 0.773
Table 3.8: Collaborativeness metrics for cumulative graphs’ main clusters, G˜ ⊆ G¯
The networks corresponding to the topics of section 3.3 have also been generated simi-
larly to G. Note that authors with publications in more than one topic exist, and these
authors are included in all the corresponding networks. A metrics’ summary for all five
topic networks is given by Table 3.9.
# Nodes # Edges # Isolated nodes % Isolated nodes # Connected
components
Size of largest
component
Av. degree # Communities Modularity Clustering coeff
Topic A 1124 2137 15 1.3 264 56 3.802 265 0.983 0.759
Topic B 695 1382 13 1.9 157 80 3.977 158 0.950 0.773
Topic C 900 1141 41 4.6 281 29 2.536 281 0.981 0.636
Topic D 880 1509 17 1.9 174 312 3.430 183 0.918 0.701
Topic E 1045 1964 59 5.6 354 31 3.759 354 0.926 0.664
Table 3.9: Network metrics for topic networks.
Topic B is the network with the highest average degree followed by Topic A. The
topic with the smallest average degree, 2.5, is Topic C. In topics A and B the number
of isolated nodes is very small < (0.2) compared to Topic E where the percentage
of isolated nodes is approximately 6%. Moreover, in topics C and E an author is
10% more likely to collaborate with a collaborator’s co-author. Thus, topics “human
subject research” and “biological studies” tend to be more collaborative than the topic
of “strategies”, and an authors in these are less likely to have at least one collaborator
compared to the topic of “modelling problems as a PD”.
“Evolutionary dynamics on networks” also appear to be a collaborative topic. In fact
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the network of the topic is a sub graph of G¯, the main cluster of G and it will be
demonstrated in the following section that authors in this network are more like to
gain from the influence of the network compared to any other topic network.
The two centrality measures reported in this thesis are closeness and betweenness
centrality. Closeness centrality is a measure of how easy it is for an author to contact
others, and consequently affect them; influence them. Thus closeness centrality is a
measure of influence. Betweenness centrality is a measure of how many paths pass
through a specific node, thus the amount of information this person has access to.
Betweenness centrality is interpreted as a measure of how much an author gains from
the field. The values of the centralities can range between 0 and 1. Influence and
the amount of information an author has access to are proxies to understand if/which
authors benefit more from their position.
For G and G¯ the most central authors based on closeness and betweenness centralities
are given by Table 3.10. The most central authors in G and G¯ are the same. This
implies that the results on centrality heavily rely on the main cluster (as expected).
Matjaz Perc is an author with 83 publications in the data set and the most central
authors based on both centrality measures. The most central authors are fairly similar
between the two measures. The author that appear to be central based on one measure
and not the other are Martin Nowak, Franz Weissing, Jianye Hao, Angel Sanchez and
Valerio Capraro which have access to information due to their positioning but do not
influence the network as much, and the opposite is true for Attila Szolnoki, Luo-Luo
Jiang Sandro Meloni, Cheng-Yi Xia and Xiaojie Chen.
G G¯
Name Betweenness Name Closeness Name Betweenness Name Closeness
1 Matjaz Perc 0.015 Matjaz Perc 0.066 Matjaz Perc 0.373 Matjaz Perc 0.330
2 Zhen Wang 0.011 Long Wang 0.060 Zhen Wang 0.279 Long Wang 0.301
3 Long Wang 0.007 Yamir Moreno 0.059 Long Wang 0.170 Yamir Moreno 0.299
4 Martin Nowak 0.006 Attila Szolnoki 0.059 Martin Nowak 0.159 Attila Szolnoki 0.297
5 Angel Sanchez 0.004 Zhen Wang 0.059 Angel Sanchez 0.114 Zhen Wang 0.296
6 Yamir Moreno 0.004 Arne Traulsen 0.056 Yamir Moreno 0.110 Arne Traulsen 0.281
7 Arne Traulsen 0.004 Luo-Luo Jiang 0.055 Arne Traulsen 0.107 Luo-Luo Jiang 0.280
8 Franz Weissing 0.004 Sandro Meloni 0.055 Franz Weissing 0.101 Sandro Meloni 0.278
9 Jianye Hao 0.004 Cheng-Yi Xia 0.055 Jianye Hao 0.094 Cheng-Yi Xia 0.276
10 Valerio Capraro 0.004 Xiaojie Chen 0.055 Valerio Capraro 0.093 Xiaojie Chen 0.276
Table 3.10: The 10 most central authors based on betweenness and closeness centralities
for G and G¯.
It is obvious that in G the centrality values are low which suggests that in the PD
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authors do not benefit from their positions. This could be an effect of information not
flowing from one community to another as authors tend to write with people from their
communities. Nevertheless, there are authors that do benefit from their position, but
these are only the authors connected to the main cluster.
The centrality measures for the topic networks have also been estimated and are given
in Tables 3.11-3.12. If information was flowing between the communities of the research
topics then there would be an increase to the values of centralities for the sub networks.
However, the only topic where authors gain from their positions are the authors of Topic
D (topic on evolutionary dynamics on network). From the list of names it is obvious
that these authors are part of G¯, and that the network of Topic D is a sub network
of G¯. This confirms the results. The people benefiting from their position in the co-
authorship networks corresponding to research topics of the PD are only the people
from the main cluster of G.
Topic A Topic B Topic C Topic D Topic E
Name Betweeness Name Betweeness Name Betweeness Name Betweeness Name Betweeness
1 David Rand 0.002 Long Wang 0.006 Daniel Ashlock 0.001 Matjaz Perc 0.064 Zengru Di 0.0
2 Valerio Capraro 0.001 Luo-Luo Jiang 0.005 Matjaz Perc 0.000 Luo-Luo Jiang 0.037 Jian Yang 0.0
3 Angel Sanchez 0.001 Martin Nowak 0.004 Karl Tuyls 0.000 Yamir Moreno 0.031 Yevgeniy Vorobeychik 0.0
4 Feng Fu 0.001 Matjaz Perc 0.003 Philip Hingston 0.000 Christoph Hauert 0.027 Otavio Teixeira 0.0
5 Martin Nowak 0.000 Attila Szolnoki 0.003 Eun-Youn Kim 0.000 Long Wang 0.024 Roberto Oliveira 0.0
6 Nicholas Christakis 0.000 Christian Hilbe 0.002 Wendy Ashlock 0.000 Zhen Wang 0.024 M. Nowak 0.0
7 Pablo Branas-Garza 0.000 Yamir Moreno 0.002 Attila Szolnoki 0.000 Han-Xin Yang 0.023 M. Harper 0.0
8 Toshio Yamagishi 0.000 Xiaojie Chen 0.002 Seung Baek 0.000 Martin Nowak 0.020 Xiao Han 0.0
9 James Fowler 0.000 Arne Traulsen 0.002 Martin Nowak 0.000 Angel Sanchez 0.017 Zhesi Shen 0.0
10 Long Wang 0.000 Zhen Wang 0.002 Thore Graepel 0.000 Zhihai Rong 0.016 Wen-Xu Wang 0.0
Table 3.11: The 10 most central authors based on betweenness centrality for topics’
networks.
Topic A Topic B Topic C Topic D Topic E
Name Closeness Name Closeness Name Closeness Name Closeness Name Closeness
1 David Rand 0.027 Long Wang 0.043 Karl Tuyls 0.022 Matjaz Perc 0.123 Stefanie Widder 0.029
2 Valerio Capraro 0.023 Matjaz Perc 0.041 Thore Graepel 0.019 Zhen Wang 0.109 Rosalind Allen 0.029
3 Jillian Jordan 0.022 Attila Szolnoki 0.040 Joel Leibo 0.018 Long Wang 0.107 Thomas Pfeiffer 0.029
4 Nicholas Christakis 0.021 Martin Nowak 0.040 Edward Hughes 0.017 Yamir Moreno 0.105 Thomas Curtis 0.029
5 James Fowler 0.020 Olivier Tenaillon 0.038 Matthew Phillips 0.017 Luo-Luo Jiang 0.104 Carsten Wiuf 0.029
6 Martin Nowak 0.020 Xiaojie Chen 0.038 Edgar Duenez-Guzman 0.017 Attila Szolnoki 0.103 William Sloan 0.029
7 Angel Sanchez 0.019 Bin Wu 0.038 Antonio Castaneda 0.017 Gyorgy Szabo 0.102 Otto Cordero 0.029
8 Gordon Kraft-Todd 0.019 Yanling Zhang 0.037 Iain Dunning 0.017 Xiaojie Chen 0.102 Sam Brown 0.029
9 Akihiro Nishi 0.019 Feng Fu 0.037 Tina Zhu 0.017 Guangming Xie 0.101 Babak Momeni 0.029
10 Anthony Evans 0.019 David Rand 0.037 Kevin Mckee 0.017 Lucas Wardil 0.101 Wenying Shou 0.029
Table 3.12: The 10 most central authors based on closeness centrality for topics’ net-
works.
The fact that most authors of the main cluster are primarily publishing in evolutionary
dynamics on networks indicates that publishing in this specific topic differs from the
other topics covered in this manuscript. There appears to be more collaboration and
influence in the publications on evolutionary dynamics and authors are more likely to
CHAPTER 3. A BIBLIOMETRIC STUDY OF RESEARCH TOPICS,
COLLABORATION AND INFLUENCE IN THE FIELD OF THE ITERATED
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 62
gain from their position, though it is not clear as to why.
The distributions of both centrality measures for all the networks are given in the
Appendix A.2.
3.6 Chapter summary
This Chapter explored the research topics from a collection of 2,422 publications of
the IPD, and moreover, the authors’ collaborative behaviour and their influence in the
research field. This was achieved by applying network theoretic approaches and a LDA
algorithm to the collection of publications. Both the software [110] and the main data
set [103] associated with the Chapter have been archived and are available to be used
by other researchers. In fact Arcas has been used by [189] and [277].
Arcas, its development and the data collection were covered in section 3.2, as well
as an introduction to the co-authorship network and to LDA. Section 3.3 covered an
initial analysis of the data set which demonstrated that the PD is a field that continues
to attract academic attention and publications. In section 3.4 LDA was applied to
the data set to identify topics on which researchers have been publishing. The LDA
analysis showed that the articles could be classified into 5 topics associated with human
subject research, biological studies, strategies, evolutionary dynamics on networks and
modelling problems as a PD. These topics summarise the field of the PD well, as
they demonstrate its interdisciplinarity and applications to a variety of problems. A
temporal analysis explored how relevant these topics have been over the course of
time, and it revealed that even though there were not the necessarily always the most
discussed topics they were still being explored by researchers.
The collaborative behaviour of the field was explored in section 3.5 by constructing the
co-authorship network. It was concluded that the field is a collaborative field, where
authors are likely to write with a collaborator’s co-authors and on average an author
has 4 co-authors, however, it not necessarily more collaborative than other fields. The
authors tend to collaborate with authors from one community, but not many authors
are involved in multiple communities. This however might be an effect of academic
research, and it might not be true just for the field of the PD. Exploring the influence
of authors and their gain from being in the network of the field demonstrated that
authors do not gain much, and the authors with influence are only the ones connected
to the main cluster, to a “main” group of authors. This ‘main” group of authors
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consists of authors publishing in evolutionary dynamics on networks. Thus, an author
would be aiming to publish on this topic if they were interested in gaining from their
position in the publications of the PD.
The study of the PD is the study of cooperation and investigating the cooperative
behaviours of authors is what this Chapter has aimed to achieve. The following Chap-
ters focus on best responses in changing environments of the PD, and more specifically
Chapter 4 studies best responses from a collection of strategies in a large number of
IPD tournaments.
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Chapter 4
A meta analysis of tournaments
and an evaluation of performance
in the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
The research reported in this Chapter has led to a manuscript, entitled:
“Properties of winning Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies”
Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.05911
Associated data sets: [100,105]
Associated codebase: [99]
Axelrod-Python library (APL) version: 3.0.0
The manuscript’s abstract is the following:
Researchers have explored the performance of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies
for decades: from the celebrated performance of Tit For Tat, to the introduction of
the zero-determinant strategies, to the use of sophisticated learning structures such as
neural networks, many new strategies have been introduced and tested in a variety of
tournaments and population dynamics. Typical results in the literature, however, rely
on performance against a small number of somewhat arbitrarily selected strategies in a
small number of tournaments, casting doubt on the generalisability of conclusions. We
analyse a large collection of 195 strategies in 45,600 tournaments, present the top per-
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forming strategies across multiple tournament types, and distill their salient features.
The results show that there is not yet a single strategy that performs well in diverse
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios, nevertheless there are several properties that
heavily influence the best performing strategies. This refines the properties described
by R. Axelrod in light of recent and more diverse opponent populations to: be nice, be
provocable and generous, be a little envious, be clever, and adapt to the environment.
More precisely, we find that strategies perform best when their probability of cooper-
ation matches the total tournament population’s aggregate cooperation probabilities,
or a proportion thereof in the case of noisy and probabilistically ending tournaments,
and that the manner in which a strategy achieves the ideal cooperation rate is crucial.
The features of high performing strategies help cast some light on why strategies such
as Tit For Tat performed historically well in tournaments and why zero-determinant
strategies typically do not fare well in tournament settings.
The differences between the Chapter and the manuscript include the introduction to
the PD and the discussion of previous literature. Both the introduction to the PD and
the discussion of previous tournaments and strategies are excluded from the Chapter.
That is because the introduction to the PD was presented in Chapter 1 and the previous
literature was discussed in Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 4. A META ANALYSIS OF TOURNAMENTS AND AN
EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE IN THE ITERATED PRISONER’S
DILEMMA. 67
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was discussed that conceptualising strategies and understanding the
best way of playing the game has been of interest to the scientific community since the
formulation of the game. In Chapter 2 it was established that following the computer
tournaments of Axelrod in the 1980’s a strategy’s performance in a round robin com-
puter tournament became a common evaluation technique for newly designed strate-
gies. A large collection of works were discussed in Chapter 2 which introduced a broad
collection of strategies, and new strategies and competitions are published frequently
as established in Chapter 3. The question, however, still remains the same: what is
the best way to play the game?
Compared to the works reviewed in Chapter 2, where typically a few selected or intro-
duced strategies are evaluated on a small number of tournaments and/or small number
of opponents, this Chapter evaluates the performance of 195 strategies in 45,600 com-
puter tournaments. Furthermore, a large portion of these strategies are drawn from the
known and named strategies in IPD literature, including many previous tournament
winners, in contrast to other work that may have randomly generated many essentially
arbitrary strategies (typically restrained to a class such as memory-one strategies, or
those of a certain structural form such as finite state machines or deterministic memory
two strategies). Additionally, the analysis of this Chapter considers tournament vari-
ations including standard tournaments, tournaments with noise, probabilistic match
length, and both noise and probabilistic match length. This diversity of strategies and
tournament types yields new insights and tests earlier claims in alternative settings
against known powerful strategies.
The later part of the Chapter evaluates the impact of features on the performance of
the strategies using modern machine learning and statistical techniques. These features
include measures regarding a strategy’s behaviour as well as measures regarding the
tournaments. The outcomes reinforce the discussion started by Axelrod on properties
of successful strategies (presented in section 2.3), and conclude that the properties
are:
• Be a little bit envious
• Be “nice” in non-noisy environments or when game lengths are longer
• Reciprocate both cooperation and defection appropriately; Be provocable in tour-
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naments with short matches, and generous when matches are longer
• It is okay to be clever
• Adapt to the environment; Adjust to the mean population cooperation rate
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows:
• section 4.2 covers the different tournament types and the data collection which
are made possible due to APL.
• section 4.3 focuses on the best performing strategies for each type of tournament
and overall.
• section 4.4 explores the traits which contribute to a good performance.
4.2 Data collection
The data set generated for this Chapter was created with APL version 3.0.0. APL
allows for different types of IPD computer tournaments to be simulated and contains
a large list of strategies. Most of these are strategies described in the literature with
a few exceptions of strategies that have been contributed specifically to the package.
A total of 195 strategies are used in this Chapter, a list of these is given in the Ap-
pendix B.1.
Although APL features several tournament types, only standard, noisy, probabilistic
ending, and noisy probabilistic ending tournaments are considered here. Standard
tournaments are tournaments similar to that of Axelrod’s tournaments [33]. There
are N strategies which all play an iterated game of n number of turns against each
other. Note that self-interactions are not included. Similarly, noisy tournaments have
N strategies and n number of turns, but at each turn there is a probability pn that
a player’s action will be flipped. Probabilistic ending tournaments, are of size N and
after each turn a match between strategies ends with a given probability pe. Finally,
noisy probabilistic ending tournaments have both a noise probability pn and an ending
probability pe. For smoothing the simulated results a tournament is repeated for k
number of times. This was allowed to vary in order to evaluate the effect of smoothing.
The winner of each tournament is based on the median score a strategy achieved and
not by the number of wins.
The process of collecting tournament results is described by Algorithm 4.1.
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Algorithm 4.1: Tournaments’ result summary collections algorithm
foreach seed ∈ [0, 11, 400] do
N ← randomly select integer ∈ [Nmin, Nmax];
players← randomly select N players;
k ← randomly select integer ∈ [kmin, kmax];
n← randomly select integer ∈ [nmin, nmax];
pn ← randomly select float ∈ [pnmin, pnmax];
pe ← randomly select float ∈ [pemin, pemax];
result standard ← Axelrod.tournament(players, n, k);
result noisy ← Axelrod.tournament(players, n, pn, k);
result probabilistic ending ← Axelrod.tournament(players, pe, k);
result noisy probabilistic ending ← Axelrod.tournament(players, pn, pe, k);
return result standard, result noisy, result probabilistic ending, result noisy
probabilistic ending ;
For each trial a random sizeN is selected, and from the 195 strategies a random list ofN
strategies is chosen. For the given list of strategies a standard, a noisy, a probabilistic
ending and a noisy probabilistic ending tournament are performed and repeated k
times. The parameters for the tournaments, as well as the number of repetitions,
are selected once for each trial. The parameters and their respective minimum and
maximum values are given by Table 4.1.
parameter parameter explanation min value max value
N number of strategies 3 195
k number of repetitions 10 100
n number of turns 1 200
pn probability of flipping action at each turn 0 1
pe probability of match ending in the next turn 0 1
Table 4.1: Data collection; parameter values.
A total of 11,400 trials of Algorithm 4.1 have been run. For each trial the results for
4 different tournaments were collected, thus a total of 45,600 (11, 400× 4) tournament
results have been retrieved. Each tournament outputs a result summary in the form
of Table 4.2. These have been archived and are available at [100, 105]. Each strategy
has participated on average in 5,154 tournaments of each type. The strategy with
the maximum participation in each tournament type is Inverse Punisher with 5,639
entries. The strategy with the minimum entries is EvolvedLookerUp 1 1 1 which was
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selected in 4,693 trials.
A result summary (Table 4.2) has N rows because each row contains information for
each strategy that participated in the tournament. The information includes the strat-
egy’s rank, median score, the rate with which the strategy cooperated (Cr), its match
win count, and the probability that the strategy cooperated in the opening move. More-
over, the probabilities of a strategy being in any of the four states (CC,CD,DC,DD),
and the rate of which the strategy cooperated after each state. The normalised rank is
a feature that has been manually added to the result summary. The rank R of a given
strategy can vary between 0 (first) and N − 1 (last), and thus the normalised rank,
denoted as r, is calculated as a strategy’s rank divided by N − 1.
Rates
Rank Name Median score Cooperation rating (Cr) Win Initial C CC CD DC DD CC to C CD to C DC to C DD to C
0 EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 2.97 0.705 28.0 1.0 0.639 0.066 0.189 0.106 0.836 0.481 0.568 0.8
1 Evolved FSMSix 16 Noise 05 2.875 0.697 21.0 1.0 0.676 0.020 0.135 0.168 0.985 0.571 0.392 0.07
2 PSO Gambler 1 1 1 2.874 0.684 23.0 1.0 0.651 0.034 0.152 0.164 1.000 0.283 0.000 0.136
3 PSO Gambler Mem1 2.861 0.706 23.0 1.0 0.663 0.042 0.145 0.150 1.000 0.510 0.000 0.122
4 Winner12 2.835 0.682 20.0 1.0 0.651 0.031 0.141 0.177 1.000 0.441 0.000 0.462
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 4.2: Output result of a single tournament.
4.3 Top ranked strategies
The performance of each strategy is evaluated in four tournament types, as presented in
section 4.2, followed by an evaluation of their performance over all the 45,600 simulated
tournaments. Each strategy participated in multiple tournaments of the same type (on
average 5,154). For example Tit For Tat participated in a total of 5,114 tournaments of
each type. The strategy’s normalised rank distribution in these is given in Figure 4.1.
A value of r = 0 corresponds to a strategy winning the tournament where a value
of r = 1 corresponds to the strategy coming last. Because of the strategies’ multiple
entries their performance is evaluated based on the median normalised rank denoted
as r¯.
The top 15 strategies for each tournament type based on r¯ are given in Table 4.3. The
data collection process was designed such that the probabilities of noise and ending of
the match varied between 0 and 1. However, commonly used values for these probabili-
ties are values less than 0.1. Thus, Table 4.3 also includes the top 15 strategies in noisy
tournaments with pn < 0.1 and probabilistic ending tournaments with pe < 0.1. The r
distributions for the top ranked strategies of Table 4.3 are given by Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Tit For Tat’s r distribution in tournaments. Lower values of r correspond
to better performances. The best performance of the strategy has been in standard
tournaments where it achieved a r¯ of 0.34.
Standard Noisy Noisy (pn < 0.1) Probabilistic ending Probabilistic ending (pe < 0.1) Noisy probabilistic ending
Name r¯ Name r¯ Name r¯ Name r¯ Name r¯ Name r¯
0 Evolved HMM 5 0.007 Grumpy 0.140 DBS 0.000 Fortress4 0.013 Evolved FSM 16 0.000 Alternator 0.304
1 Evolved FSM 16 0.010 e 0.194 Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 0.008 Defector 0.014 Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 0.013 φ 0.310
2 EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 0.011 Tit For 2 Tats 0.206 Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05 0.013 Better and Better 0.016 MEM2 0.027 e 0.312
3 Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 0.017 Slow Tit For Two Tats 0.210 BackStabber 0.024 Tricky Defector 0.019 Evolved HMM 5 0.044 pi 0.317
4 PSO Gambler 2 2 2 0.021 Cycle Hunter 0.215 DoubleCrosser 0.025 Fortress3 0.022 EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 0.049 Limited Retaliate 0.353
5 Evolved ANN 0.029 Risky QLearner 0.222 Evolved ANN 5 0.028 Gradual Killer 0.025 Spiteful Tit For Tat 0.060 Anti Tit For Tat 0.354
6 Evolved ANN 5 0.034 Retaliate 3 0.229 Evolved ANN 0.038 Aggravater 0.028 Nice Meta Winner 0.068 Limited Retaliate 3 0.356
7 PSO Gambler 1 1 1 0.037 Cycler CCCCCD 0.235 Spiteful Tit For Tat 0.051 Raider 0.031 NMWE Finite Memory 0.069 Retaliate 3 0.356
8 Evolved FSM 4 0.049 Retaliate 2 0.239 Evolved HMM 5 0.051 Cycler DDC 0.045 NMWE Deterministic 0.070 Retaliate 0.357
9 PSO Gambler Mem1 0.050 Defector Hunter 0.240 Level Punisher 0.052 Hard Prober 0.051 Grudger 0.070 Retaliate 2 0.358
10 Winner12 0.060 Retaliate 0.242 Omega TFT 0.059 SolutionB1 0.060 NMWE Long Memory 0.074 Limited Retaliate 2 0.361
11 Fool Me Once 0.061 Hard Tit For 2 Tats 0.250 Fool Me Once 0.059 Meta Minority 0.061 Nice Meta Winner Ensemble 0.076 Hopeless 0.368
12 DBS 0.071 Limited Retaliate 3 0.253 PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise 05 0.067 Bully 0.061 EvolvedLookerUp1 1 1 0.077 Arrogant QLearner 0.407
13 DoubleCrosser 0.072 ShortMem 0.253 Evolved FSM 16 0.078 EasyGo 0.071 NMWE Memory One 0.080 Cautious QLearner 0.409
14 BackStabber 0.075 Limited Retaliate 0.257 EugineNier 0.080 Fool Me Forever 0.071 Winner12 0.085 Fool Me Forever 0.418
Table 4.3: Top performances for each tournament type based on r¯. The results of each
type are based on 11,420 unique tournaments. The results for noisy tournaments with
pn < 0.1 are based on 1,151 tournaments, and for probabilistic ending tournaments
with pe < 0.1 on 1,139. The top ranks indicate that trained strategies perform well in
a variety of environments, but so do simple deterministic strategies. The normalised
medians are close to 0 for most environments, except environments with noise not
restricted to 0.1 regardless of the number of turns. Noisy and noisy probabilistic
ending tournaments have the highest medians.
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Figure 4.2: r distributions of the top 15 strategies in different environments. A lower
value of r¯ corresponds to a more successful performance. A strategy’s r distribution
skewed towards zero indicates that the strategy ranked highly in most tournaments it
participated in. Most distributions are skewed towards zero except the distributions
with unrestricted noise, supporting the conclusions from Table 4.3.
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In standard tournaments 10 out of the 15 top strategies were introduced in [125]. These
are strategies based on finite state automata (FSM), hidden Markov models (HMM), ar-
tificial neural networks (ANN), lookup tables (LookerUp) and stochastic lookup tables
(Gambler) that have been trained using reinforcement learning algorithms (evolution-
ary and particle swarm algorithms). They have been trained to perform well against a
subset of the strategies in APL in a standard tournament, thus their performance in the
specific setting was anticipated although still noteworthy given the random sampling
of tournament participants. DoubleCrosser, BackStabber and Fool Me Once, are
strategies not from the literature but from APL. DoubleCrosser is an extension of
BackStabber and both strategies make use of the number of turns because they are
set to defect on the last two rounds. It should be noted that these strategies can be
characterised as “cheaters” because the source code of the strategies allows them to
know the number of turns in a match (unless the match has a probabilistic ending).
These strategies were expected to not perform as well in tournaments where the num-
ber of turns is not specified. Finally, Winner 12 [193] and DBS [32] are both from
the literature. DBS is a strategy specifically designed for noisy environments, however,
it ranks highly in standard tournaments as well. Similarly the fourth ranked player,
Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05, was trained for noisy tournaments yet performs well in
standard tournaments. Figure 4.2a shows that these strategies typically perform well
in any standard tournament in which they participate.
In the case of noisy tournaments with smaller noise pn < 0.1 the top performing
strategies include strategies specifically designed for noisy tournaments. These are
DBS, Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05, Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05, PSO Gambler 2 2
2 Noise 05 and Omega Tit For Tat [159]. Omega Tit For Tat, another strategy
designed to break the deadlocking cycles of CD and DC that Tit For Tat can fall
into in noisy environments, places 10th. The rest of the top ranks are occupied by
strategies which performed well in standard tournaments and deterministic strategies
such as Spiteful Tit For Tat [4], Level Punisher [8], Eugine Nier [233].
In contrast, the performance of the top ranked strategies in noisy environments when
pn ∈ [0, 1] is bimodal. The top strategies include strategies which decide their actions
based on the cooperation to defection ratio, such as ShortMem [57], Grumpy [7]
and e [7], and the Retaliate strategies which are designed to defect if the opponent
has tricked them more often than a given percentage of the times that they have
done the same. The bimodality of the r distributions is explained by Figure 4.3 which
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demonstrates that the top 6 strategies were highly ranked due to the their performance
in tournaments with pn > 0.5, and that in tournaments with pn < 0.5 they performed
poorly. At a noisy level of 0.5 or greater, mostly cooperative strategies become mostly
defectors and vice versa.
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Figure 4.3: Normalised rank r distributions for top 6 strategies in noisy tournaments
over the probability of noisy (pn).
The most effective strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments with pe < 0.1 are a
series of ensemble Meta strategies, trained strategies which performed well in standard
tournaments, and Grudger [7] and Spiteful Tit For Tat [4]. The Meta strategies [7]
utilise a team of strategies and aggregate the potential actions of the team members into
a single action in various ways. Figure 4.2d indicates that these strategies performed
well in any probabilistic ending tournament.
In probabilistic ending tournaments with pe ∈ [0, 1] the top ranks are mostly occupied
by defecting strategies such as Better and Better, Gradual Killer, Hard Prober (all
from [7]), Bully (Reverse Tit For Tat) [212] and Defector, and a series of strategies
based on finite state automata introduced by Daniel Ashlock and Wendy Ashlock:
Fortress3, Fortress4 (both introduced in [28]), Raider [30] and Solution B1 [30].
The success of defecting strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments is due to larger
values of pe which lead to shorter matches (the expected number of rounds is 1/pe), so
the impact of the PD being iterated is subdued. As stated by the Folk Theorem [89],
defecting strategies do better when the likelihood of the game ending in the next turn
increases. This is demonstrated by Figure 4.4, which gives the distributions of r for
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the top 6 strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments over pe.
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Figure 4.4: Normalised rank r distributions for top 6 strategies in probabilistic ending
tournaments over pe. The 6 strategies start of with a high median rank, however, their
ranked decreased as the the probability of the game ending increased and at the point
of pe = 0.1.
The top performances in tournaments with both noise and a probabilistic ending and
the top performances over the entire data set have the largest median values compared
to the top rank strategies of the other tournament types, Figure 4.2f and Figure 4.5.
The r¯ for the top strategy is approximately at 0.3, indicating that the most successful
strategy can on average just place in the top 30% of the competition.
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Figure 4.5: r distributions for best performed strategies in the data set [100]. A lower
value of r¯ corresponds to a more successful performance.
On the whole, the analysis of this section has shown that:
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Name r¯
Limited Retaliate 3 0.286
Retaliate 3 0.297
Retaliate 2 0.302
Limited Retaliate 2 0.304
Limited Retaliate 0.311
Retaliate 0.317
BackStabber 0.324
DoubleCrosser 0.331
Nice Meta Winner 0.350
PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise 05 0.351
Grudger 0.352
NMWE Memory One 0.357
Evolved HMM 5 0.358
Nice Meta Winner Ensemble 0.359
Forgetful Fool Me Once 0.359
Table 4.4: Top performances over all the tournaments. The top ranks include strategies
that have been previously mentioned. The set of Retaliate strategies occupy the
top spots followed by BackStabber and DoubleCrosser. The distributions of the
Retaliate strategies have no statistical difference. PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise 05 and
Evolved HMM 5 are trained strategies introduced in [125] and Nice Meta Winner
and NMWE Memory One are strategies based on teams. Grudger is a strategy
from Axelrod’s original tournament and Forgetful Fool Me Once is based on the same
approach as Grudger.
• In standard tournaments the dominating strategies were strategies that had been
trained using reinforcement learning techniques.
• In noisy environments where the noise probability strictly less than 0.1 was con-
sidered, the successful strategies were strategies specifically designed or trained
for noisy environments.
• In probabilistic ending tournaments most of the highly ranked strategies were
defecting strategies and trained finite state automata, all by the authors of [28,30].
These strategies ranked high due to their performance in tournaments where the
probability of the game ending after each turn was bigger than 0.1.
• In probabilistic tournaments with pe less than 0.1 the highly ranked strategies
were strategies based on the behaviour of others.
• From the collection of strategies considered here, no strategy can be consistently
successful in noisy environments, except if the value of noise is constrained to less
than a 0.1.
Though there is not a single strategy that repeatedly outranks all others in any of the
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distinct tournament types, or even across the tournament types, there are specific types
of strategies have been repeatedly ranked in the top ranks. These have been strategies
that have been trained, strategies that defect, and strategies that would adapt their
behaviour based on preassigned rules to achieve the highest outcome. These results
contradict some of Axelrod’s suggestions, and more specifically, the suggestions ‘Do
not be clever’ and ‘Do not be envious’. The features and properties contributing a
strategy’s success are further explored in section 4.4.
4.4 Evaluation of performance
This section examines the performance of the strategies based on features of strategies
described in Table 4.5. These features are measures regarding a strategy’s behaviour
from the tournaments the strategies competed in as well as intrinsic properties such as
whether a strategy is deterministic or stochastic.
feature feature explanation source value type min value max value
stochastic If a strategy is stochastic strategy classifier from APL boolean Na Na
makes use of game If a strategy makes used of the game information strategy classifier from APL boolean Na Na
makes use of length If a strategy makes used of the number of turns strategy classifier from APL boolean Na Na
memory usage The memory size of a strategy divided by the number of turns memory size from APL float 0 1
SSE A measure of how far a strategy is from ZD behaviour method described in [166] float 0 1
max cooperating rate (Cmax) The biggest cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
min cooperating rate (Cmin) The smallest cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
median cooperating rate (Cmedian) The median cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
mean cooperating rate (Cmean) The mean cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmax A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the maximum result summary float 0 1
Cmin / Cr A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the minimum result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmedian A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the median result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmean A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the mean result summary float 0 1
Cr The cooperating ratio of a strategy result summary float 0 1
CC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual cooperation result summary float 0 1
CD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after being betrayed by the opponent result summary float 0 1
DC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after betraying the opponent result summary float 0 1
DD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual defection result summary float 0 1
pn The probability of a player’s action being flip at each interaction trial summary float 0 1
n The number of turns trial summary integer 1 200
pe The probability of a match ending in the next turn trial summary float 0 1
N The number of strategies in the tournament trial summary integer 3 195
k The number of repetitions of a given tournament trial summary integer 10 100
Table 4.5: The features which are included in the performance evaluation analysis.
Stochastic, makes use of length and makes use of game are APL classifiers that de-
termine whether a strategy is stochastic or deterministic, whether it makes use of the
number of turns or the game’s payoffs. The memory usage is calculated as the number
of turns the strategy considers to make an action (which is specified in the APL) divided
by the number of turns. The SSE (introduced in [166]) shows how close a strategy is
to behaving as a ZDs, and subsequently, in an extortionate way. The method identifies
the ZDs closest to a given strategy and calculates the algebraic distance between them,
defined as SSE. More details on the measure are presented in Chapter 5. A SSE value
of 1 indicates no extortionate behaviour at all whereas a value of 0 indicates that a
strategy is behaving as a ZDs. The rest of the features considered include the cooper-
ating ratio of a strategy, the minimum (Cmin), maximum (Cmax), mean (Cmean) and
median (Cmedian) cooperating ratios of each tournament.
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The memory usage of strategies is the number of rounds of play used by the strategy
divided by the number of turns in each match. For example, Winner 12 uses the
previous two rounds of play, and if participating in a match with 100 turns its memory
usage would be 2/100. For strategies with an infinite memory size, for example Evolved
FSM 16 Noise 05, memory usage is equal to 1. Note that for tournaments with a
probabilistic ending the number of turns was not collected, so the memory usage feature
is not used for probabilistic ending tournaments.
The correlation coefficients between the features of Table 4.5 the median score and the
median normalised rank are given by Table 4.6. The correlation coefficients between
all features of Table 4.5 have been calculated and a graphical representation can be
found in the Appendix C.1.
Standard Noisy Probabilistic ending Noisy probabilistic ending Overall
r median score r median score r median score r median score r median score
CC to C rate -0.501 0.501 0.414 -0.504 0.408 -0.323 0.260 0.022 0.108 0.081
CD to C rate 0.226 -0.199 0.456 -0.330 0.320 -0.017 0.205 -0.220 0.281 -0.177
Cr -0.323 0.384 0.711 -0.678 0.714 -0.832 0.579 -0.135 0.360 -0.124
Cr / Cmax -0.323 0.381 0.616 -0.551 0.714 -0.833 0.536 -0.116 0.395 -0.265
Cr / Cmean -0.331 0.358 0.731 -0.740 0.721 -0.861 0.649 -0.621 0.428 -0.439
Cr / Cmedian -0.331 0.353 0.652 -0.669 0.712 -0.852 0.330 -0.466 0.294 -0.405
Cr / Cmin 0.109 -0.080 -0.358 0.250 -0.134 0.150 -0.368 0.113 0.000 0.280
Cmax -0.000 0.049 0.000 0.023 -0.000 0.046 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.553
Cmean -0.000 0.229 -0.000 0.271 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.690 -0.000 0.544
Cmedian 0.000 0.209 -0.000 0.240 -0.000 0.187 -0.000 0.673 0.000 -0.250
Cmin 0.000 0.084 0.000 -0.017 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.041 -0.161 -0.190
DC to C rate 0.127 -0.100 0.509 -0.504 -0.018 0.033 0.341 -0.016 0.173 -0.088
DD to C rate 0.412 -0.396 0.533 -0.436 -0.103 0.176 0.378 -0.263 0.237 -0.239
N 0.000 -0.009 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
k 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.001
n 0.000 -0.125 -0.000 -0.024 - - - - 0.000 -0.074
pe - - - - 0.000 0.165 0.000 -0.058 0.000 0.055
pn - - -0.000 0.207 - - -0.000 -0.650 -0.000 -0.256
Make use of game -0.003 -0.022 0.025 -0.082 -0.053 -0.108 0.013 -0.016 -0.004 -0.053
Make use of length -0.158 0.124 0.005 -0.123 -0.025 -0.090 0.014 -0.016 -0.041 -0.026
SSE 0.473 -0.452 0.463 -0.337 -0.156 0.223 0.305 -0.259 0.233 -0.167
memory usage -0.082 0.095 -0.007 -0.017 - - - - -0.053 0.046
stochastic 0.006 -0.024 0.022 -0.026 0.002 -0.130 0.021 -0.013 0.013 -0.048
Table 4.6: Correlations between the features of Table 4.5 and the normalised rank and
the median score.
In standard tournaments the features CC to C, Cr, Cr/Cmax and the cooperating ratio
compared to Cmedian and Cmean have a moderately negative effect on the normalised
rank (smaller rank is better), and a moderate positive on the median score. The SSE
error and the DD to C rate have the opposite effects. Thus, in standard tournaments
behaving cooperatively corresponds to a more successful performance. Even though
being nice generally pays off that does not hold against defective strategies. Being
more cooperative after a mutual defection, that is not retaliating, is associated to lesser
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overall success in terms of normalised rank. Figure 4.6 confirms that the winners of
standard tournaments always cooperate after a mutual cooperation and almost always
defect after a mutual defection.
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Figure 4.6: Distributions of CC to C and DD to C for the winners in standard tour-
naments.
Compared to standard tournaments, in both noisy and in probabilistic ending tourna-
ments the higher the rates of cooperation the lower a strategy’s success and median
score. A strategy would want to cooperate less than both the mean and median coop-
erator in such settings. In probabilistic ending tournaments the correlation coefficients
have larger values, indicating a stronger effect. Thus a strategy will be punished
more by its cooperative behaviour in probabilistic ending environments, supporting
the results of section 4.4 as well. The distributions of the Cr of the winners in both
tournaments are given by Figure 4.7. It confirms that the winners in noisy tourna-
ments cooperated less than 35% of the time and in probabilistic ending tournaments
less than 10%. In noisy probabilistic ending tournaments and over all the tournaments’
results, the only features that had a moderate effect are Cr/Cmean, Cr/Cmax and Cr.
In such environments cooperative behaviour appears to be punished less than in noisy
and probabilistic ending tournaments.
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Figure 4.7: Cr distributions of the winners in noisy and in probabilistic ending tour-
naments.
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A multivariate linear regression has been fitted to model the relationship between
the features and the normalised rank. Based on the graphical representation of the
correlation matrices given in Appendix C.1 several of the features are highly correlated
and have been removed before fitting the linear regression model. The features included
are given by Table 4.7 alongside their corresponding p values in the distinct tournaments
and their regression coefficients.
Standard Noisy Probabilistic ending Noisy probabilistic ending Overall
R adjusted: 0.541 R adjusted: 0.639 R adjusted: 0.587 R adjusted: 0.577 R adjusted: 0.242
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
CC to C rate -0.042 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.111 0.0 -0.099 0.0
CD to C rate 0.297 0.000 -0.068 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.023 0.0 0.129 0.0
Cr / Cmax - - 1.856 0.000 - - 1.256 0.0 - -
Cr / Cmean -0.468 0.000 -0.577 0.000 0.525 0.000 -0.120 0.0 0.300 0.0
Cmax -0.071 0.000 - - -0.022 0.391 1.130 0.0 - -
Cmean 0.118 0.000 -2.558 0.000 -0.023 0.001 -1.489 0.0 - -
Cmin -0.161 0.000 -1.179 0.000 -0.170 0.000 - - - -
Cmin / Cr 0.057 0.000 -0.320 0.000 0.125 0.000 - - -0.103 0.0
DC to C rate 0.198 0.000 0.040 0.000 -0.030 0.000 0.022 0.0 0.064 0.0
k 0.000 0.319 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.0 - -
n 0.000 0.000 - - - - - - - -
pe - - - - 0.000 0.847 -0.083 0.0 - -
pn - - -0.048 0.000 - - - - - -
SSE 0.258 0.000 0.153 0.000 -0.041 0.000 0.100 0.0 0.056 0.0
constant 0.697 0.000 1.522 0.000 -0.057 0.019 -0.472 0.0 0.178 0.0
memory usage -0.010 0.000 -0.000 0.035 - - - - - -
Table 4.7: Results of multivariate linear regressions with r as the dependent variable.
R squared is reported for each model.
A multivariate linear regression has also be fitted on the median score. The coefficients
and p values of the features can be found in Appendix C.2. The results of the two
methods are in agreement.
The feature Cr/Cmean has a statistically significant effect across all models and a high
regression coefficient. It has both a positive and negative impact on the normalised rank
depending on the environment. For standard tournaments, Figure 4.8 gives the dis-
tributions of several features for the winners of standard tournaments. The Cr/Cmean
distribution of the winner is also given in Figure 4.8. A value of Cr/Cmean = 1 im-
plies that the cooperating ratio of the winner was the same as the mean cooperating
ratio of the tournament, and in standard tournaments, the median is 1. Therefore, an
effective strategy in standard tournaments was the mean cooperator of its respective
tournament.
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The distributions of SSE and CD to C rate for the winners of standard tournaments
are also given in Figure 4.8. The SSE distributions for the winners indicate that the
strategy behaved in a ZD way in several tournaments, however, not constantly. The
winners participated in matches where they did not try to extortionate their opponents.
Furthermore, the CD to C distribution indicates that if a strategy were to defect against
the winners the winners would reciprocate on average with a probability of 0.5.
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Figure 4.8: Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of
standard tournaments. A value of Cr/Cmean = 1 imply that the cooperating ratio of
the winner was the same as the mean cooperating ratio of the tournament. An SSE
distribution skewed towards 0 indicates a extortionate behaviour by the strategy.
Similarly for the rest of the different tournaments types, and the entire data set the
distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio are given by Figures 4.9, 4.11, 4.12
and 4.13.
Based on the Cr/Cmean distributions the successful strategies have adapted differently
to the mean cooperator depending on the tournament type. In noisy tournaments where
the median of the distribution is at 0.67, and thereupon the winners cooperated 67% of
the time the mean cooperator did. In tournaments with noise and a probabilistic ending
the winners cooperated 60%, whereas in settings that the type of the tournament can
vary between all the types the winners cooperated 67% of the time the mean cooperator
did. Lastly, in probabilistic ending tournaments above more defecting strategies prevail
(section 4.3), and this result is reflected here.
The probability of noise has been observed to substantially affect successful behaviour.
Figure 4.10 gives the ratio Cr/Cmean for the winners in tournaments with noise, over
the probability of noise. From Figure 4.10a it is clear that cooperating only 67% of the
time the mean cooperator did is optimal only when pn ∈ [0.2, 0.4) and pn ∈ [0.6, 0.7].
In environments with pn < 0.1 the winners want to be close to the mean coopera-
tor, similarly to standard tournaments, and as the probability of noise is exceeding
0.5 (where the game is effectively inverted) strategies should aim to be less and less
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Figure 4.9: Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of noisy
tournaments.
cooperative.
Figure 4.10 gives Cr/Cmean for the winners over pn in tournaments with noise and
a probabilistic ending. The optimal proportions of cooperations are different now
that the number of turns is not fixed, successful strategies want to be more defecting
that the mean cooperator, that only changes when pn approaches 0.5. Figure 4.10
demonstrates how the adjustments to Cr/Cmean change over the noise in the to the
environment, and thus supports how important adapting to the environment is for a
strategy to be successful.
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Figure 4.10: Cr/Cmean distributions over intervals of pn. These distributions model
the optimal proportion of cooperation compared to Cmean as a function of (pn).
The distributions of the SSE across the tournament types suggest that successful strate-
gies exhibit some extortionate behaviour, but not constantly. ZDs are a set of strate-
gies that are often envious as they try to exploit their opponents. The winners of the
tournaments considered in this analysis are envious, but not as much as many ZDs.
Though the exact interactions between the matches have not been recorded here, the
work of [125] which introduced the trained strategies that appeared in the top ranked
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strategies of section 4.3 did. In [125] it was shown that clever strategies managed to
achieve mutual cooperation with stronger strategies whilst exploiting the weaker strate-
gies. This could explain the clever winners of this analysis, and would explain the SSE
distributions. This could also be the reason why ZDs fail to appear in the top ranks –
they try to exploit all opponents and cannot actively adapt back to mutual coopera-
tion against stronger strategies, which requires more depth of memory. Note that ZDs
also tend to perform poorly in population games for a similar reason: they attempt
to exploit other players using ZDs, failing to form a cooperative sub population [164].
This makes them good invaders but poor resisters of invasion.
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Figure 4.11: Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of
probabilistic ending tournaments.
The distributions of the CD to C rate evaluate the behaviour of a successful strategy
after its opponent has defected against it. In standard tournaments it was observed that
a successful strategy reciprocates with a probability of 0.5, and in a setting that the type
of the tournament can vary between all the examined types a winning strategy would
reciprocate on average with a probability of 0.58. In tournaments with noise a strategy
is less likely to cooperate following a defection compared to standard tournaments, and
in probabilistic ending tournaments a strategy will reciprocate a defection. This leads
to adjusting the recommendation of being provocable to defections made by Axelrod.
A strategy should be provocable in tournaments with short matches, but in the rest of
the settings a strategy should be more generous.
Further statistically significant features with strong effects include Cr/Cmin, Cr/Cmax,
Cmin and Cmax. These add more emphasis on how important it is for a strategy to
adapt to its environment. Finally, the features number of turns, repetitions and the
probabilities of noise and the game ending had no significant effects based on the
multivariate regression models.
A third method that evaluates the importance of the features in Table 4.5 using clus-
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Figure 4.12: Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners of
noisy probabilistic ending tournaments.
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Figure 4.13: Distributions of Cr/Cmean, SSE and CD to C ratio for the winners over
the tournaments of the entire data set.
tering and random forests can be found in the Appendix C.3. The results uphold the
outcomes of the correlation and multivariate regression. It also evaluates the effects
of the classifiers stochastic, make use of game, and make use of length which have not
been evaluated by the methods above because there are binary variables. The results
imply that they have no significant effect on a strategy’s performance.
4.5 Chapter summary
This Chapter explored the performance of 195 strategies of the IPD in 45,600 computer
tournaments. The collection of computer tournaments presented here is the largest and
most diverse collection in the literature. The 195 strategies are drawn from the APL
and include strategies from the IPD literature. The computer tournaments include
tournaments of four different types.
So what is the best way of playing the IPD? And is there a single dominant strategy
for the IPD?
There was not a single strategy within the collection of the 195 strategies that managed
to perform well in all the tournaments variations it competed in. Even if on average
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a strategy ranked highly in a specific environment this did not guarantee its success
over the different tournament types. Nevertheless, in sections 4.3 and 4.4 examined
the best performing strategies across various tournament types and analysed their
salient features. It was demonstrated that there are properties associated with the
success of strategies which in fact contradict the originally suggested properties of
Axelrod [35].
It was shown that complex or clever strategies can be effective, whether trained against
a corpus of possible opponents or purposely designed to mitigate the impact of noise
such as the DBS strategy. Moreover, it was found that some strategies designed or
trained for noisy environments were also highly ranked in noise-free tournaments which
reinforces the idea that strategies’ complexity/cleverness is not necessarily a liability,
rather it can confer adaptability to a more diverse set of environments. It was also
shown that while the type of exploitation attempted by ZDs is not typically effec-
tive in standard tournaments, envious strategies capable of both exploiting and not
their opponents can be highly successful. Based on the results of [125] this could
be because they are selectively exploiting weaker opponents while mutually cooper-
ating with stronger opponents. Highly noisy or tournaments with short matches also
favoured envious strategies. These environments mitigated the value of being nice. Un-
certainty enables exploitation, reducing the ability of maintaining or enforcing mutual
cooperation, while triggering grudging strategies to switch from typically cooperating
to typically defecting.
The feature analysis of the best performing strategies demonstrated that a strategy
should reciprocate, as suggested by Axelrod, but it should relax its readiness to do
so and be more generous. For noisy environments this is in line with the results
of [47,75,209,258], however, it was also showed that generosity pays off even in standard
settings, and that in fact the only setting a strategy would want to be too provocable is
when the matches are not long. Forgiveness as defined by Axelrod was not explored in
this Chapter. This was mainly because the two round states were not recorded during
the data collection. This could be a topic of future work that examines the impact
of considering more rounds of history. The features analysis also concluded that there
is a significant importance in adapting to the environment, and more specifically, to
the mean cooperator. In standard tournaments a strategy would aim to be the mean
cooperator while in noisy tournaments the best performing players cooperate at a lower
rate than the tournament population on average. Moreover, the manner in which
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a strategy achieves a given cooperation rate relative to the tournament population
average is important.
This could potentially explain the early success of Tit For Tat. Tit For Tat naturally
achieves a cooperation rate near Cmean by virtue of copying its opponent’s last move
while also minimising instances where it is exploited by an opponent (cooperating while
the opponent defects), at least in non-noisy tournaments. It could also explain why
Tit For N Tats does not fare well for N > 1 – it fails to achieve the proper cooperation
ratio by tolerating too many defections.
Similarly, the results could suggest an explanation regarding the intuitively unexpected
effectiveness of memory-one strategies historically. Given that among the important
features associated with success are the relative cooperation rate to the population av-
erage and the four memory-one probabilities of cooperating conditional on the previous
round of play, these features can be optimised by a memory-one strategy such as Tit
For Tat. Usage of more history becomes valuable when there are exploitable opponent
patterns. This is indicated by the importance of SSE as a feature, showing that the
first-approximation provided by a memory-one strategy is no longer sufficient. The
limitations of memory are further explored in Chapter 5.
Overall, the five properties successful strategies need to have in a IPD competition
based on the analysis that has been presented in this Chapter are:
• Be a little bit envious
• Be “nice” in non-noisy environments or when game lengths are longer
• Reciprocate both cooperation and defection appropriately; Be provocable in tour-
naments with short matches, and generous when matches are longer
• It is okay to be clever
• Adapt to the environment; Adjust to the mean population cooperation rate
In this Chapter well performed behaviour was explored whilst considering a collection of
pre defined strategies. In comparison, Chapter 5 does not consider pre defined strategies
but estimates the exact best responses. This is done by considering strategies with a
theory of mind that compete in environments of memory-one opponents.
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Chapter 5
Stability of defection,
optimisation of strategies and the
limits of memory in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The research reported in this Chapter has led to a manuscript, entitled:
“A theory of mind: Best responses to memory-one strategies. The
limitations of extortion and restricted memory”
Available at: arxiv.org/abs/1911.12112
Associated data set: [104]
Associated codebase: [111]
Axelrod-Python library (APL) version: 4.4.0
The manuscript’s abstract is the following:
Memory-one strategies are a set of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies that have
been praised for their mathematical tractability and performance against single op-
ponents. This manuscript investigates a theory of mind: best response memory-one
strategies, as a multidimensional optimisation problem. We add to the literature that
has shown that extortionate play is not always optimal by showing that optimal play
is often not extortionate. We also provide evidence that memory-one strategies suffer
from their limited memory in multi agent interactions and can be outperformed by
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optimised strategies with longer memory.
The differences between the Chapter and the manuscript include details on the bespoke
open source package used to carried out the numerical experiments, details on resultant
theory and an additional section on reactive strategies. These details and the additional
section are only reported in this Chapter, and not in the manuscript. The Chapter also
includes an introduction to the Bayesian optimisation used to carry out the numerical
experiments.
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter contributes to the question: what is the optimal behaviour an IPD
strategy should adapt as a response to different environments? In [234] the authors
stated that “Only a player with a theory of mind about his opponent can do better, in
which case Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is an Ultimatum Game”. The purpose of this
Chapter is to investigate the first part of this sentence, more specifically, to investigate
the best response strategy with a theory of mind in an environment with memory-one
opponents, and to understand the effects of extortion and restricted memory in those
environments. Extortionate behaviour is explored using a linear algebraic approach
presented in [166].
The outcomes of this Chapter reinforce and extend known results which were presented
in Chapter 2. These are that (a) memory-one strategies must be adaptable to be
successful [125,166] and (b) longer-memory strategies have a certain form of advantage
over short memory strategies [133,230]. The Chapter is structured as follows:
• section 5.2 describes a closed form algebraic expression for the utility of a memory-
one strategy to a given group of opponents.
• section 5.3 produces a compact method of identifying the best response memory-
one strategy against a given set of memory-one opponents.
• section 5.4 explains best response reactive strategies and demonstrates the usage
of resultant theory in explicitly finding a reactive best response.
• section 5.5 describes a series of numerical experiments and a well designed frame-
work that allows the comparison of an optimal memory-one strategy and a more
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complex strategy which has a larger memory.
• section 5.6 presents a compact method of identifying environments for which
cooperation cannot occur.
5.2 Quadratic form utility of the IPD
One specific advantage of memory-one strategies is their mathematical tractability.
They can be represented completely as an element of R4[0,1]. As previously discussed in
Chapter 2, if a strategy is concerned with only the outcome of a single turn then there
are four possible ‘states’ the strategy could be in:
• Both players cooperated, denoted as CC.
• First player cooperated while the second one defected, denoted as CD.
• First player defected while the second one cooperated, denoted as DC.
• Both players defected, denoted as DD.
Therefore, a memory-one strategy can be denoted by the probability vector of cooper-
ating after each of these states; p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) ∈ R4[0,1].
In [219] it was shown that it is not necessary to simulate the play of a strategy p against
a memory-one opponent q. Rather this exact behaviour can be modelled as a stochastic
process, and more specifically as a Markov chain (Figure 5.1) whose corresponding
transition matrix M is given by Equation (5.1). The long run steady state probability
vector v, which is the solution to vM = v, can be combined with the payoff matrices
of Equation (1.1) to give the expected payoffs for each player. More specifically, the
utility for a memory-one strategy p against an opponent q, denoted as uq(p), is given
by Equation (5.2).
M =

p1q1 p1 (−q1 + 1) q1 (−p1 + 1) (−p1 + 1) (−q1 + 1)
p2q3 p2 (−q3 + 1) q3 (−p2 + 1) (−p2 + 1) (−q3 + 1)
p3q2 p3 (−q2 + 1) q2 (−p3 + 1) (−p3 + 1) (−q2 + 1)
p4q4 p4 (−q4 + 1) q4 (−p4 + 1) (−p4 + 1) (−q4 + 1)

(5.1)
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CC CD
DC DD
Figure 5.1: Markov Chain
uq(p) = v · (R,S, T, P ). (5.2)
This thesis is the first work to explore the form of uq(p). The first theoretical result
of the thesis is given by Theorem 1 which states that uq(p) is given by a ratio of two
quadratic forms [160].
Theorem 1. The expected utility of a memory-one strategy p ∈ R4[0,1] against a memory-
one opponent q ∈ R4[0,1], denoted as uq(p), can be written as a ratio of two quadratic
forms:
uq(p) =
1
2pQp
T + cp+ a
1
2pQ¯p
T + c¯p+ a¯
, (5.3)
where Q, Q¯ ∈ R4×4 are square matrices defined by the transition probabilities of the
opponent q1, q2, q3, q4 as follows:
Q =

0 − (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) (q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3)
− (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) 0 (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T )
(q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) 0 (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S)
(q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T ) (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S) 0

, (5.4)
Q¯ =

0 − (q1 − q3) (q2 − q4 − 1) (q1 − q2) (q3 − q4) (q1 − q4) (q2 − q3 − 1)
− (q1 − q3) (q2 − q4 − 1) 0 (q2 − q3) (q1 − q4 − 1) (q1 − q2) (q3 − q4)
(q1 − q2) (q3 − q4) (q2 − q3) (q1 − q4 − 1) 0 − (q2 − q4) (q1 − q3 − 1)
(q1 − q4) (q2 − q3 − 1) (q1 − q2) (q3 − q4) − (q2 − q4) (q1 − q3 − 1) 0

. (5.5)
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c and c¯ ∈ R4×1 are similarly defined by:
c =

q1 (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
− (q3 − 1) (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
−Pq1q2 + Pq2q3 + Pq2 − Pq3 +Rq2q4 − Sq2q4 + Sq4
−Rq2q4 +Rq4 + Sq2q4 − Sq2 − Sq4 + S + Tq1q4 − Tq3q4 + Tq3 − Tq4

, (5.6)
c¯ =

q1 (q2 − q4 − 1)
− (q3 − 1) (q2 − q4 − 1)
−q1q2 + q2q3 + q2 − q3 + q4
q1q4 − q2 − q3q4 + q3 − q4 + 1

, (5.7)
and the constant terms a, a¯ are defined as a = −Pq2 + P + Tq4 and a¯ = −q2 + q4 + 1.
Proof. From Equation (5.2) uq(p) = v · (R,S, T, P ).
Evaluating this yields,
uq(p) =

−p1p2(q1−q3)(Pq2−P−Tq4)+p1p3(q1−q2)(Pq3−Sq4)+p1p4(q1−q4)(Sq2−S−Tq3)+p2p3(q2−q3)(Pq1−P−Rq4)−
p2p4(q3−q4)(Rq2−R−Tq1 +T )+p3p4(q2−q4)(Rq3−Sq1 +S)+p1q1(Pq2−P −Tq4)−p2(q3−1)(Pq2−P −Tq4)+
p3(−Pq1q2 + Pq2q3 + Pq2 − Pq3 +Rq2q4 − Sq2q4 + Sq4) + p4(−Rq2q4 +Rq4 + Sq2q4 − Sq2 − Sq4 + S)
Tq1q4 − Tq3q4 + Tq3 − Tq4 − Pq2 + P + Tq4
p1p2(q1q2−q1q4−q1−q2q3+q3q4+q3)+p1p3(−q1q3+q1q4+q2q3−q2q4)+p1p4(−q1q2+q1q3+q1+q2q4−q3q4−q4)+
p2p3(−q1q2+q1q3+q2q4+q2−q3q4−q3)+p2p4(−q1q3+q1q4+q2q3−q2q4)+p3p4(q1q2−q1q4−q2q3−q2+q3q4+q4)+
p1(−q1q2+q1q4+q1)+p2(q2q3−q2−q3q4−q3+q4+1)+p3(q1q2−q2q3−q2+q3−q4)+p4(−q1q4+q2+q3q4−q3+q4−1)+
q2 − q4 − 1

.
Consider the numerator of uq(p). The cross product terms pipj are given by,
−p1p2(q1 − q3)(Pq2 − P − Tq4) + p1p3(q1 − q2)(Pq3 − Sq4) + p1p4(q1 − q4)(Sq2 − S − Tq3)+
p2p3(q2 − q3)(Pq1 − P −Rq4)− p2p4(q3 − q4)(Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T ) + p3p4(q2 − q4)(Rq3 − Sq1 + S)
This can be re written in a matrix format given by Equation (5.8).
(p1, p2, p3, p4)
1
2

0 − (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) (q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3)
− (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) 0 (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T )
(q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) 0 (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S)
(q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T ) (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S) 0


p1
p2
p3
p4

(5.8)
Similarly, the linear terms are given by,
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p1q1(Pq2 − P − Tq4) + p4(−Rq2q4 + Rq4 + Sq2q4 − Sq2 − Sq4 + S + Tq1q4 − Tq3q4 + Tq3 − Tq4)
−p2(q3 − 1)(Pq2 − P − Tq4) + p3(−Pq1q2 + Pq2q3 + Pq2 − Pq3 + Rq2q4 − Sq2q4 + Sq4)
and the expression can be written using a matrix format as Equation (5.9).
(p1, p2, p3, p4)

q1 (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
− (q3 − 1) (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
−Pq1q2 + Pq2q3 + Pq2 − Pq3 +Rq2q4 − Sq2q4 + Sq4
−Rq2q4 +Rq4 + Sq2q4 − Sq2 − Sq4 + S + Tq1q4 − Tq3q4 + Tq3 − Tq4

(5.9)
Finally, the constant term of the numerator, which is obtained by substituting p =
(0, 0, 0, 0), is given by Equation (5.10).
−Pq2 + P + Tq4 (5.10)
Combining Equation (5.8), Equation (5.9) and Equation (5.10) gives that the numer-
ator of uq(p) can be written as,
1
2
p

0 − (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) (q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3)
− (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) 0 (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T )
(q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) 0 (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S)
(q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T ) (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S) 0

pT+

q1 (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
− (q3 − 1) (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
−Pq1q2 + Pq2q3 + Pq2 − Pq3 +Rq2q4 − Sq2q4 + Sq4
−Rq2q4 +Rq4 + Sq2q4 − Sq2 − Sq4 + S + Tq1q4 − Tq3q4 + Tq3 − Tq4

p− Pq2 + P + Tq4
and equivalently as,
1
2
pQpT + cp+ a
where Q ∈ R4×4 is a square matrix defined by the transition probabilities of the oppo-
nent q1, q2, q3, q4 as follows:
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Q =

0 − (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) (q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3)
− (q1 − q3) (Pq2 − P − Tq4) 0 (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T )
(q1 − q2) (Pq3 − Sq4) (q2 − q3) (Pq1 − P −Rq4) 0 (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S)
(q1 − q4) (Sq2 − S − Tq3) − (q3 − q4) (Rq2 −R− Tq1 + T ) (q2 − q4) (Rq3 − Sq1 + S) 0

,
c ∈ R4×1 is similarly defined by:
c =

q1 (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
− (q3 − 1) (Pq2 − P − Tq4)
−Pq1q2 + Pq2q3 + Pq2 − Pq3 +Rq2q4 − Sq2q4 + Sq4
−Rq2q4 +Rq4 + Sq2q4 − Sq2 − Sq4 + S + Tq1q4 − Tq3q4 + Tq3 − Tq4

,
and a = −Pq2 + P + Tq4.
The same process is done for the denominator.
Numerical simulations have been carried out to validate the result. The simulated
utility, which is denoted as Uq(p), has been calculated with APL. For smoothing the
simulated results the utility has been estimated in a tournament of 500 turns and 200
repetitions. Figure 5.2 shows two examples demonstrating that the formulation of
Theorem 1 successfully captures the simulated behaviour.
Theorem 1 can be extended to consider multiple opponents. The IPD is commonly
studied in tournaments and/or Moran Processes [155] where a strategy interacts with a
number of opponents. The payoff of a player in such interactions is given by the average
payoff the player received against each opponent. More specifically the expected utility
of a memory-one strategy against N opponents is given by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The expected utility of a memory-one strategy p ∈ R4[0,1] against a group
of opponents {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)}, denoted as 1N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p), is given by:
1
N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(12pQ
(i)pT + c(i)p+ a(i))
N∏
j = 1
j 6= i
(12pQ¯
(j)pT + c¯(j)p+ a¯(j))
N∏
i=1
(12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))
.
(5.11)
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Figure 5.2: Simulated and empirical utilities for p = (0, 1, 0, 1) and p = (0, 23 ,
1
3 , 0)
against (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , q4) for q4 ∈ {0, 119 , 219 , . . . , 1819 , 1}. uq(p) is the theoretic value given in
Theorem 1, and Uq(p) is simulated numerically using APL.
Equation (5.11) is the average score (using Equation (5.3)) against the set of oppo-
nents.
Using a procedure similar to that used in Theorem 1, the formulation of Theorem 2 is
validated using numerical simulations where the 10 memory-one strategies described
in [271] have been used as the opponents. Figure 5.3 shows that the simulated behaviour
has been captured successfully.
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Figure 5.3: The utilities of memory-one strategies (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , p4) for p4 ∈
{0, 119 , 219 , . . . , 1819 , 1} against the 10 memory-one strategies described in [271].
1
10
∑10
i=1 u
(i)
q (p) is the theoretic value given in Theorem 1, and
1
10
∑10
i=1 U
(i)
q (p) is simu-
lated numerically using APL.
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The list of strategies from [271] was also used to check whether the utility against
a group of strategies could be captured by the utility against the mean opponent;
condition (5.12). However, condition (5.12) fails. This is numerically shown using a
series of examples, demonstrated in Figure 5.4.
1
N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p) = u
1
N
N∑
i=1
q(i)
(p), (5.12)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p 2
Tournament size N = 4
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
| 1N
Ni=
1 u
q (i)(p)
u
1N
N
i=
1 q
(i)(p)|
Figure 5.4: The difference between the average utility against the opponents from [271]
and the utility against the average player of the strategies in [271] of a player p =
(p1, p2, p1, p2). A positive difference indicates that condition (5.12) does not hold.
Theorem 2 which allows for the utility of a memory-one strategy against any number of
opponents to be estimated without simulating the interactions is the main result used
in the rest of this Chapter. In section 5.3 it is used to define best response memory-one
strategies, in section 5.4 to define best response reactive strategies and in section 5.6
to explore the conditions under which defection dominates cooperation.
5.3 Best responses to memory-one players
This section focuses on memory-one best response strategies. A best response is a strat-
egy which corresponds to the most favourable outcome (Chapter 1), thus a memory-one
best response to a set of opponents q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N) corresponds to a strategy p∗ for
which Equation (5.11) is maximised. This is considered as a multi dimensional opti-
misation problem given by:
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
such that : p ∈ R[0,1]
(5.13)
CHAPTER 5. STABILITY OF DEFECTION, OPTIMISATION OF STRATEGIES
AND THE LIMITS OF MEMORY IN THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA. 96
Optimising this particular ratio of quadratic forms is not trivial. It can be verified
empirically for the case of a single opponent that there exists at least one point for
which the definition of concavity does not hold.
A function f(x) is concave on an interval [a, b] if, for any two points x1, x2 ∈ [a, b] and
any λ ∈ [0, 1],
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ λf(x1) + (1− λ)f(x2). (5.14)
Let f be u( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). For x1 = (
1
4 ,
1
2 ,
1
5 ,
1
2), x2 = (
8
10 ,
1
2 ,
9
10 ,
7
10) and λ = 0.1. Direct
substitution in to the left hand side of Equation (5.14) gives,
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = u( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
(
0.1
(
1
4
,
1
2
,
1
5
,
1
2
)
+ 0.9
(
8
10
,
1
2
,
9
10
,
7
10
))
= 1.485
and in to the right hand side,
λf(x1) + (1− λ)f(x2) = 0.1× u( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
((
1
4
,
1
2
,
1
5
,
1
2
))
+ 0.9× u( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
((
8
10
,
1
2
,
9
10
,
7
10
))
= 0.1× 1.790 + 0.9× 1.457
= 1.490.
Thus Equation (5.14) does not hold, and thus u( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) is not concave.
The non concavity of u(p) indicates multiple local optimal points. This is also intuitive.
The best response against a Cooperator, q = (1, 1, 1, 1), is a Defector p∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0).
The strategies p = (12 , 0, 0, 0) and p = (
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2) are also best responses. The approach
taken here is to introduce a compact way of constructing the discrete candidate set of all
local optimal points, and evaluating the objective function Equation (5.11). This gives
the best response memory-one strategy. The approach is given in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The optimal behaviour of a memory-one strategy p∗ ∈ R4[0,1] against a set
of N opponents {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R4[0,1] is given by:
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p∗ = argmax
N∑
i=1
uq(p), p ∈ Sq.
The set Sq is defined as all the possible combinations of:
Sq =

p ∈ R4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• pj ∈ {0, 1} and d
dpk
N∑
i=1
u(i)q (p) = 0 for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K
where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
• p ∈ {0, 1}4

. (5.15)
Proof. The optimal behaviour of a memory-one strategy player p∗ ∈ R4[0,1] against a
set of N opponents {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R4[0,1] is established by:
p∗ = argmax
(
N∑
i=1
uq(p)
)
, p ∈ Sq,
where Sq is given by Equation (5.15).
The optimisation problem of (5.13) can be written as:
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
such that : pi ≤ 1 for ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
−pi ≤ 0 for ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
(5.16)
The optimisation problem has two inequality constraints and regarding the optimality
this means that:
• either the optimum is away from the boundary of the optimization domain, and
so the constraints plays no role;
• or the optimum is on the constraint boundary.
Thus, the following three cases must be considered:
Case 1: The solution is on the boundary and any of the possible combinations for
pi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are candidate optimal solutions.
Case 2: The optimum is away from the boundary of the optimization domain and the
interior solution p∗ necessarily satisfies the condition ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p
∗) = 0.
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Case 3: The optimum is away from the boundary of the optimization domain but some
constraints are equalities. The candidate solutions in this case are any combinations of
pj ∈ {0, 1} and ddpk
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) = 0 for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K where J ∩K =
Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Combining cases 1-3 a set of candidate solution is constructed as:
Sq =

p ∈ R4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• pj ∈ {0, 1} and d
dpk
N∑
i=1
u(i)q (p) = 0 for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K
where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
• p ∈ {0, 1}4

.
The derivative of
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) calculated using the following property (see [10] for details):
dxAxT
dx
= 2Ax. (5.17)
Using property (5.17):
d
dp
1
2
pQpT + cp+ a = pQ+ c and
d
dp
1
2
pQ¯pT + c¯p+ a¯ = pQ¯+ c¯. (5.18)
Note that the derivative of cp is c and the constant disappears. Combining these it can
be proven that:
d
dp
N∑
i=1
u(i)q (p) =
N∑
i=1
d
dp(
1
2pQ
(i)pT + c(i)p+ a(i))(12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))− ddp(12pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))(12pQ(i)pT + c(i)p+ a(i))
(12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))2
=
N∑
i=1
(pQ(i) + c(i)+)(12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))
(12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))2
− (pQ¯
(i) + c¯(i))(12pQ
(i)pT + c(i)p+ a(i))
(12pQ¯
(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i))2
For ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p) to equal zero then:
N∑
i=1
(
pQ(i) + c(i)
)(1
2
pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i)
)
−
(
pQ¯(i) + c¯(i)
)(1
2
pQ(i)pT + c(i)p+ a(i)
)
= 0, while
(5.19)
N∑
i=1
1
2
pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i) 6= 0. (5.20)
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The optimal solution to Equation 5.13 is the point from Sq for which the utility is
maximised.
Note that there is no immediate way to find the zeros of ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p);
d
dp
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p) =
=
N∑
i=1
(
pQ(i) + c(i)
)(
1
2
pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p + a¯(i)
)
−
(
pQ¯(i) + c¯(i)
)(
1
2
pQ(i)pT + c(i)p + a(i)
)
(
1
2
pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p + a¯(i)
)2
(5.21)
For ddp
N∑
i=1
uq(p) to equal zero then:
N∑
i=1
((
pQ(i) + c(i)
)(1
2
pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i)
)
−
(
pQ¯(i) + c¯(i)
)(1
2
pQ(i)pT + c(i)p+ a(i)
))
= 0, while
(5.22)
N∑
i=1
1
2
pQ¯(i)pT + c¯(i)p+ a¯(i) 6= 0. (5.23)
Finding best response memory-one strategies, more specifically constructing the subset
Sq, can be done analytically. The points for any or all of pi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
are trivial, and finding the roots of the partial derivatives which are a set of polynomial
equations (Equation (5.22)) is feasible using resultant theory [152]; however, for large
systems building the resultant quickly becomes intractable.
Nevertheless, there are constrained versions of problem (5.13) for which calculating
the resultant is efficient and a best response strategy can be identified explicitly. A
constrained version is that of reactive strategies. Section 5.4 presents best response
reactive strategies, and demonstrates the usage of resultant theory in identifying best
responses.
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5.4 Reactive strategies & Resultant theory
Reactive strategies are a subset of memory-one strategies discussed in Chapter 2. Well
known reactive strategies include Tit For Tat and Generous Tit For Tat. As a re-
minder, reactive strategies only take into account the opponent’s previous moves, and
thus can be described as p = (p1, p2) ∈ R2[0,1].
Best response reactive strategies are incorporated in the formulation of this Chapter
by adding two extra constraints to the optimisation problem of (5.13),
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
uq(p)
such that : p1 = p3
p2 = p4
p1, p2 ∈ R[0,1].
(5.24)
and a best response reactive strategy to a set of opponentsN opponents {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)}
is given by Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The optimal behaviour of a reactive strategy p∗ ∈ R2[0,1] against a set of N
opponents {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R2[0,1] is given by:
p∗ = argmax
N∑
i=1
uq(p), p ∈ Sq.
The set Sq is defined as all the possible combinations of:
Sq =

p ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• pj ∈ {0, 1} and d
dpk
N∑
i=1
u(i)q (p) = 0 for all j ∈ J & k ∈ K for all J,K
where J ∩K = Ø and J ∪K = {1, 2}.
• p ∈ {0, 1}2

. (5.25)
Note that ddp
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) = 0 corresponds to a system of 2 polynomials of 2 variables,
corresponding to the partial derivatives over p1 and p2. Solving systems of 2 polyno-
mials of 2 variables can be done analytically. The approach taken here to extract the
roots from the partial derivatives is to use resultants.
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5.4.1 Resultant theory
The resultant of two polynomials is a polynomial expression of their coefficients which
is equal to zero if and only if the polynomials have a common root.
More specifically given a polynomial,
f(x) = anx
n + a(n−1)x(n−1) + · · ·+ a1x+ a0
of degree n with roots αi, i = 1, . . . , n and a polynomial
g(x) = bmx
m + b(m−1)x(m−1) + · · ·+ b1x+ b0
of degree m with roots βj , j = 1, . . . ,m, the resultant denoted as R(f, g) and also called
the eliminant [252], is defined by
R(f, g) = amn b
n
m
n∏
(i=1)
m∏
(j=1)
(αi − βj). (5.26)
Interestingly, the resultant can also be expressed as the determinant of matrices such
as Sylvester’s, Bezout’s and Macaulay’s. For systems of 2 polynomials the resultant is
commonly expressed as the determinant of Sylvester’s matrix [15]. The Sylvester matrix
associated with f and g is the (n+m)× (n+m) matrix constructed as described by
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Algorithm 5.1.
Algorithm 5.1: Construction of Sylvester matrix [15]
if n > 0 then
the 1st row is
(
am am−1 · · · a1 a0 0 · · · 0
)
;
for i← 1 to n− 1 do
the ith is the previous row shifted one column to the right; the other entries
of the row are 0
;
if m > 0 then
the (n+ 1)th row is:
(
bm bm−1 · · · b1 b0 0 · · · 0
)
;
for i← n+ 1 to (m+ n)− 1 do
the ith is the previous row shifted one column to the right; the other entries
of the row are 0
As an example consider the case of m = 4 and n = 3. The Sylvester matrix denoted
as Sf,g is given by,
Sf,g =

a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 0 0
0 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 0
0 0 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0
b3 b2 b1 b0 0 0 0
0 b3 b2 b1 b0 0 0
0 0 b3 b2 b1 b0 0
0 0 0 b3 b2 b1 b0

(5.27)
and,
|Sf,g| = R(f, g).
The resultant can verify that the system has a root, but also can be used to extract
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the roots. In a system of 2 polynomial equations in 2 variables, the resultant can be
defined over one variable whereas the second one is kept as a coefficient. It is used in
this Chapter to analytically solve for the roots of the derivative of the utility, and thus
explicitly identify the best response reactive strategy against a given set of memory-one
opponents.
The open source package [202] is used to calculate the Sylvester matrix and subse-
quently its determinant. An example is demonstrated in Figure 5.5. The approach
demonstrated in Figure 5.5 is used to find the roots of the partial derivatives of
d
dp
N∑
i=1
u
(i)
q (p) and the candidate set of solutions Sq is constructed as defined in Equa-
tion (5.25).
1 >>> import sympy as sym
2 >>> from sympy.polys import subresultants_qq_zz
3 >>> p_1, p_2 = sym.symbols('p_1, p_2')
4
5 >>> f = p_1 ** 2 + p_1 * p_2 + 2 * p_1 + p_2 - 1
6 >>> g = p_1 ** 2 + 3 * p_1 - p_2 ** 2 + 2 * p_2 - 1
7 >>> matrix = subresultants_qq_zz.sylvester(f, g, p_2)
8 >>> matrix
9 Matrix([
10 [p_1 + 1, p_1**2 + 2*p_1 - 1, 0],
11 [ 0, p_1 + 1, p_1**2 + 2*p_1 - 1],
12 [ -1, 2, p_1**2 + 3*p_1 - 1]])
13 >>> matrix.det().factor()
14 -p_1*(p_1 - 1)*(p_1 + 3)
Figure 5.5: Example code for calculating the Sylvester matrix associated with f =
p21 + p1p2 + 2p1 + p2 − 1 and g = p21 + 3p1 − p22 + 2p2 − 1 using [202]. The matrix
is calculated for p2 whilst p1 is handled as a coefficient, and thus the determinant is
expressed in p1. In order for the system to have a common root, p1 must be ∈ {−3, 0, 1}.
By substituting these values of p1, each at a time, in f and g gives the roots for p2.
A bespoke package has been developed to carry out the calculations for this Chapter.
The package is called opt_mo and an example of how Sq is calculated against a given
opponent q = (0.513, 0.773, 0.870, 0.008) is given by Figure 5.6.
Once Sq is calculated then defining the best response is trivial. Figure 5.7 demonstrates
how this is done using opt_mo, and the result is validated by Figure 5.8.
Sylvester’s formulation can only handle systems of 2 polynomials, however, the multi-
variate resultants can be calculated for n homogeneous polynomials in n variables. A
number of multivariate resultants can be found in the literature such as Dixon’s [156]
resultant and Macaulay’s [186] resultant.
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1 >>> import opt_mo
2 >>> import numpy as np
3 >>> import axelrod as axl
4
5 >>> axl.seed(14)
6 >>> opponents = [np.random.random(4)]
7 >>> opponents
8 [array([0.51394334, 0.77316505, 0.87042769, 0.00804695])]
9
10 >>> candidate_set = opt_mo.reactive_best_response.get_candidate_reactive_best_responses(
11 ... opponents
12 ... )
13 >>> candidate_set
14 {(0.913428410721382+0j), 0.6964731896521483, 0.2775453690890986, 0, 1}
Figure 5.6: Code example of calculating Sq for a given opponent. The function
reactive_best_response.get_candidate_reactive_best_responses retrieves the
set Sq for a reactive strategy against a list of opponents. The set includes 0, 1 and to
roots of the partial derivatives 0.277 and 0.696. An imaginary solution has also been
calculated, however, it is ignored in the next step which calculates the best response.
1 >>> import numpy as np
2 >>> import opt_mo
3
4 >>> opponents = [np.array([0.51394334, 0.77316505, 0.87042769, 0.00804695])]
5 >>> candidate_set = opt_mo.reactive_best_response.get_candidate_reactive_best_responses(
6 ... opponents
7 ... )
8
9 >>> opt_p1, opt_p2, score = opt_mo.reactive_best_response.get_argmax(
10 ... opponents, candidate_set
11 ... )
12 >>> opt_p1, opt_p2
13 (0, 0.6964731842832972)
Figure 5.7: Code example of estimating the best response reactive strategy from a
given Sq set and a given list of opponents.
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Figure 5.8: The utility of a p = (p1, p2) reactive player against q =
(0.513, 0.773, 0.870, 0.008) for changing values of p1 and p2. The point marked with
X is the point identified as the best response.
Project [202] which was used to construct Sylvester’s resultant is called SymPy and
it is the Pythonic package for symbolic mathematics. However, the project did not
include the feature to calculate multivariate resultants. As part of this Chapter the
source code for constructing both Dixon’s and Macaulay’s resultants was developed
and was integrated into SymPy. Figure 5.9 shows the pull request made to SymPy for
integrating the source code to their codebase. Figure 5.10 demonstrates an example of
using [202] to calculate Dixon’s resultant.
1 >>> from sympy.polys.multivariate_resultants import DixonResultant
2 >>> p_1, p_2 = sym.symbols('p_1, p_2')
3
4 >>> f = p_1 + p_2
5 >>> g = p_1 ** 2 + p_2 ** 3
6 >>> h = p_1 ** 2 + p_2
7
8 >>> dixon = DixonResultant(variables=[p_1, p_2], polynomials=[f, g, h])
9 >>> poly = dixon.get_dixon_polynomial()
10 >>> matrix = dixon.get_dixon_matrix(polynomial=poly)
11 >>> matrix
12 Matrix([
13 [ 0, 0, -1, 0, -1],
14 [ 0, -1, 0, -1, 0],
15 [-1, 0, 1, 0, 0],
16 [ 0, -1, 0, 0, 1],
17 [-1, 0, 0, 1, 0]])
18
19 >>> matrix.det()
20 0
Figure 5.10: Code example of using [202] to calculate Dixon’s resultant. f, g and h
have a common root (x = 1, y = −1). The determinant of Dixon’s matrix falls to zero
which confirms that the system has a common root.
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Figure 5.9: Screenshot of the pull request made to SymPy for integrating the source
code of the multivariate resultants to the project’s codebase. The details of the pull
request as well as the conversation with the project’s main contributors can be found
at: https://github.com/sympy/sympy/pull/14370.
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Multivariate resultants theoretically can be used to explicitly identify best response
memory-one strategies by solving the system of 4 polynomials. However, as previously
stated for large systems building the resultant quickly becomes intractable. As a result
in section 5.5 a numerical approach was considered instead.
5.5 Numerical experiments
As briefly discussed in section 3.1, ZDs have been praised for their robustness against a
single opponent. ZDs are evidence that extortion works in pairwise interactions. Their
behaviour ensures that the strategies will never lose a game. However, this thesis
argues that in multi opponent interactions, where the payoffs matter, strategies trying
to exploit their opponents will suffer. Compared to ZDs, best response memory-one
strategies which have a theory of mind of their opponents, utilise their behaviour in
order to gain the most from their interactions. The question that arises then is whether
best response strategies are optimal because they behave in an extortionate way. This
is explored in section 5.5.3.
The other main finding presented in [234] was that short memory of the strategies
was all that was needed. This thesis argues that the second limitation of ZDs in
multi opponent interactions is that of their restricted memory. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of memory in the IPD a best response longer-memory strategy against a
given set of memory-one opponents is explored, and its performance is compared to
that of a memory-one best response in section 5.5.4.
The results of this section rely on estimating best response memory-one strategies
and understanding whether they behave in an extortionate way. Best responses will be
estimated heuristically using Bayesian optimisation, which is described in section 5.5.1,
and in order to investigate whether best responses behave in an extortionate matter
the SSE method described in section 5.5.2 is used.
5.5.1 Bayesian optimisation
Bayesian optimisation is a global optimisation algorithm that has proven to outperform
many other popular algorithms [148]. The algorithm builds a bayesian understanding of
the objective function which is well suited to the potential multiple local optimas in the
described search space of this Chapter. Differential evolution [274] was also considered,
however, it was not selected due to Bayesian optimisation being computationally more
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efficient.
As described in [87] Bayesian optimisation consists of two main components: a Bayesian
statistical model for modelling the objective function, and an acquisition function for
deciding where to sample next. The algorithm initially evaluates the objective accord-
ing to a space-filling experimental design, often consisting of points chosen uniformly at
random. They are used iteratively to allocate the remainder of a budget of I function
evaluations, as shown in Algorithm 5.2.
Algorithm 5.2: Basic pseudo-code for Bayesian optimisation. As given in [87]
Place a Gaussian process prior on f ;
Observe f at i0 points according to an initial space-filling experimental design, set
i = i0 ;
while i ≤ I do
Update the posterior probability distribution on f using all available data;
Let xi be a maximiser of the acquisition function over x, where the acquisition
function is computed using the current posterior distribution;
Observe yi = f(xi);
Increment i;
return either the point evaluated with the largest f(x), or the point with the
largest posterior mean.
The statistical model is invariably a Gaussian process. It provides a Bayesian posterior
probability distribution that describes potential values for the objective function at a
candidate point. Each time the objective function is observed at the new point the
posterior distribution is updated.
The acquisition function measures the value that would be generated by evaluation of
the objective function at a new point, based on the current posterior distribution over
f . The most commonly used acquisition functions are:
• The expected improvement [149].
• The knowledge gradient [86].
• The entropy search and predictive entropy search [130].
As an example of the algorithm’s usage consider the optimisation problem of (5.13).
Figure 5.11 illustrates the change of the utility function over I. The algorithm is set
to run for I = 60. After 60 function evaluations if the utility has not changed in the
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last 10% of evaluations, then the algorithm runs for a further 20 evaluations. This is
repeated until there is no change to the utility in the last 10% of evaluations.
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y
Figure 5.11: Utility over time of calls using Bayesian optimisation. The opponents are
q(1) = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) and q
(2) = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). The best response obtained is p
∗ = (0, 1150 , 0, 0)
5.5.2 SSE method
The SSE method is a linear algebraic approach that defines the closest ZD strategy to
a given strategy p. This strategy is defined as x∗ given by,
x∗ =
(
CTC
)−1
CT p¯ (5.28)
where
p¯ = (p1 − 1, p2 − 1, p3, p4) and
and
C =

R− P R− P
S − P T − P
T − P S − P
0 0

. (5.29)
Once x∗ is estimated the method calculates the squared norm of the remaining error
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referred to as sum of squared errors of prediction (SSE):
SSE = p¯T p¯− p¯C (CTC)−1CT p¯ = p¯T p¯− p¯Cx∗ (5.30)
The SSE is defined as how far a strategy is from behaving as a ZD. A small SSE implies
ZD behaviour whereas a high SSE implies a non extortionate behaviour.
5.5.3 Best response memory-one strategies for N = 2
Bayesian optimisation was used to generate a data set of best response memory-one
strategies for N = 2 opponents. The data set has been archived and is available at [104].
The data set contains two sets of best response memory-one strategies for each pair of
opponents. These are:
• Best response memory-one strategies without self interactions.
• Best response memory-one strategies with self interactions.
In several evolutionary settings such as Moran Processes self interactions are key.
Previous work has identified interesting results such as the appearance of self recog-
nition mechanisms when training strategies using evolutionary algorithms in Moran
processes [164]. This aspect of reinforcement learning can be done for best response
memory-one strategies by incorporating the strategy itself in the objective function
as shown in Equation (5.13). K is the number of self interactions that will take
place.
max
p
:
1
N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p) +Kup(p)
such that : p ∈ R[0,1]
(5.31)
For determining the memory-one best response with self interactions, an algorithmic
approach is considered, called best response dynamics. The best response dynamics
approach used in this manuscript is given by Algorithm 5.3.
Algorithm 5.3: Best response dynamics algorithm
p(t) ← (1, 1, 1, 1);
while p(t) 6= p(t−1) do
p(t+1) = argmax 1N
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p(t)) +Kup(t)(p
(t));
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Using this approach it would be possible to create a memory-one best response strat-
egy that updates on every generation of a Moran process to recalculate the optimal
behaviour given the population.
The data set contains a total of 1,000 trials corresponding to 1,000 different instances
of a best response strategy in tournaments with and without self interactions. For each
trial a set of 2 opponents is randomly generated and the memory-one best responses
against them are found. The probabilities qi of the opponents are randomly generated
and Figures 5.12a and 5.12b, show that they are uniformly distributed over the trials.
Thus, the full space of possible opponents has been covered.
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Figure 5.12: Distributions of opponents’ probabilities.
The SSE method was applied to the best response memory-one strategies once the
data set was generated. The distributions of SSE for the best response in tournaments
(N = 2) with and without self interactions with (K = 1) are given in Figure 5.13.
Moreover, a statistical summary of the SSE distributions is given in Table 5.1.
mean standard deviation 5% 50% 95% max median skewness kurtosis
Tournament without self interactions 0.34 0.40 0.028 0.17 1.05 2.47 0.17 1.87 3.60
Tournament with self interactions 0.17 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.67 1.53 0.12 3.42 1.92
Table 5.1: SSE of best response memory-one for N = 2.
For the best response in tournaments that do not include self interactions the distri-
bution of SSE is skewed to the left, indicating that the best response does exhibit ZDs
behaviour and so could be extortionate, however, the best response is not uniformly
a ZDs. A positive measure of skewness and kurtosis, and a mean of 0.34 indicate a
heavy tail to the right. Therefore, in several cases the strategy is not trying to extort
its opponents. In [132] a similar behaviour is refereed to as the partner strategy. The
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Figure 5.13: SEE distributions for best response in tournaments without and with self
interactions for N = 2.
partner strategy aims to share the payoff for mutual cooperation, but it is ready to fight
back when being exploited. The partner strategy was designed, but the best responses
which are defined by their opponents seem to exhibit the same behaviour.
Similarly, when considering self interactions, the distribution of SSE for the best re-
sponse strategy has skewness and kurtosis that indicate a heavy tail to the right. This
indicates that memory-one strategies that interact with copies of themselves need to
even more adaptable than ZDs, and aim for mutual cooperation as well as exploitation
which is in line with the results of [132] where their strategy was designed to adapt and
was shown to be evolutionary stable. The findings of this work show that an optimal
strategy acts in the same way.
The difference between best responses in tournaments without and with self interactions
is further explored by Figure 5.14. Though, no statistically significant differences have
been found, from Figure 5.14, it seems that the best response that incorporate self
interactions has a higher median p2; which corresponds to the probability of cooperating
after receiving a defection. Thus, they are more likely to forgive after being tricked.
This is due to the fact that they could be playing against themselves, and they need
to be able to forgive so that future cooperation can occur.
5.5.4 Longer memory best responses
This section focuses on the memory size of strategies. The effectiveness of memory
in the IPD has been previously explored in the literature, as discussed in section 3.1,
however, none of the previous works has compared the performance of longer-memory
strategies to memory-one best responses.
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Figure 5.14: Distributions of p∗ for best response in tournaments without and with self
interactions. The medians, denoted as p¯∗, for tournaments are p¯∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0), and for
evolutionary settings p¯∗ = (0, 0.19, 0, 0).
The strategy used in this Chapter is one of the archetypes described in Chapter 2
called Gambler (introduced in [125]). As a reminder, Gambler is a stochastic version
of a lookup table. It makes probabilistic decisions based on the opponent’s n1 first
moves, the opponent’s m1 last moves and the player’s m2 last moves. In this Chapter
Gambler with parameters: n1 = 2,m1 = 1 and m2 = 1 is used as a longer-memory
strategy.
By considering the opponent’s first two moves, the opponents last move and the player’s
last move, there are only 16 (4× 2× 2) possible outcomes that can occur, furthermore,
Gambler also makes a probabilistic decision of cooperating in the opening move. Thus,
Gambler is a function f : {C, D} → [0, 1]R. This can be hard coded as an element of
[0, 1]16+1R , one probability for each outcome plus the opening move. Hence, compared
to (5.13), finding an optimal Gambler is a 17 dimensional problem given by:
max
p
:
N∑
i=1
Uq
(i)(f)
such that : f ∈ R17[0,1]
(5.32)
Note that Equation (5.11) can not be used here for the utility of Gambler, and actual
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simulated players are used. This is done using a tournament of 500 turns and 200
repetitions, moreover, (5.32) is solved numerically using Bayesian optimisation.
As in the previous section a large data set has been generated with instances of an
optimal Gambler and a memory-one best response, available at [104]. Estimating a
best response Gambler (17 dimensions) is computational more expensive compared to
a best response memory-one (4 dimensions). As a result, the analysis of this section is
based on a total of 130 trials. For each trial two random opponents have been selected.
The 130 pair of opponents are a sub set of the opponents used in section 5.5.3. The
distributions of their transition probabilities are given in Figures 5.15a and 5.15a.
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Figure 5.15: Distributions of opponents’ probabilities for longer memory experiment.
The ratio between Gambler’s utility and the best response memory-one strategy’s util-
ity has been calculated and its distribution in given in Figure 5.16. It is evident from
Figure 5.16 that Gambler always performs as well as the best response memory-one
strategy and often performs better. There are no points where the ratio value is less
than 1, thus Gambler never performed less than the best response memory-one strat-
egy and in places outperforms it. This seems to be at odd with the result of [234]
that against a memory-one opponent having a longer memory will not give a strategy
any advantage. However, against two memory-one opponents Gambler’s performance
is better than the optimal memory-one strategy. This is evidence that in the case of
two opponents having a shorter memory is limiting.
5.6 Stability of defection
An additional theoretical result that is possible to obtain due to Theorem 2, is a
condition for which in an environment of memory-one opponents defection is the stable
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Figure 5.16: Utilities of Gambler and best response memory-one strategies for 130
different pair of opponents.
choice, based only on the coefficients of the opponents.
This result is obtained by evaluating the sign of Equation (5.11)’s derivative at p =
(0, 0, 0, 0). If at that point the derivative is negative, then the utility of a player only
decreases if they were to change their behaviour, and thus defection at that point is
stable.
Lemma 5. In a tournament of N players {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)} for q(i) ∈ R4[0,1] defec-
tion is stable if the transition probabilities of the opponents satisfy conditions Equa-
tion (5.33) and Equation (5.34).
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i)) ≤ 0 (5.33)
while,
N∑
i=1
a¯(i) 6= 0 (5.34)
Proof. For defection to be stable the derivative of the utility at the point p = (0, 0, 0, 0)
must be negative.
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Substituting p = (0, 0, 0, 0) in Equation (5.21) gives:
d
N∑
i=1
uq
(i)(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p=(0,0,0,0)
=
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i))
(a¯(i))2
(5.35)
The sign of the numerator
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i) − c¯(i)Ta(i)) can vary based on the transition
probabilities of the opponents. The denominator can not be negative, and otherwise is
always positive. Thus the sign of the derivative is negative if and only if
N∑
i=1
(c(i)T a¯(i)−
c¯(i)Ta(i)) ≤ 0.
Consider a population for which defection is known to be stable. In that population
all the members will over time adopt the same behaviour; thus in such population
cooperation will never take over. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.17.
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Figure 5.17: A. For q1 = (0.2219, 0.8707, 0.2067, 0.9186), q2 =
(0.4884, 0.6117, 0.7659, 0.5184) and q3 = (0.2968, 0.1877, 0.0807, 0.7384), Equa-
tion (5.33) and Equation (5.34) hold and Defector takes over the population.
B. For q1 = (0.9670, 0.5472, 0.9726, 0.7148), q2 = (0.6977, 0.2160, 0.9762, 0.0062) and
q3 = (0.2529, 0.4349, 0.7738, 0.1976), Equation (5.33) fails and Defector does not take
over the population.
CHAPTER 5. STABILITY OF DEFECTION, OPTIMISATION OF STRATEGIES
AND THE LIMITS OF MEMORY IN THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA. 117
5.7 Chapter summary
This Chapter has considered best response strategies in the IPD game, and more
specifically, memory-one best responses. It has proved that:
• The utility of a memory-one strategy against a set of memory-one opponents can
be written as a sum of ratios of quadratic forms (Theorem 2).
• There is a compact way of identifying a memory-one best response to a group of
opponents through a search over a discrete set (Theorem 3).
• There is a compact way of identifying environment of memory-one opponents
where defection is the stable choice based only on the coefficients of the opponents
(Lemma 5).
Note that Theorem 3 does not only have game theoretic novelty, but also mathematical
novelty of solving quadratic ratio optimisation problems where the quadratics are non
concave. Additionally, Theorem 3 led to Lemma 4 which defined best response reactive
strategies. Using the set of reactive strategies it was possible to demonstrate the usage
of resultant theory in the search of best response strategies.
The empirical results of this Chapter were presented in section 5.5. The results relied on
a bespoke data set of 1,000 pairs of memory-one opponents. For each pair of opponents
two sets of best response memory-one strategies were estimated. These two best re-
sponse memory-one calculations were estimated in the case when self-interactions were
included and also when they were not included. The behaviour of these best responses
was investigated. More specifically, it was explored whether it was extortionate acts
that made them the most favourable strategies. It was shown that it was not extortion
but adaptability that allowed the strategies to gain the most from their interactions.
In settings with self interactions there is some evidence that the best response strategy
is more likely to forgive after being tricked.
Section 5.5 also explored the limitations of memory. The performance of best response
memory-one strategy was compared to that of a Gambler with longer memory. The
results concluded that the performance of memory-one strategies is limited by their
memory in cases where they interact with multiple opponents. They can never score
higher than a longer memory strategy.
By specifically exploring the entire space of memory-one strategies to identify the best
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strategy for a variety of situations, this Chapter has added to the literature casting
doubt on the effectiveness of ZDs, it has highlighted the importance of adaptability
and provides a framework for the continued understanding of these important ques-
tions.
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Chapter 6
Best response sequences in the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The research reported in this Chapter has been carried out with:
Axelrod-Python library (APL) version: 4.2.0
Associated data set: [106]
Associated codebase: [98]
6.1 Introduction
In this Chapter best response strategies are explored in the form of static sequences of
moves, in order to generate a large data set of best response sequences to a collection
of opponents.
The data set is generated by considering best response sequences in finite IPD matches
of 205 turns against 192 strategies available in the APL. These best response sequences
are not obtained explicitly but instead are estimated heuristically using a genetic al-
gorithm devised for this purpose.
The purpose of a large collection of best response sequences is to serve as training
data in Chapter 7 which aims to train a recurrent neural network as an IPD strategy.
In Chapter 7 the usage of the bespoke data set, which has been archived and made
publicly available [106], is discussed in more detail. This Chapter is structured as
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follows:
• section 6.2 formalises the use of sequences to express a player in a finite IPD
match.
• section 6.3 describes the genetic algorithm used to estimate best response se-
quences.
• section 6.4 details the process of generating best response sequences to a collection
of 192 strategies.
6.2 Iterated Prisoner Dilemma Strategies as sequences
In a finite N round IPD match a player that does not react to their opponent can be
defined by a sequence,
S ∈ {C,D}n,where 1 ≤ n ≤ N. (6.1)
Strategies that base their actions on sequences are already established in the litera-
ture [44], such as Periodic Player CD, Periodic Player DC, Periodic Player CCD
and Periodic Player DDC [178, 207], or as referred to in [165] Cycler CD, Cycler
DC, Cycler CCD and Cycler DDC. These are strategies that play a given sequences
periodically, however, the strategies concerned with here play a given sequence only
once, thus n = N .
As an example consider a match of 10 turns between the strategy S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,
D,D,C,C} and Cooperator. The match between the two strategies is captured by
Table 6.1 where U(s1, s2) ∈ R2 is the average score per turn scored by strategies s1
and s2.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 U(S,Cooperator)
S D D D C C C D D C C 4.0
Cooperator C C C C C C C C C C 1.5
Table 6.1: The interactions of a 10 turns match between S =
{D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Cooperator as well as the average score per
turn achieved by each strategy.
A sequence strategy S can play against strategies that react to the history, for example
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against Tit For Tat as demonstrated by Table 6.2,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 U(S,Tit For Tat)
S D D D C C C D D C C 2.2
Tit For Tat C D D D C C C D D C 2.2
Table 6.2: The interactions and average score per turn of a 10 turns match between
S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Tit For Tat.
and against stochastic strategies such as Random. Random cooperates with a prob-
ability of 0.5 at each turn, and thus the actions of the strategy are not deterministic.
Random is a strategy that does not react to the history, however, the actions of
stochastic strategies that react to the history also differ between repetitions even when
the history of the match is the same. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 both capture a match between
S and a Random player. For a match of 10 turns Random has a total of 210 possi-
ble plays. In order to capture several different plays of stochastic strategies computer
seeding, further details of this are given in section 6.4.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 U(S,Random)
S D D D C C C D D C C 2.2
Random D D C C D C D C C D 2.2
Table 6.3: The interactions and average score per turn of a 10 turns match between
S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Random.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 U(S,Random)
S D D D C C C D D C C 2.4
Random C D D C C C D D C C 1.9
Table 6.4: The interactions and average score per turn of a 10 turns match between
S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} and Random. The actions make by Random are
different to that of Table 6.3.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, a best response strategy is a strategy that achieves
the most favourable outcome. Thus a best response sequence against a given opponent
Q corresponds to a sequence S∗ for which the average score per turn is maximised, as
given in (6.2).
max
S∗
:U(S∗, Q) (6.2)
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Identifying best responses to some opponents can be a trivial problem. The optimal se-
quence against a Cooperator is in an all D sequence. In fact the sequence {D, . . . ,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
} is
a best response against any sequence player whose plays are independent of the history.
However, for some strategies identifying best responses is a complex problem.
Additionally, there are strategies that have multiple best response sequences. For
instance the strategy Adaptive introduced in [178]. Adaptive opens by playing a se-
quence of {C, . . . , C︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
} followed by a sequence of {D, . . . ,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
5
}. The strategy then proceeds
to play either C or D depending on which action had a higher total score for the strat-
egy (the total score is recalculated at each turn). A sequence maximises its average
score against Adaptive by locking the strategy into unconditional cooperations follow-
ing its opening 11 turns sequence while the sequence defects. In order for cooperation
to be the most favourable action for Adaptive the strategy needs to achieve two mutual
cooperations at its opening sequence. That is because the score achieved by cooperat-
ing 2 × 3 + 4 × 0 = 6 is greater than the score achieved by defecting 1 × 5 = 5. Any
sequence which incorporates two cooperations in the first 6 turns and defects thereafter
is a best response sequence to Adaptive. Thus, there can be 26 best response sequences
to the strategy, for example S∗1 and S∗2 ,
S∗1 = {C,D,D,D,D,C,D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D}
S∗2 = {D,D,C,C,D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D}
where U(S∗1 ,Adaptive) = U(S∗2 ,Adaptive) = 3.4.
Due to identifying best response sequences to some opponents being a complex problem,
and moreover, multiple best response sequences existing for some opponents the best
response sequences are not manually identified. Instead a genetic algorithm is used to
estimate them. A background on genetic algorithms as well as the details of the specific
genetic algorithm devised for this Chapter are presented in the following section.
6.3 Genetic algorithm
A genetic algorithm (GA) is a heuristic inspired by the process of natural selection that
belongs to the larger class of evolutionary algorithms. As stated in [292] GAs encode
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a potential solution to a specific problem on a simple chromosome-like data structure,
and apply recombination operators to these structures in such a way as to preserve
critical information. GAs are often viewed as function optimisers, although the range
of problems to which they have been applied is quite broad [139,151,297].
An implementation of a GA begins with a population P of potential solutions, a number
of generations G ∈ N and a cut-off or bottleneck b < |P |. At each generation the
algorithm scores and potentially removes each member of the population pi ∈ P . This
is done by using a mapping from a member of the population to an ordered set based
on an evaluation function f , usually f(pi)→ R, and by only keeping the top b ranking
members (or proportion of members) by score at the end of each generation. The rest of
the member are discarded. By keeping the top ranked individuals critical information
regarding the successful candidates is preserved and the population rebuilds on it by
using a series of crossovers and mutations.
• During a crossover 2 members of the population are selected, and a new member
is created based on combination of their “genes”. The 2 selected members are
commonly referred to as parents.
• Mutation is a probabilistic change that occurs to an individual, Mutation is
commonly associated with a probability, denoted as pm. pm is the probability of
a mutation happening, either to the individual or to each gene of the individual.
A diagrammatic representation of a generic GA is given in Figure 6.1.
start
Generate
population members
Construct new
members to rebuild
the population
Score and rank
population members
Use crossover
Retain top rank-
ing members
Mutate population
Generations
complete?
endMutatingScoringConstructing
Yes
No
Figure 6.1: Generic flow diagram of a GA.
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The purpose of a GA here is to estimate a best response sequence to a given opponent
Q. Consequently, the members of the population correspond to sequences,
Si ∈ P where |Si| = N
and the evaluation function corresponds to the average score per turn of a sequence
against Q,
U(Si, Q)→ R for Si ∈ P.
More specifically, the exact GA used in this Chapter is given by Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1: GA for estimating best response sequences to a given opponent
Q.
Input: Q,N, b, pm, G,K
Output: The populations at each generation and the members’ scores
begin
create initial population (Algorithm 6.2) of members S, where |S| = N and
|P | = K
while gi < G do
score each member based on U(Si, Q) for Si ∈ P
sort population based on scores
keep b top members
while |P | < K do
select 2 random members
use members to create new member through crossover
for gene in new member do
mutate gene with probability pm
end
add new member to population
end
end
end
The initial population is created using Algorithm 6.2.
Using a starting population of random guesses is a generally common approach in
the GA literature [139]. However, there is efficiency in using non random starting
populations [76, 228]. As discussed in section 6.2 the best response sequence to any
strategy that does not react to the history is a Defector. Moreover, the best response
sequences to several strategies are sequences that defect only in the last turns. These
are sequences that have been incorporated in the initial population. More specifically,
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Algorithm 6.2: Create initial population of individuals S
Input: K,N
Output: A population of size K.
begin
set of cuts ← K evenly spaced numbers over [1, N ]
for c ∈ set of cuts do
first new member ← {C, . . . , C︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, D, . . . ,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−c
}
second new member ← {D, . . . ,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, C, . . . , C︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−c
}
add both members to population
end
end
Algorithm 6.2 consider all the possible combinations of:
•{C, . . . , C︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, D, . . . ,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−c
} for c ∈ evenly spaced numbers over [1, N ] and
•{D, . . . ,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, C, . . . , C︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−c
} for c ∈ evenly spaced numbers over [1, N ].
The GA of Algorithm 6.1 has been implemented in the programming language Python
and it has been organised into an open source package called sequence_sensei avail-
able at [98]. The properties of creating an initial population, crossover and mutation
have been implemented as individual functions. The implementation of Algorithm 6.2
in the package is given by Figure 6.2.
1 import numpy as np
2 def get_initial_population(half_size_of_population, sequence_length):
3 """
4 Generates an initial population of sequences. Note that the length
5 of the population which is being generated is 2 * half_size_of_population.
6 """
7 cuts = np.linspace(1, sequence_length, half_size_of_population, dtype=int)
8 sequences = []
9 for cut in cuts:
10 sequences.append(
11 [1 for _ in range(cut)] + [0 for _ in range(sequence_length - cut)]
12 )
13 sequences.append(
14 [0 for _ in range(cut)] + [1 for _ in range(sequence_length - cut)]
15 )
16
17 return sequences
Figure 6.2: Source code for the function get_initial_population implemented in
sequence_sensei which is used to create an initial population of a given size.
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Figure 6.3 gives an example of creating an initial population using the package. Note
that the sequences are of 0s and 1s and not of IPD actions. The APL project can map
binary number to actions such that 0 → D and 1 → C. This is also demonstrated in
Figure 6.3.
1 >>> import sequence_sensei as ss
2 >>> import numpy as np
3
4 >>> initial_population = ss.get_initial_population(
5 ... half_size_of_population=5, sequence_length=8
6 ... )
7 >>> np.matrix(initial_population)
8 matrix([[1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
9 [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
10 [1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
11 [0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
12 [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0],
13 [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1],
14 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0],
15 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1],
16 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
17 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]])
18
19 >>> import axelrod as axl
20 >>> np.matrix([[axl.Action(gene) for gene in member] for member in initial_population])
21 matrix([[C, D, D, D, D, D, D, D],
22 [D, C, C, C, C, C, C, C],
23 [C, C, D, D, D, D, D, D],
24 [D, D, C, C, C, C, C, C],
25 [C, C, C, C, D, D, D, D],
26 [D, D, D, D, C, C, C, C],
27 [C, C, C, C, C, C, D, D],
28 [D, D, D, D, D, D, C, C],
29 [C, C, C, C, C, C, C, C],
30 [D, D, D, D, D, D, D, D]], dtype=object)
Figure 6.3: Example of using get_initial_population to generate a population of
K = 10 and N = 8.
In the GA, as given by Algorithm 6.1, the crossover occurs by randomly selecting two
member of the population, while |P | < K, and randomly selecting a crossover point.
Note that the crossover point is smaller than N . The new member initially inherits
the genes to the left of the crossover point of the first parent, and to the right of the
crossover point of the second parent.
For instance, given two member of the population S1 = {C,C,C,C,C,C,C,C,C,C}
and S2 = {C,D,C,D,C,D,C,D,C,D} and given that the crossover point is 4, this
gives a new member S3:
CHAPTER 6. BEST RESPONSE SEQUENCES IN THE ITERATED
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 127
S3 = {C,C,C,C︸ ︷︷ ︸
from S1
, C,D,C,D,C,D︸ ︷︷ ︸
from S2
}.
The implementation of crossover in sequence_sensei is given by Figure 6.4, and Fig-
ure 6.5 demonstrates the usage of the crossover function to crossover S1 and S2.
1 import random
2
3 def crossover(sequence_one, sequence_two):
4 sequence_length = len(sequence_one)
5 crossover_point = random.randint(0, sequence_length)
6
7 return sequence_one[:crossover_point] + sequence_two[crossover_point:]
Figure 6.4: Source code of the crossover function.
1 >>> import random
2 >>> import sequence_sensei as ss
3
4 >>> turns = 10
5 >>> s_one = [1 for _ in range(turns)]
6 >>> s_two = [i % 2 for i in range(turns)]
7
8 >>> random.seed(0)
9 >>> new_member = ss.crossover(s_one, s_two)
10 >>> new_member
11 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]
Figure 6.5: An example of using crossover function to crossover S1 and S2
Following the crossover between two members, a mutation is applied to new member
before it is added to the population. Mutation has been implemented as a given
probability pm that each gene of the new member is flipped. A total of N random
numbers between [0, 1] are sampled. If the sampled probability at time i is less than
pm then the i
th gene of the individual is flipped, as demonstrated by Figure 6.6.
S3 = {C, C, C, C, C, C, D, C, D,C}
mutated S3 = {C, C, C, C, C, C, D, C, D,D}
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Figure 6.6: Mutation example of S3.
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The implementation of mutation in sequence_sensei is given by Figure 6.7, and an
example of mutating S3 using the function is given in Figure 6.8.
1 def mutation(gene, mutation_probability):
2 if random.random() < mutation_probability:
3 return abs(gene - 1)
4 return gene
Figure 6.7: Source code of the mutation function.
1 >>> new_member = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]
2
3 >>> random.seed(1)
4 >>> [ss.mutation(gene, mutation_probability=0.05) for gene in new_member]
5 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
Figure 6.8: An example of using the mutation function to mutate S3.
The main function implemented in sequence_sensei for performing a GA is the
evolved function. The function has several input arguments which correspond to
the inputs of Algorithm 6.1. In the following section the evolved function is used to
run several trials and estimate best response sequences. The parameters values for
each run will be presented there. Moreover, the details of the best response sequence
collection against the 192 strategies are presented in the following section.
6.4 Data collection
The data set generated in this Chapter was created using the GA of Algorithm 6.1
and the APL project. The GA of Algorithm 6.1 estimates the best response sequence
for a given opponent, and in order to generate a collection of best responses a list
of opponents is obtained from APL. More specifically 192 strategies are used in this
Chapter. These can be found in the Appendix B.2.
The APL project is also used to calculate the average score per turn, U(S,Q), player
S can achieve against an opponent Q. The project contains a specific player class that
can simulate the play of any given sequence of Cs and Ds. The player class is called
Cycler and it takes as an input argument a series of actions as a string. An example
of creating and using such a player in a match is given by Figure 6.9. The average
score per turn is obtained using an in built method of APL once a match has been
simulated.
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1 >>> import axelrod as axl
2
3 >>> players = [axl.Cycler('DDDCCCDDCC'), axl.Cooperator()]
4 >>> match = axl.Match(players, turns=10)
5 >>> match.play()
6 [(D, C), (D, C), (D, C), (C, C), (C, C), (C, C), (D, C), (D, C), (C, C), (C, C)]
7
8 >>> match.final_score_per_turn()
9 (4.0, 1.5)
10
11 >>> players = [axl.Cycler('DDDCCCDDCC'), axl.TitForTat()]
12 >>> match = axl.Match(players, turns=10)
13 >>> match.play()
14 [(D, C), (D, D), (D, D), (C, D), (C, C), (C, C), (D, C), (D, D), (C, D), (C, C)]
15
16 >>> match.final_score_per_turn()
17 (2.2, 2.2)
Figure 6.9: Simulating a match between Cycler and Cooperator and Cycler and Tit
For Tat. The class Cycler takes a given sequence as an input argument in a string
format ('DDDCCCDDCC'). Once a match has been simulated with the play method the
average score per turn is obtained using the final_score_per_turn method.
From the 192 strategies, 62 are stochastic and 130 are deterministic. In section 6.2
it was explained that the outcome of a match between two deterministic strategies is
always the same. In comparison, the outcome of a match with a stochastic strategy
can differ, because the actions of a stochastic opponent are not deterministic. The
actions of a stochastic opponent can be repeated by using computer seeding for seeding
the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) that creates the parameters that define
what moves the strategy will take. Seeds are set before generating a random number,
and if the same seed is used on initialisation then the random output remains the
same. Thus, as long as a match is seeded the behaviour of a stochastic strategy can be
reproduced, and different seeds lead to different plays of stochastic strategies.
Consider the match between Random and S = {D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C,C} pre-
sented in section 6.2. Random has a total of 210 possible plays for the given match.
By using different computer seeds a number of these plays can be simulated as shown
in Figure 6.10.
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1 >>> players = [axl.Cycler('DDDCCCDDCC'), axl.Random()]
2 >>> for seed in range(5):
3 ... axl.seed(seed)
4 ... match = axl.Match(players, turns=10)
5 ... actions = match.play()
6 ... print(actions, match.final_score_per_turn())
7 ... print("================================================================================")
8 [(D, D), (D, D), (D, C), (C, C), (C, D), (C, C), (D, D), (D, C), (C, C), (C, D)] (2.2, 2.2)
9 ================================================================================
10 [(D, C), (D, D), (D, D), (C, C), (C, C), (C, C), (D, D), (D, D), (C, C), (C, C)] (2.4, 1.9)
11 ================================================================================
12 [(D, D), (D, D), (D, C), (C, C), (C, D), (C, D), (D, D), (D, C), (C, D), (C, D)] (1.6, 2.6)
13 ================================================================================
14 [(D, C), (D, D), (D, C), (C, D), (C, D), (C, C), (D, C), (D, D), (C, C), (C, C)] (2.6, 2.1)
15 ================================================================================
16 [(D, C), (D, C), (D, C), (C, C), (C, C), (C, C), (D, D), (D, D), (C, D), (C, C)] (2.9, 1.9)
17 ================================================================================
Figure 6.10: Example code of using seeding to generate different plays of Random.
The value of seed changes to {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the seed is set with the command
axl.seed(seed) before simulating the game. This initialises the pseudo random gen-
erator that define what moves Random will take. The above code snipped will always
have the same output each time it is repeated.
A total of 10 different plays are captured for each of the stochastic strategies of this
Chapter. Thus, a total of 10 different seeds are used for each stochastic strategy.
The data collection process of best response sequences in more details is given by
Figure 6.11.
start
assign a strategy from
the collection as Q
Is Q
stochastic?
Perform GA trials
write generations
history to csv
seed ∈ {0, . . . , 9}
seed=NaN end
Yes
No
seed=NaN or seed= 9
seed 6=NaN and seed< 9
Figure 6.11: Diagrammatic representation of the best response sequences collection
process.
From the collection of opponents a strategy is selected at each trial. If the strategy
is deterministic a set of GAs with different parameters values are performed for 2,000
generations. The summary of the GA trials which contain information for each genera-
tion is exported to a single csv file, then the next opponent is selected. If the opponent
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is stochastic the above process is repeated 10 times. Each time the stochastic strategy
is accompanied by a different seed value which is used to initialise the pseudo random
generator. For each combination of stochastic opponent and seed the GAs summary is
exported to a csv file.
For each opponent, or opponent-seed combination a total of 18 GAs are performed.
The different values for each parameter are given by Table 6.5.
Parameter Explanation Values
N number of turns 205
G number of generations 2,000
b bottleneck 10, 20
K size of a population 20, 30, 40
pm probability of gene mutating 0.01, 0.05, 0.1
Table 6.5: The parameters of the GA. The GA is performed a total of 18 times for
each opponent. More specifically, it is performed for each possible combination of the
parameters values.
All the best response sequences that are generated in this Chapter are best response
sequences of 205 turns. Moreover, they are best responses not to 192 strategies, but
to a total of (130 + 62× 10) 750 opponents. Thus, a total of 750 trials of Figure 6.11
have been performed.
An example of an exported summary for the deterministic opponent Alternator is
given by Table 6.6.
opponent seed b pm K/2 gi index score gene 1 gene 2 . . . gene 203 gene 204 gene 205
0 Alternator NaN 10 0.01 10 0 19 3.009756 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
1 Alternator NaN 10 0.01 10 0 0 3.000000 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
2 Alternator NaN 10 0.01 10 0 2 2.839024 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
3 Alternator NaN 10 0.01 10 0 17 2.839024 0 0 . . . 1 1 1
4 Alternator NaN 10 0.01 10 0 4 2.673171 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080535 Alternator NaN 20 0.10 20 2000 29 2.775610 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
1080536 Alternator NaN 20 0.10 20 2000 24 2.770732 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
1080537 Alternator NaN 20 0.10 20 2000 31 2.770732 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
1080538 Alternator NaN 20 0.10 20 2000 32 2.770732 0 0 . . . 0 0 1
1080539 Alternator NaN 20 0.10 20 2000 34 2.756098 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
Table 6.6: An example of an exported summary. The specific output is for the opponent
Alternator. Alternator is a deterministic strategy, consequently, the value of seed is
NaN. The values of the different GA parameters are recorded in the summary, as well
as the details of each member of each generation. The sequences’ genes were recorded
in 0 and 1, where 0→ D and 1→ C. The best responses sequences are the individuals
that have the maximum score at gi = 2,000.
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For a stochastic strategy there are a total of 9 exported summaries. An example of an
exported summary for Champion with seed=9 is given by Table 6.7. The best response
sequences are collected from the last generation of the exported summaries.
opponent seed b pm K/2 gi index score gene 1 gene 2 . . . gene 203 gene 204 gene 205
0 Champion 9 10 0.01 10 0 10 3.712195 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
1 Champion 9 10 0.01 10 0 12 3.663415 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
2 Champion 9 10 0.01 10 0 8 3.585366 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
3 Champion 9 10 0.01 10 0 14 3.448780 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
4 Champion 9 10 0.01 10 0 6 3.312195 1 1 . . . 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080535 Champion 9 20 0.10 20 2000 25 3.634146 0 0 . . . 1 1 0
1080536 Champion 9 20 0.10 20 2000 34 3.629268 1 1 . . . 0 0 1
1080537 Champion 9 20 0.10 20 2000 31 3.604878 1 1 . . . 1 0 1
1080538 Champion 9 20 0.10 20 2000 21 3.443902 0 0 . . . 1 0 0
1080539 Champion 9 20 0.10 20 2000 20 3.351220 1 0 . . . 0 1 0
Table 6.7: An example of an exported summary for a stochastic strategy. The column
seed does not have a value of NaN anymore but has captured the seed that was used
to generate the specific play of the stochastic opponent. The members’ genes are also
recorded for each generation. Note that 0→ D and 1→ C.
In section 6.2 it was stated that the best response to a strategy that does not react to the
history is to always defect. Such strategies include Cooperator, Defector, Alternator
and the family of the Cycler strategies. Algorithm 6.1 successfully identified their best
responses, as shown in Table 6.8.
opponent score gene 1 gene 2 gene 3 gene 4 gene 5 gene 6 . . . gene 201 gene 202 gene 203 gene 204 gene 205
Cooperator 5.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Alternator 3.010 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Cycler CCCCCD 4.337 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Cycler CCCD 4.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Cycler CCCDCD 3.673 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Cycler CCD 3.673 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Cycler DC 2.990 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Cycler DDC 2.327 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Defector 1.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.8: Best response sequences to a number of opponents that do not react to the
history of the match. The best response to such strategies are to always defect. This
was successfully captured by the best sequence collection process of this Chapter.
The best response sequence to Tit For Tat and Grudger is the sequence that cooper-
ates until before the last turn. That way the sequence receives the payoff for mutual
cooperation for N − 1 turns, and then betrays its opponent in the last turn to max-
imise its score, receiving a payoff of T . It only defects on the last turn because then
it can not be punished. The sequence is also the best response to the strategy Hard
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Tit For Tat. The strategy is a variant of Tit For Tat that uses that uses a longer his-
tory for retaliation. The best response sequences were captured for all three strategies,
Table 6.9.
opponent score gene 1 gene 2 gene 3 gene 4 gene 5 gene 6 . . . gene 201 gene 202 gene 203 gene 204 gene 205
Tit For Tat 3.01 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 1 0
Grudger 3.01 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 1 0
Hard Tit For Tat 3.01 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 1 0
Table 6.9: Best response sequences to strategies Tit For Tat, Grudger and Hard Tit
For Tat.
There are more sophisticated yet still established best response sequences. These in-
clude the best response to TF1 [164]. In [164] the strategy TF1 was trained using a 16
state finite state machine in a Moran process setting. The TF1 strategy developed a
hand shake mechanism that allowed it to identify strategies that play like itself. Once
two copies of TF1 identify each other they go into mutually cooperations until the end
of their interactions. The best response to the strategy is the sequence that performs
the handshake, and goes into mutual cooperations until before the final turn. This best
response sequence was also captured by the data collection process. The handshake
is performed in the opening three turns, and it is the sequence {C,C,D} as shown in
Table 6.10.
opponent score gene 1 gene 2 gene 3 gene 4 gene 5 gene 6 . . . gene 201 gene 202 gene 203 gene 204 gene 205
TF1 3.0 1 1 0 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 1 0
Table 6.10: Best response sequence to TF1 introduced in [164]. The strategy performs
a handshake in the first three moves. The hand shake is the sequence CDC. If the
opponent plays that same then the strategies go into mutual cooperation.
6.4.1 Parallelisation and stochastic results
The data collection process of this Chapter was carried out using parallel processing.
In parallel processing many calculations or executions of tasks are carried out simul-
taneously. In the case of the data collection here the tasks were scoring members of
the population. More specifically, at most 10 members of the population were being
scored at the same time.
Parallel programming was executed using multi threading [261]. Threads are “light-
weight” processes, a unit of execution within a process. Threads are designed to have
shared memory and can manipulate global variables of main thread. Scoring a member
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of the population corresponded to a single task which was executed on a single thread.
For the stochastic opponents the task included seeding/setting the PRNG state before
simulating the match. Seeding at the time of generating the data collection was not
implemented in a safe thread way.
The data collection was implemented in a way that each thread was setting the global
PRNG state. That was then shared across all the the threads without synchronisa-
tion. Since the threads are running in parallel, at the same time, and their access
to this global PRNG is not synchronised between them, errors occur. In the case of
the stochastic opponents this means that there are given instances that are not repro-
ducible and for those instance the simulated behaviour does not reflect the opponent’s
behaviour for its given seed.
There are several ways that this error can be corrected. There is a thread safe way
of implementing seeding which involves giving each thread its own local PRNG. Then
there is no longer any state that’s shared by multiple threads without synchronisa-
tion.
For the stochastic opponents 34% of the collected sequences are not reproducible.
Recalling that the aim of this Chapter is to generate a collection of well performing
sequences in the IPD, so that they can be used as the training data for the purposes
of Chapter 7. A 34% percentage of non reproducible sequences is a reasonable ratio
which also ensures more variability to the data for training.
6.4.2 The collection of best response sequences
The collections process was performed for 750 trials, and a total of 18 GAs were per-
formed for each trial. The best response sequences are the sequences with the highest
average score per turn in the final generation regardless of the GA.
In order to understand whether the algorithms reached convergence over the 2,000
generations, the highest score in a population over the generations for four different
strategies is given in Figure 6.12. The population is said to have converged if the highest
average score of the population has not changed over a number of generations.
There are trials for which the algorithms never converged to the best response se-
quences. There are two reason that as to why this happened:
• The bottleneck was equal to the population size. A value K/2 = 10 while b = 20
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results to no new members being added to the population. These trials would
have reached convergence only if the best response was in the initial generation.
• The mutation probability is too high. The earliest converged GA trials are the
trials for which pm = 0.01. As pm is the probability that each gene of the new
member is being flipped, higher values could potentially add to much variation to
the new members. This could lead to the new members losing critical information
they inherited from their parents.
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Figure 6.12: The highest score in a population over the generations for Tit For Tat,
Grudger, FSM 16 and Aggravater. The selected trials capture the results of all the
18 trials for the given set of opponents.
Nevertheless, a sequence that has not converged is still useful. Even though it is not
the highest scoring member, it is a sequence that was not arbitrarily generated but has
some critical information regarding playing against given opponents.
There are several trials that have managed to converged, and they did so in less than
200 generations. This is potentially the effect of a non random initial population.
Figure 6.13 shows the highest score in a population over the generations for the four
strategies of Figure 6.12 but only up to gi = 500. All trials with a pm = 0.01 converged
within the first 200 generations. The trial which reaches convergence first (in the four
demonstrated cases) is the trial with the parameter values of K/2 = 15, b = 10 and
pm = 0.1.
There are a total of 130 deterministic strategies in the collection of opponents and
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Figure 6.13: The highest score in a population over the generations for Tit For Tat,
Grudger, FSM 16 and Aggravater up to gi = 500.
best response sequences were estimated for each. Several of the known best response
sequences have been manually checked and they have been successfully estimated by
the algorithm. These include best response sequences to Tit For Tat, Grudger, Alter-
nator, Pavlov and the Cycler strategies.
In section 6.2 is was explained that strategies can have more than a single best response
sequence. In the case of the strategy Adaptive any strategy that cooperated twice in
the opening 6 moves and defected thereafter is a best response. The data collection
has managed to successfully identify multiple best responses to Adaptive, these are
given by Table 6.11. Adaptive is not the only deterministic strategy with multiple
best response sequences. More specifically, for the 130 deterministic opponents a total
of 2,949 best response sequences were collected.
index gene 1 gene 2 gene 3 gene 4 gene 5 gene 6 gene 7 . . . gene 203 gene 204 gene 205
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
Table 6.11: Best responses sequences estimated by the data collection process. Note
that 0 corresponds to defection and 1 to cooperation.
An interesting questions that arises is: how diverse are the set of best response se-
CHAPTER 6. BEST RESPONSE SEQUENCES IN THE ITERATED
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 137
quences? Out of the 2,949 sequences 2,836 are unique. A graphical representation of
these sequences is given by Figure 6.16a. The two distinct colours represent genes of
C and D. Overall, it can be seen that there is diversity in the best response sequences,
and they are not just long sequences of either C or D. A common trend appears to be
a series of defections at the last turns. In a finite IPD this is to expected. As it was
mentioned in Chapter 4, the more likely it is that the match will end soon, the more
likely it is that the best strategy is to defect.
A total of 2,309 sequences have been estimated for the stochastic opponents. From
these sequences, 66% did indeed play against the correct seeded opponent.
For instance for the strategy - seed combination of Champion - seed= 9 the highest
score achieved by a member of the population over the generations is given by Fig-
ure 6.14. There is variation in the highest score occurring over the generations with
several increasing and decreasing peaks. However, for most of the generations the high-
est score appears to be between 3.80− 3.82. The best response sequence retrieved by
the data collection scored 3.82 against Champion, and it reflected the score of the
sequence against Champion - seed= 9.
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Figure 6.14: The maximum score a sequence achieved against Champion with seed
9 over the generations. Each line represents a different GA trial. Only the GAs with
pm = 0.01 have been included.
There are stochastic opponents for which more variation occurred over the generations.
An example of that is Random. The highest score of the population in a single GA
trial, for opponent - seed combination Random - seed= 1, is given by Figure 6.15. In
the case of Random - seed= 1 the score of the best response sequence that was collected
was not the actual score the sequence scores against Random - seed= 1.
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Figure 6.15: The maximum score a sequence achieved against Random - seed= 1 over
the generations.
From the 2,309 sequences against stochastic strategies 2,130 are unique. A graphical
representation of these sequences are given by Figure 6.16b. Similar to the results of
the best response sequences against deterministic opponents the sequences are diverse.
However, compared to the best response sequences to deterministic opponents the
responses to stochastic opponents appear to be less diverse. The responses to stochastic
opponents appear to belong to two families of strategies. Strategies that cooperate for
approximately the first 150 turns and defect thereafter, and strategies that play a
series of alternating sets of cooperations and defections. The best response sequences
to deterministic opponents can not be classified in just two families of strategies, and
thus are more diverse.
In summary, from the list of 192 strategies examined in this Chapter, 750 different op-
ponent instances were simulated and a total of 5,258 best response sequences of length
205 were retrieved. The choice of 205 turns will be explained in the following Chapter.
The best response sequences have been archived and made available at [106].
6.5 Chapter summary
This Chapter has explored the concept of best responses in the IPD game in the form
of static sequences of moves. It introduced an evolutionary algorithm, Algorithm 6.1,
which can successfully identify best response sequences.
The algorithm was executed to estimate best response sequences to the majority of
opponents listed in the APL. More specifically, a total of 192 opponents from APL
were used. Several of the strategies in the project are stochastic and computer seeded
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(a) A graphical representation of best 2,949
response sequence. These have been esti-
mated using deterministic opponents.
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Figure 6.16: A graphical representation of best response sequences. The best response
sequences have been sorted based on their total number of cooperations. Thus the top
rows of the plots are dominated by best response sequences that mainly defect and the
bottom rows by sequences that mainly cooperate.
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versions of these strategies were used to explore their different behaviours. From the
list of 192 opponents a total of 750 different behaviours were simulated.
For the 130 deterministic strategies a total of 2,949 sequences, from which 2,836 were
unique, were estimated. These sequences were not just a set of trivial sequences of
either C or D. A common trait in the best response sequences appeared to be a
series of defection closer to the final turns. For the seeded versions of the 62 stochastic
opponents the best response sequences are not guaranteed to have been captured due to
issues related to PRNGs and multi threading. Nevertheless, a total of 2,309 sequences
from which 2,130 are unique were collected. Similar, these sequences are more diverse
than just a series of a single action.
A total of 5,258 sequences were collected. These have been archived and are available
at [106]. The main purpose of this Chapter has been to generate the bespoke data set,
which contains a large number of unique and diverse sequences, so it can be used as
training data in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
Training long short-term memory
networks produces successful
Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies
The research reported in this Chapter has been carried out with:
Axelrod-Python library (APL) version: 4.2.0
Associated data sets: [108,109]
Associated codebase: [98]
This work was performed using the computational facilities of the Advanced Research
Computing @ Cardiff (ARCCA) Division, Cardiff University.
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 it was mentioned that conceptualising and introducing new strategies
has been an important aspect of research to the field. The aim of this Chapter is
to introduce new IPD strategies based on an archetype that has not received much
attention in the literature.
In Chapter 4 it was concluded that one of the properties successful strategies in a IPD
competition need to have is cleverness/complexity. Complexity can confer to adapt-
ability, and adaptability is important in performing well in diverse sets of environments.
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This was established not only in Chapter 4 but also from the results of Chapter 5. The
set of complex strategies that ranked highly across distinct tournaments in Chapter 4
included strategies based on archetypes such as finite state automata, hidden Markov
models and artificial neural networks (ANNs).
ANNs have successfully been trained to play games other than the IPD such as draughts [60],
chess [84] and Go [263]. Feed forward networks were firstly used to represent IPD
strategies in 1996 [126]. Feed forward networks have been used in the literature ever
since [24, 27, 71, 85], and possibly the most successful ANN strategies in the game are
the ones introduced in [125]. The three ANN based strategies in [125] ranked 7th, 9th,
and 11th in a tournament of 223 strategies.
A type of ANNs that have not received much attention in the literature are the recurrent
neural networks (RNNs). RNNs are a type of neural networks that include a feedback
connection and are designed to work with inputs in the form of sequences. RNNs were
firstly considered as an archetype in 1996. In [253] a RNN which considered a single
previous step as an input was trained via a Q learning algorithm to play against a single
opponent. The opponent was either the strategy Tit For Tat or another Q learning
strategy. The results of [253] were promising, the RNN player learned to successfully
win against Tit For Tat, however it had learned to win only a single opponent.
its opponent play but only against a single strategy, which was Tit For Tat.
The limitations of [253] could potentially have been due to the limitations of the RNNs
themselves. As it will be discussed later in section 7.2, RNNs quickly became unable
to learn due to the vanishing gradient problem. To improve on the standard recur-
rent networks a new model called the long short-term memory network (LSTM) was
introduced in [137]. Remembering information for long periods of time is the default
behaviour of LSTMs, not something they struggle to learn.
LSTMs are a set of networks that have been proven to be successfully trained and today
are being used in a number of innovative applications such as time series analysis [188],
speech recognition [251] and prediction in medical care pathways [288]. However, they
have not received attention in the IPD literature. The aim of this Chapter is to train
and introduce a number of strategies based on LSTMs. The training has been possible
due to the collection of best response sequences generated in Chapter 6.
A total of 24 LSTMs based strategies are introduced in this Chapter, and their perfor-
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mance is evaluated and compared in a meta tournament analysis of 300 standard tour-
naments. The results demonstrate that LSTM networks can be trained to successfully
compete in IPD tournaments. The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows:
• section 7.2 presents an introduction to artificial, recurrent and long short-term
memory neural networks.
• section 7.3 covers the architectural details of the LSTMs considered in this Chap-
ter. The networks are trained to predict best response sequences. This is done not
only on the entire data set generated by the collection of best response sequences,
but also for three distinct subsets of the collection.
• section 7.4 evaluates and compares the performance of 24 LSTMs strategies in
300 standard IPD computer tournaments.
7.2 Artificial, recurrent and long short-term memory neu-
ral networks
ANNs are computing systems vaguely inspired by the biological neural networks that
constitute brains. As stated in [146] the research on ANNs has experienced three
periods of extensive activity. The first peak was in the 1940s. The work of [197]
opened the subject by creating a computational model for neural networks. The second
peak occurred in 1960s with the introduction of the perceptron [247]. The perceptron
is a linear binary classifier and in the 1960s it was shown that it could be used to
learn to classify simple shapes with 20 × 20 pixels input. However, it was impossible
for the perceptron to be extended to classification tasks with many categories. The
limitations of the model were presented in [206] which halted the enthusiasm of most
researchers in ANNs, resulting in no activity in the field for almost 20 years. The
third peak occurred in the early 1980s with the introduction of the back propagation
algorithm for multilayered networks [291]. Though the algorithm was initially proposed
by [291] it has been reinvented several times and it was popularised by [196]. Following
the introduction of the algorithm and the ability to now train more complex models,
ANNs have received considerable interest and are being used today in a number of
applications, good review articles include [12,182,208,260].
ANNs based on the connection pattern can be grouped into two categories:
• Feed forward networks.
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• Recurrent or feedback networks.
ANNs can be viewed as weighted directed graphs in which artificial neurons are nodes
and directed edges, with weights, are connections between the neuron outputs and the
neuron inputs [146]. This is demonstrated by Figure 7.1. In feed forward networks the
graphs have no loops, whereas in recurrent networks loops occur because of feedback
connections.
hidden layerinput layer output layer
Figure 7.1: A generic representation of an ANN.
A graphical representation of a feed forward network with a single hidden layer is given
by Figure 7.2.
Neural
Network
input
output
h = φ(Wx)
x
yˆ
Figure 7.2: Graphical representation of a feed forward network.
A feed forward network is composed by an input layer, hidden layers, and an output
layer [146,171]. The input is a vector x. The dimensionality, or number of nodes of the
input layer is dependent on the dimensionality of x. Each element of the input vector
is connected to the hidden layer via a set of learned weights. The hidden layer also
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consists of nodes. The number of nodes of the hidden layer is an architectural decision.
The jth hidden node outputs,
hj = φ(
∑
i
wijxi),where φ is an activation function.
Frequently used activation functions [157,171] include:
• The sigmoid function σ(x) which squashes numbers into the range [0, 1].
• The hyperbolic tangent, tanh(x) which squashes numbers into the range [−1, 1].
• The rectified linear unit, ReLU(x) = max(0, x).
The hidden layer in turn is fully connected to an output layer, where the jth output
node outputs,
yj =
∑
i
vijhi.
Feed forward networks make predictions using forward propagation which in matrix
notation is described by,
h = φ(Wx) (7.1)
yˆ = softmax(V h) (7.2)
where W is a weight matrix connecting the input and hidden layers, V is a weight
matrix connecting the hidden and output layers and the output layer transforms the
raw scores to a probability via a softmax function.
The softmax function, referred to also as softargmax [117] or normalised exponential
function [52], is a function that normalises a vector of M real numbers to a probability
distribution consisting of M probabilities proportional to the exponentials of the input
numbers. The normalisation ensures that the sum of the components of the output
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vector is 1. The softmax function, denoted as s(xi), is defined by Equation (7.3).
s(xi) =
exi
M∑
m=1
exm
for i ∈ 1, . . . ,M. (7.3)
W and V are the learning parameters of the network. Their dimensionality depends
on the dimensionality of network’s layers. For example if x and yˆ were 2 dimensional
and the hidden layer had 500 nodes then W ∈ R2×500 and V ∈ R500×2. Increas-
ing the dimensionality of the hidden layer corresponds to larger number of learning
parameters.
To train an ANN a set of values for the learning parameters need to be found so that
the error on the training data is minimised [122]. The function that measures error is
called the loss function. An example of a loss functions is the cross entropy, denoted
as L(y, yˆ) where yˆ is the prediction and y the true output. For M training examples
and K classes the cross entropy error is given by Equation (7.4).
L(y, yˆ) = − 1
M
∑
m∈M
∑
k∈K
ym,klog(yˆm,k) (7.4)
The minimum of the loss function is calculated using the gradient descent algorithm
[249]. The gradient descent algorithm relies on the gradients which are the vector of
derivatives of the loss function with respect to the learning parameters. Thus ∂L∂W and
∂L
∂V . These gradients are calculated with the back propagation algorithm [296] which
is a way of efficiently calculating the gradients starting from the output.
According to [249] there are variants of the gradient descent which differ in how much
data is used to compute the gradient of the objective function. Using the gradient
descent algorithm, the weights are updated incrementally after each pass over the
training data set. In contrast, the stochastic gradient descent performs a parameter
update for each training example. This work uses a variant of the stochastic gradient
descent called the Adaptive Moment Estimation (Adam) algorithm [162].
An extension of feed forward networks are recurrent networks. RNNs are capable of
processing variable length sequences of inputs. Sequences are data samples over a
number of time steps. RNNs can receive sequence inputs and output sequences of the
same length, using their internal state/knowledge to make a prediction on the input at
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time t based on the decisions made at the previous time steps.
A graphical representation of a RNN is given by Figure 7.3. The loop represents that
information can be passed down from one step of the network to the next. RNNs
can be thought of as multiple copies of the same network each passing a message to a
successor, which is also demonstrated by Figure 7.3.
Recurrent
Neural Network
xt
yˆt
= h1 = φ(Wx1)
x1
yˆ1
h2 =
=Wx2 + Uh1
x2
yˆ2
. . . ht =
=Wxt + Uht−1
xt
yˆt
h1 h2 ht
Figure 7.3: Graphical representation of a RNN.
In RNNs information is passed down by using,
ht = φ(Wxt + Uht−1)
where ht−1 is the hidden state computed at time t−1 multiplied by some weight vector
U . In matrix notation RNNs are described by,
ht = φ(Wxt + Uht−1) (7.5)
yˆt = softmax(V ht). (7.6)
Unfortunately in practice RNNs quickly become unable to learn to connect the infor-
mation. The longer the sequences, the higher the chance that the back propagation
gradients either accumulate and explode or vanish down to zero. The fundamental
difficulties of RNNs were explored in depth by [48]. As stated in [137], although RNNs
are theoretically fascinating there was no clear practical advantage over feed forward
networks.
A network specifically designed to avoid the long-term dependency problem was intro-
duced by [137], called the long short-term memory network. The core idea to LSTMs
is the cell state also referred to as the long term memory, denoted as Ct. The cell
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state is a vector designed to pass down information with only a few carefully regulated
changes being applied to it by structures called gates. Gates are composed of a sigmoid
neural net layer and a point wise multiplication operator. In order to explain the cell
gate and subsequently how LSTMs make predictions consider a LSTM’s hidden layer
at time step t given by Figure 7.4.
σ
Ct−1 Ctx
ft
σ tanh
x x
tanh
+
it
Ct
σ
xt
ht−1
ot
ht
ht
Figure 7.4: An LSTM hidden layer at time step t.
The cell state and hidden state from the previous time step are fed back into the
network. Initially, the network decides what information from the previous cell state is
to be discarded. This decision is made by the forget state. The forget state considers
the hidden state at time t− 1 and the input at time t,
ft = σ(Wfxt + Ufht−1). (7.7)
The forget gate outputs a number between 0 and 1 or each number in the cell state
Ct−1. A 1 represents “keep this” while a 0 represents “forget this”.
Secondly, the network decides what information is going to be stored at the cell gate.
There are two parts to this. Firstly, the input gate decides which values are going to
be updated,
it = σ(Wixt + Uiht−1). (7.8)
and secondly, a tanh layer creates a vector of candidate values denoted as C˜t that could
CHAPTER 7. TRAINING LONG SHORT-TERM MEMORY NETWORKS
PRODUCES SUCCESSFUL PRISONER’S DILEMMA STRATEGIES 149
be added to the cell state. C˜t is given by Equation (7.9).
C˜t = tanh(Wcxt + Ucht−1). (7.9)
The cell state Ct−1 is multiplied by ft, forgetting the values which have been decided
to be discarded. The new candidate values are scaled by how much information has
been decided to keep from the input. Thus,
Ct = ftCt−1 + itC˜t. (7.10)
The LSTM outputs a hidden state at each time step which is based on the current cell
state. Initially, the cell state goes through a tanh function and then it is multiplied by
a sigmoid gate that decides which parts to output from the cell state,
ot = σ(Woxt + Uoht−1), (7.11)
ht = ottanh(Ct). (7.12)
This process is being carried out for each time step of the input sequence. At each
time step both the cell state and hidden state are fed back into the network. The
hidden state can also be used to make a prediction at each time step as demonstrated
by Figure 7.5.
LSTM
xt
yˆt
=
x1
yˆ1
x2
yˆ2
. . .
xt
yˆt
C1
h1
C2
h2
Ct
ht
Figure 7.5: Graphical representation of an LSTM network.
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LSTMs unique architecture allows them to learn longer-term dependencies and to be
trained using the back propagation algorithm. Hence, they are an exceptional model for
sequential data and this is why they were chosen here. As it was described in Chapter 6,
the actions of IPD strategies can be defined as sequences, and therefore a collection
of best response sequences was generated using a heuristic method. In section 7.3 a
variety of LSTM networks are trained to predict these best response sequences.
7.3 Training LSTM networks to predict best response se-
quences
LSTM are trained in a supervised fashion on a set of training sequences. The purpose
of training a network in this Chapter is so it can learn to play successfully against IPD
strategies. For that reason the networks are going to be trained on the collection of
best response sequences generated in Chapter 6.
The training inputs are the actions of a given strategy for N turns. The expected
outputs are the responses to those N actions by the opponent’s best response sequence.
Each best response sequence, from Chapter’s 6 collection, corresponds to 204 expected
outputs. This is done so that each sample captures a match between a strategy and
its best response for N turns in a match where N ∈ {1, 204}.
Consider the actions of the strategy Adaptive and its best response, as presented in
section 6.4.2, given by Table 7.1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 . . . 204 205
Adaptive 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 . . . 1 1
S∗ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
Table 7.1: The actions of the strategy Adaptive against one of the best response
sequences to the strategy. Note that 0→ D and 1→ C.
Initially the highest dimensionality a training sample based on Table 7.1 can have
is 204. This is because the expected output to Adaptive’s action in turn 1 is the
action of the best response sequence at turn 2. Moreover, the expected output to the
Adaptive’s 204th action is the best response’s 205th action. This is demonstrated by
Figure 7.6.
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input: x1 x2 x3 x4 x204
1 1 1 1 . . . 1 1
output: y1 y2 y3 y4 y204
1 1 0 0 0 . . . 0
Figure 7.6: An example of a networks input and output of t = 204. The last action of
Adaptive as well as the first action of the best response sequence are discarded.
Secondly, in order to train the networks on different input lengths the training sample
of Figure 7.6 is transformed to 204 samples. This is done by considering all the possible
IPD matches between the pair where the number of turns N ∈ [1, 204]. For example
Table 7.1 corresponds to the training samples given by Equation (7.13).
x =
[
1
]
→ y =
[
1
]
x =
[
1 1
]
→ y =
[
1 1
]
x =
[
1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
1 1 0
]
x =
[
1 1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
1 1 0 0
]
(7.13)
x =
[
1 1 1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
1 1 0 0 0
]
x =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
1 1 0 0 0 0
]
x =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
]
→ y =
[
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
]
...
...
Subsequently, the training data set retrieved from the collection of best responses has
a total of 5, 258× 204 = 1, 122, 612 training samples.
Two types of LSTMs have been trained in this Chapter. These are referred to as:
• The sequence to sequence (StoS) network.
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• The sequence to probability (StoP) network.
Both networks take as input a sequence of actions. The StoS network outputs a re-
sponse to each time step of the input sequence, thus attempting to recover the entire
best response sequence. The StoP network only outputs a response to the sequence
at the last time step, thus only attempting to figure out what comes next. Both net-
works indicate the predicted action with a probability of cooperating. A graphical
representation of the two networks are given by Figures 7.7 and 7.8.
1 1 1 1
. . .
1
Figure 7.7: A graphical representation of the StoS LSTM network.
1 1 1 1
. . .
1
Figure 7.8: A graphical representation of the StoP LSTM network.
The StoS network is trained on samples in the form of Equation (7.13), whereas the
StoP network is trained on sample in the form of Equation (7.14).
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x =
[
1
]
→ y =
[
1
]
x =
[
1 1
]
→ y =
[
1
]
x =
[
1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
0
]
x =
[
1 1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
0
]
(7.14)
x =
[
1 1 1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
0
]
x =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1
]
→ y =
[
0
]
x =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
]
→ y =
[
0
]
...
...
7.3.1 Building the networks with Keras
There are many open source libraries that allow the creation of neural nets in Python
without having to explicitly write the code from scratch. As stated in [286] the three
most popular are TensorFlow [9], Keras [64], and PyTorch [231]. Keras is a high level
neural net Python library that runs on top of TensorFlow. Though Keras’ performance
is comparatively slower than TensorFlow and PyTorch, Keras has a simple architecture
and it is more readable and concise. Keras has been used in several academic works
such as [43,200,269], and is also used here to construct and train the networks.
The Python code for implementing the StoS model is given by Figure 7.9. In line 12
the model is defined to be of the Sequential class. This means that the model will be
constructed layer by layer. The StoS network has a single LSTM layer with 100 nodes.
The input to the LSTM network is not of a fixed length and there is a single time
step between the elements of each input sequence. This is defined by the argument
input_shape=(None, 1). The LSTM layer outputs a hidden state at each time step.
Initially, the hidden states go through a dropout layer. The dropout layer is a simple
and yet efficient method to reduce overfitting by randomly dropping out nodes of the
hidden states [40]. Finally, the hidden states are transformed into probabilities via a
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sigmoid layer. There are a total of 41,301 learning parameters to the StoS model.
1 >>> from keras.models import Sequential
2
3 >>> from keras.layers import (
4 ... Dense,
5 ... Dropout,
6 ... CuDNNLSTM,
7 ... )
8
9 >>> num_hidden_cells = 100
10 >>> drop_out_rate = 0.2
11
12 >>> model = Sequential()
13
14 >>> model.add(
15 ... CuDNNLSTM(
16 ... num_hidden_cells, return_sequences=True, input_shape=(None, 1))
17 ... )
18
19 >>> model.add(Dropout(rate=drop_out_rate))
20
21 >>> model.add(Dense(1, activation="sigmoid"))
22 >>> model.summary()
23 Model: "sequential_1"
24 _________________________________________________________________
25 Layer (type) Output Shape Param #
26 =================================================================
27 cu_dnnlstm_1 (CuDNNLSTM) (None, None, 100) 41200
28 _________________________________________________________________
29 dropout_1 (Dropout) (None, None, 100) 0
30 _________________________________________________________________
31 dense_1 (Dense) (None, None, 1) 101
32 =================================================================
33 Total params: 41,301
34 Trainable params: 41,301
35 Non-trainable params: 0
36 _________________________________________________________________
Figure 7.9: Python code for implementing the StoS LSTM with Keras.
Regarding the dimensionality of the hidden layer there is no direct answer as to what
is the optimal number of nodes. Several methods for determining the dimensionality
include experimentation, intuition and building on the work of others. A common
practice is that the dimensionality of the hidden layer is smaller than the dimensionality
of the input layer. The dimensionality of the input layer changes from 1 to 204, and
thus a number of 100 nodes was chosen so that the dimensionality of the hidden layer
is smaller 50% of the times.
The Python code for implementing the StoP network with Keras is given by Figure 7.10.
The implementations of the networks are similar, however, the StoP model contains 2
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LSTM layers. The first LSTM layer outputs the hidden states at each time step. In
turn these are connected to the second layer which only outputs the hidden state at
the final time step. The StoP network has a higher number of learning parameters due
to the two LSTM layers. More specifically, there are 122,101 learning parameters to
the network.
1 >>> from keras.models import Sequential
2 >>> from keras.layers import (
3 ... Dense,
4 ... Dropout,
5 ... CuDNNLSTM,
6 ... )
7
8 >>> num_hidden_cells = 100
9 >>> drop_out_rate = 0.2
10
11 >>> model = Sequential()
12
13 >>> model.add(
14 ... CuDNNLSTM(num_hidden_cells, return_sequences=True, input_shape=(None, 1))
15 ... )
16
17 >>> model.add(CuDNNLSTM(num_hidden_cells))
18 >>> model.add(Dropout(rate=drop_out_rate))
19
20 >>> model.add((Dense(1, activation="sigmoid")))
21 >>> model.summary()
22 Model: "sequential_2"
23 _________________________________________________________________
24 Layer (type) Output Shape Param #
25 =================================================================
26 cu_dnnlstm_2 (CuDNNLSTM) (None, None, 100) 41200
27 _________________________________________________________________
28 cu_dnnlstm_3 (CuDNNLSTM) (None, 100) 80800
29 _________________________________________________________________
30 dropout_2 (Dropout) (None, 100) 0
31 _________________________________________________________________
32 dense_2 (Dense) (None, 1) 101
33 =================================================================
34 Total params: 122,101
35 Trainable params: 122,101
36 Non-trainable params: 0
37 _________________________________________________________________
Figure 7.10: Python code for implementing the StoP LSTM with Keras.
Keras includes two implementations for an LSTM layer. The class LSTM and the class
CuDNNLSTM which is the class used here. CuDNNLSTM provides a faster implementa-
tion of LSTM with the NVIDIA CUDA Deep Neural Network library. The use of the
CuDNNLSTM class means that the networks can be trained on a graphics processing unit
(GPU).
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7.3.2 High performance training
Conventionally the execution of computer code happens on the central processing unit
(CPU). The CPU, also called main processor, is essentially the brain of any computing
device [50]. Architecturally the CPU is composed of just a few cores designed to support
an extremely broad variety of tasks.
A graphical processing unit (GPU), on the other hand, is composed of hundred of
cores designed to process a set of simpler and more identical computations in parallel.
GPUs were initially designed as dedicated graphical rendering workhorses for computer
games. However as stated in [58], graphics processors transitioned from their initial
role to general purpose engines for high throughput floating-point computation.
A CPU core is more powerful than a GPU core. A CPU core is designed to carry
out a variety of tasks one of which include computations, whereas GPUs are designed
exclusively for data computations. The vast majority of a CPUs power goes unused
by machine learning applications. Machine learning applications which perform large
numbers of computations on a vast amount of data can see huge performance improve-
ments when running on a GPU versus a CPU.
There are several manufacturers of GPUs. These include NVIDIA, AMD, Asus and
Intel. NVIDIA created a parallel computing architecture and platform for its GPUs
called CUDA [127]. CUDA programming model gave developers access and the ability
to express simple processing operations in parallel through code. The vast majority
of deep learning projects work exclusively with NVIDIA GPUs because of the better
software support NVIDIA provides. In 2005, [270] presented the usage of GPUs in
training a generic 2 layer fully connected neural network. The first important work was
later in 2008 [238]. However, the usage of GPUs in machine learning was popularised
in 2012 by [170].
Due to the time advantage, the training process of the networks was carried out on a
GPU. The training was performed using the computational facilities of the ARCCA
division, Cardiff University.
7.3.3 Training data sets
Section 7.3 covered the training data set used to train the LSTM networks. There are
a total of 1,122,612 training inputs and expected outputs in the data set. In order to
understand the effect of the training samples on the LSTM strategies’ performance the
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networks are trained on the entire data set and on three unique subsets.
The subsets are based on three collection of opponents. These are a collection of
best performing strategies, 15 representative strategies with. equally distributed ranks
across a standard tournament and a collection of basic strategies. The details of the
subsets are given by Table 7.2. A list of the strategies’ names used in each subset is
given in the Appendix B.3.
Data set # of opponents Explanation
# of best response
sequences
all strategies 192 The data set as presented in section 7.3. 5,258
top performing strategies 18 A data set constructed in the same way as the training data
set but only with the best response sequences to 18 strategies.
These are the top performing strategies in a standard tourna-
ment of 218 opponents.
714
representative strategies 15 A data set generated only with the best response sequences
to 15 strategies whose ranks are across the 218 ranks of the
standard tournament. They are referred to as representative
strategies because they represent behaviours of all types of per-
formance (successful and not).
212
basic strategies 11 A data set generated with the best response sequences to 11
strategies which are classified as a set of basic strategies in the
APL.
84
Table 7.2: Training data sets used to train the LSTM networks. The IPD standard
tournament with the 218 opponent has been carried out using APL version 3.10.0. The
results are available at [107].
The training data sets have been archived and are available at [109].
7.3.4 Training and validation
The two different LSTM networks, StoS and StoP, are trained on four different training
sets. Thus, a total of 4×2 = 8 LSTM networks have been trained in this Chapter.
The networks were trained using the back propagation algorithm and the Adam al-
gorithm presented in section 7.2. Due to the different size of the training data the
networks have been trained for a different number of epochs. The number of epochs is
the number of times the training algorithm has work through an entire training data
set. The number of epochs for each of the 8 network is given by Table 7.3.
all strategies top strategies representative strategies basic strategies
sequence to sequence 19999 83999 39999 129999
sequence to probability 7999 74999 39999 84999
Table 7.3: Number of epochs for each of the LSTM networks.
The StoP networks have a larger number of learning parameters. Subsequently, their
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training corresponds to more computer time. It can been seen from Table 7.3 that the
StoP networks have been trained for less epochs compared to the StoS networks.
At each training process the training data set is split into 80% training samples and 20%
test samples. At each epoch the loss function is calculated for both the training and
test samples. The loss function used to train the networks is the binary cross entropy.
In essence, the task of predicting IPD actions is a binary classification problem as there
can only be two classes: cooperation or defection.
As discussed in section 7.2, the loss function is used to optimise the learning algorithm.
The networks that will be used as IPD strategies in the next section are the networks
that achieved the lowest loss value over the epochs. The weights of the best performing
networks have been archived and are available at [108].
Another measure which is being reported at each epoch is the accuracy. The accuracy
is calculated after the learning parameters have been determined and it is in the form
of a percentage. Accuracy is a measure of how accurate the predictions are based
on the expected output. Both the measures over the number of epochs are given by
Figures 7.11 and 7.12.
In Figure 7.11 the loss and accuracy are given for the StoS networks. Overall the StoS
networks, regarding the training data set, have maintained a high value of accuracy over
the epochs. Whilst training on the basic strategies there was a minor decrease, however,
the accuracy still remained over 0.85 (85%). The loss function values have also remained
low over the epochs, for all the networks, with only a few spikes occurring.
For the StoP networks there appears to be more variation in the test loss and ac-
curacy, Figure 7.12. This is more evident for the networks that were trained on the
top strategies and the representative strategies. This could indicate that the networks
are overfitting. The StoP network trained on the entire training data set has man-
aged to maintained a low loss value (at 0.5) and a training accuracy of 0.75. The
most successfully trained StoP network appears to be the network trained on the basic
strategies.
This section has presented the 8 trained LSTM networks of this thesis. These networks
are based on two different architectures and have been trained on four different training
data sets. The networks’ validation based on the training data sets was presented in
this section. In the next section the networks are evaluated as IPD strategies.
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Figure 7.11: Loss function and accuracy of the networks based on the StoS network,
over the number of epochs.
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Figure 7.12: Loss function and accuracy of the networks based on the StoP network,
over the number of epochs.
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7.4 Validation of LSTM based strategies using a meta
tournament analysis
This section evaluates the trained LSTM networks as IPD strategies. A strategy class
called the LSTMPlayer was implemented in order for the networks, which are Keras
models, to interact in an IPD match simulated with APL. The source code for the
LSTMPlayer is given by Figure 7.13.
1 import numpy as np
2
3 import axelrod as axl
4 from axelrod.random_ import random_choice
5 from keras.layers import LSTM, Dense, Dropout
6 from keras.models import Sequential
7
8 C, D = axl.Action.C, axl.Action.D
9
10 class LSTMPlayer(axl.Player):
11 name = "The LSTM player"
12 classifier = {
13 "memory_depth": float("inf"),
14 "stochastic": True,
15 "inspects_source": False,
16 "manipulates_source": False,
17 "manipulates_state": False,
18 }
19
20 def __init__(self, model, reshape_history_funct, opening_probability=0.78):
21 self.model = model
22 self.opening_probability = opening_probability
23 self.reshape_history_function = reshape_history_funct
24 super().__init__()
25 if opening_probability in [0, 1]:
26 self.classifier["stochastic"] = False
27
28 def strategy(self, opponent):
29 if len(self.history) == 0:
30 return random_choice(self.opening_probability)
31
32 history = [action.value for action in opponent.history]
33 prediction = float(
34 self.model.predict(self.reshape_history_function(history))[0][-1]
35 )
36
37 return axl.Action(round(prediction))
38
39 def __repr__(self):
40 return self.name
Figure 7.13: Implementation of the LSTMPlayer class.
The class has three input arguments:
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• A Keras model. The input models are the 8 trained LSTM networks presented
in section 7.3.
• A reshape history function. A function that reshapes the opponent’s history to
the appropriate LSTM input.
• The probability that the strategy opens with cooperation on the first turn denoted
as po. The LSTM networks can be used to predict the strategy’s next action
following the opponent’s opening turn. Thus, the strategy’s opening action must
be manually defined.
Following the opening turn the LSTM strategy makes a prediction based on the oppo-
nent’s history. The strategy has an infinite memory because it needs to remember all
the actions made by the opponent. The prediction of the networks correspond to the
probability of cooperating. The LSTM strategy makes a deterministic decision based
on the predicted probability. It cooperates if the prediction on the last time step is
greater than 0.5, otherwise it defects. In section 7.4.2 the performance of a strategy
that plays stochastically will be briefly discussed.
The 8 trained LSTM networks are used to introduce 24 new IPD strategies. Each
network corresponds to three distinct players with a different opening move. More
specifically, three different values of po are used here. These are po = 0, po = 1 and
po = 0.78. The probability 0.78 is the probability that the best response sequences of
Chapter 6 opens with a cooperation. Thus, a total of 8 × 3 = 24 IPD strategies are
evaluated in this section.
The performance of the LSTM strategies are evaluated and compared in 300 standard
tournaments similarly to Chapter 4. The process of collecting the tournaments results
for each strategy is given by Algorithm 7.1.
For each trial a random size s ∈ [5, 10] is selected, and from the 192 strategies of
Appendix B.2, a random list of s strategies is chosen. The LSTM player is then added
to the list of players, increasing the size to s + 1. For the given list of strategies a
standard tournament of 200 turns is performed and repeated 50 times. The number of
turns is fixed at 200. In Chapter 6 the sequences were fixed to 205 turns which resulted
in many best response sequences to defect on the last turn as the match was coming
to an end. To avoid a series of unconditional defections by the LSTM strategies their
performance is evaluated in 200 turns, which is a common number of turns used in the
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Algorithm 7.1: Standard tournament result summary collection algorithm
foreach seed ∈ [0, 300] do
s← randomly select integer ∈ [smin, smax];
players← randomly select s players;
players← players + LSTM strategy;
s← s+ 1;
k ← 50;
n← 200;
result standard ← Axelrod.tournament(players, n, k);
return result standard ;
IPD literature [33,34,125,165].
A total of 300 trials of Algorithm 7.1 have been run. For each trial a result summary
(in the format of Table 4.2) is exported. Similarly to Chapter 4, the performance
of the strategies is evaluated on the normalised rank r, and more specifically on the
median normalised rank r¯. As a reminder r is calculated as a strategy’s rank divided
by s− 1.
The r¯ of each of the 24 strategies over the 300 standard tournaments is given by
Table 7.4.
sequence to sequence sequence to probability
po = 0 po = 1 po = 0.78 po = 0 po = 1 po = 0.78
All strategies 0.667 0.222 0.333 0.778 0.333 0.500
Top strategies 0.714 0.444 0.500 0.500 0.429 0.429
Representative strategies 0.750 0.667 0.683 0.500 0.250 0.300
Basic strategies 0.800 0.600 0.625 0.800 0.300 0.429
Table 7.4: The median normalised ranks of the 24 LSTM strategies over the standard
tournaments. A r¯ closer to 0 indicates a more successful performance.
The strategy with the lowest r¯ over the 300 tournaments is the LSTM strategy based
on the StoS network trained over the entire training set with po = 1. The strategy
achieved a r¯ of 0.222. The second most successful performance is by the StoP based
strategy trained against the representative strategies with po = 1. In section 7.3 it was
indicated that the specific network was overfitting, however, as an IPD strategy the
network outperforms any other StoP strategies.
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A few strategies have achieved a r¯ close to 0.3. These include the StoS strategy trained
on the entire data set with po = 0.78, and the StoP strategies trained against all
strategies, the representative strategies, and against the basic strategies with po = 1,
po = 0.78 and po = 1 equivalently.
The LSTM strategies that open with cooperation outperform any other strategy based
on the same LSTM networks. Overall, the best performing strategies open with coop-
eration. The strategies that open with a probabilistic cooperation perform better than
the strategies that open with defection. Interestingly, from Table 7.4 it is indicated
that the strategies trained on the subsets perform better when they are based on the
StoP model. There is no intuition as to why that is. The StoP networks have more
learning parameters and yet they perform better when trained on the smaller training
sets than the StoS network. The StoP network, trained against the entire data set, has
trained for the smallest number of epochs. A topic of future work would be to train
the specific network for more epochs.
Figure 7.14 gives the r distributions for the strategies based on the StoS network. All
the distributions for po = 0 have a median higher than 0.66, indicating that those
strategies on average perform in the bottom half of a tournament. The most success-
ful strategy is the strategy trained against all strategies with po = 1. The strategy’s
distribution shows that the strategy ranked highly in most of the tournament it partic-
ipated with only a few exceptions. Even if when po is lowered to 0.78 the strategy still
performs adequately. The rest of the distributions appear to have peaks either at 0.5
or closer to 1. A statistical summary of the distributions are given by Table 7.5.
count mean std min 10% 25% 50% 75% 95% max skew kurt
All strategies po = 0 300.0 0.620 0.278 0.0 0.200 0.429 0.667 0.839 1.000 1.0 -0.523 -0.587
po = 1 300.0 0.295 0.252 0.0 0.000 0.111 0.222 0.458 0.779 1.0 0.702 -0.251
po = 0.78 300.0 0.368 0.265 0.0 0.000 0.143 0.333 0.560 0.833 1.0 0.433 -0.647
Top strategies po = 0 300.0 0.655 0.273 0.0 0.250 0.500 0.714 0.875 1.000 1.0 -0.629 -0.436
po = 1 300.0 0.461 0.274 0.0 0.090 0.222 0.444 0.667 0.875 1.0 -0.029 -0.940
po = 0.78 300.0 0.509 0.255 0.0 0.167 0.333 0.500 0.704 0.876 1.0 -0.158 -0.710
Representative strategies po = 0 300.0 0.643 0.306 0.0 0.141 0.486 0.750 0.875 1.000 1.0 -0.768 -0.523
po = 1 300.0 0.636 0.262 0.0 0.250 0.500 0.667 0.833 1.000 1.0 -0.680 -0.198
po = 0.78 300.0 0.645 0.255 0.0 0.250 0.500 0.683 0.833 1.000 1.0 -0.754 -0.034
Basic strategies po = 0 300.0 0.728 0.263 0.0 0.333 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.000 1.0 -0.949 0.229
po = 1 300.0 0.556 0.283 0.0 0.143 0.375 0.600 0.778 1.000 1.0 -0.365 -0.803
po = 0.78 300.0 0.579 0.280 0.0 0.167 0.375 0.625 0.800 1.000 1.0 -0.435 -0.772
Table 7.5: Statistics summary of the r distributions for the strategies based on the
StoS network.
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Figure 7.14: Normalised rank distributions for the strategies which are based on the
StoS LSTM.
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Figure 7.15 gives the r distributions for the strategies based on the StoP network. For
po = 0 the performance of the strategies remains poorly. The strategies that have been
trained against all strategies, representative and basic strategies with po = 1 appear to
have won several of the tournaments they participated in. The statistics summary of
the distributions is given by Table 7.6.
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Figure 7.15: Normalised rank distributions for the strategies which are based on the
StoP LSTM.
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count mean std min 10% 25% 50% 75% 95% max skew kurt
All strategies po = 0 300.0 0.720 0.254 0.0 0.333 0.571 0.778 0.900 1.000 1.0 -0.860 0.056
po = 1 300.0 0.339 0.244 0.0 0.000 0.125 0.333 0.500 0.800 1.0 0.458 -0.280
po = 0.78 300.0 0.471 0.255 0.0 0.125 0.286 0.500 0.625 0.875 1.0 -0.064 -0.696
Top strategies po = 0 300.0 0.491 0.305 0.0 0.000 0.200 0.500 0.714 1.000 1.0 -0.131 -1.140
po = 1 300.0 0.417 0.283 0.0 0.000 0.167 0.429 0.600 0.875 1.0 0.157 -0.974
po = 0.78 300.0 0.432 0.277 0.0 0.000 0.200 0.429 0.625 0.876 1.0 0.109 -0.891
Representative strategies po = 0 300.0 0.487 0.287 0.0 0.000 0.286 0.500 0.700 1.000 1.0 -0.037 -0.899
po = 1 300.0 0.308 0.267 0.0 0.000 0.111 0.250 0.500 0.800 1.0 0.586 -0.695
po = 0.78 300.0 0.335 0.272 0.0 0.000 0.125 0.300 0.556 0.800 1.0 0.465 -0.867
Basic strategies po = 0 290.0 0.738 0.239 0.0 0.400 0.600 0.800 0.975 1.000 1.0 -0.881 0.315
po = 1 290.0 0.323 0.249 0.0 0.000 0.125 0.300 0.500 0.778 1.0 0.491 -0.535
po = 0.78 290.0 0.432 0.269 0.0 0.000 0.200 0.429 0.625 0.875 1.0 0.096 -0.916
Table 7.6: Statistics summary of the r distributions for the strategies based on the
StoP network.
An interesting question that arises is: what is the probability that a LSTM strategy
ranks in the top half of a standard tournament?
This is answered by calculating the cumulative distribution function (CFD) of r. CFD
is the cumulative probability for a given value. It can be used to determine the proba-
bility that a random observation taken from the population will be less than or equal to
a certain value. The CFD distributions are shown by Figures 7.16-7.17. They demon-
strate that the strategies with a r¯ less than 0.333 have a 0.70-0.80 probability of being
on the top ranks on a standard IPD tournament.
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Figure 7.16: The cumulative distribution function (CFD) for the r distributions for the
LSTM strategies based on the StoS network.
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Figure 7.17: The cumulative distribution function (CFD) for the r distributions for the
LSTM strategies based on the StoP network.
This section has evaluated the performance of 24 newly introduced IPD strategies based
on LSTM networks. The performance of the strategies was evaluated based on their
normalised ranks in 300 standard computer tournaments.
A total of 6 strategies have achieved a r¯ lower than 0.35. Thus, these strategies have on
average ranked on the top 30% of a standard tournament. Furthermore, these strategies
have a 0.70-0.80 probability of ranking in the top half of a standard tournament. Overall
the most successful strategies of the analysis have been strategies that open with a
cooperation.
The LSTM strategies that have been trained against the top ranked strategies per-
formed poorly. The top ranked strategies consisted of many trained strategies from [125].
In [125] it was shown that these strategies managed to exploit weak opponents whilst
achieving mutual cooperation with strong opponents. The best response sequences of
these strategies could have potentially only captured a single behaviour of these strate-
gies, thus not providing enough diverse training samples. This could have in turn made
the LSTM strategies less adaptable to diverse environments.
On the whole, the analysis of this section has shown that the LSTM strategies which
were trained on the entire data set of best responses were successful strategies regardless
of the LSTM architecture. Both the StoS and StoP networks have produced strategies
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that can win IPD tournaments, and on average rank on the top 30% of any given
standard tournament. Moreover, the LSTM strategies trained on subsets of the training
data set, perform better when trained with the StoP network than the StoS network.
The StoP networks for the subsets have been trained for a longer number of epochs
compared to the StoP network over the entire data set. An interesting question is
whether the StoP strategy, trained on the entire data set, would perform even better
than its equivalent StoS strategy if it was trained for longer.
Having successfully trained high performing strategies using LSTM networks, the next
section will attempt to qualify their behaviour.
7.4.1 Fingerprinting the LSTM based strategies
The 24 strategies that have been introduced in this Chapter are based on an LSTM
archetype. These strategies are based on a complex structure and interpreting their
behaviour is not trivial. The difference between the strategies is not straightforward
either. In Chapter 2 a method that produces a functional signature of a strategy called
fingerprinting was presented. More specifically, two types of fingerprints were discussed
which were the Ashlock fingerprints and the transitive fingerprints.
Ashlock’s fingerprints [23–27] compute the score of a strategy against a spectrum of
opponents. The basic method is to play the strategy against a probe strategy with
varying noise parameters. The fingerprints for the 24 strategies based on Ashlock’s
approach have been generated for the probe strategies Tit For Tat and Pavlov. These
are given by Figures 7.18 - 7.21. Note that the strategies that appear on the same
row are of the same network type and have been trained on the same training data
set.
Tit For Tat was used as the probe strategy for Figures 7.18 and 7.19. From the
fingerprints it is demonstrated that the strategies of the same row behave in a similar
manner even though their opening moves differ. The strategies based on different
networks and the strategies trained on different training data sets behave differently.
The only set of strategies based on different networks that exhibit similarities, is the
strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
Figures 7.20 and 7.21 give the Ashlock fingerprints whilst Pavlov is used as a probe.
These fingerprints, across the network types, training data set and opening moves
appear to be more similar.
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.18: Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS network
when Tit For Tat is the probe strategy.
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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Figure 7.19: Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP network
when Tit For Tat is the probe strategy.
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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Figure 7.20: Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS network
when Pavlov is the probe strategy.
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.21: Ashlock’s fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP network
when Pavlov is the probe strategy.
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Ashlock fingerprints do not give an immediate qualifiable understanding of behaviour
and so to further explore the similarities of the strategies a set of more interpretable
fingerprints, the transitive fingerprints implemented in APL, have also been generated.
The transitive fingerprints represent the cooperation rate of a strategy against a set
of opponents over a number of turns. There are three set of opponents used here to
generate the transitive fingerprints. These are the collection of strategies from [271] and
from [44], and a spectrum of Random opponents with varying cooperating probability
p. The transitive fingerprints are given by Figures 7.22 -7.27.
The differences between the strategies are more distinct using the transitive finger-
printing method. The transitive fingerprints demonstrate that the LSTM strategies do
behave differently against the same list of opponents and that the strategies that open
with cooperation achieve a higher cooperation rate compared to the strategies (on the
same row) that do not.
Furthermore, the LSTM strategies appear to be using the opening moves to make up
their minds regarding their opponents. Following the opening moves the strategies
decide on a play. This is demonstrated by the fact that there is some variation in the
opening moves of each fingerprint, but following the opening turns the patterns became
more stable. An exception to this can be seen from the transitive fingerprints against
the spectrum of Random opponents (Figures 7.26 and 7.27). It can be seen that this
is not true for the strategies trained against the top performing strategies. This set of
LSTM strategies do not make their mind regarding their opponent. In fact, following
the opening moves the strategies just play a series of alternating sets of cooperations
and defections.
This could potentially reinforce the discussion that the training set against the top
performing strategies is not diverse. Against strong opponents the top performing
strategies simply cooperate. The trained LSTM strategies, on that training data set,
have not been trained to react against random defections.
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.22: Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS network
against the list of opponents from [271].
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.23: Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP network
against the list of opponents from [271].
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.24: Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS network
against the list of opponents from [44].
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
0 50 100 150
turns
Cooperator
Defector
Random
Tit For Tat
Grudger
Cycler DDC
Cycler CCD
Soft Go By Majority
Suspicious Tit For Tat
Prober
Gradual
Win-Stay Lose-Shift
1.0
0.5
0.0 0 50 100 150
turns
Cooperator
Defector
Random
Tit For Tat
Grudger
Cycler DDC
Cycler CCD
Soft Go By Majority
Suspicious Tit For Tat
Prober
Gradual
Win-Stay Lose-Shift
1.0
0.5
0.0 0 50 100 150
turns
Cooperator
Defector
Random
Tit For Tat
Grudger
Cycler DDC
Cycler CCD
Soft Go By Majority
Suspicious Tit For Tat
Prober
Gradual
Win-Stay Lose-Shift
1.0
0.5
0.0
(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.25: Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP network
against the list of opponents from [44].
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
turns
0
1
p
1.0
0.5
0.0 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
turns
0
1
p
1.0
0.5
0.0 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
turns
0
1
p
1.0
0.5
0.0
(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.26: Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoS network
against a list of Random opponents.
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(a) Strategies trained on the entire training data set.
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(b) Strategies trained against the top performing strategies.
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(c) Strategies trained against the representative strategies.
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(d) Strategies trained against basic strategies.
Figure 7.27: Transitive fingerprints for the LSTM strategies based on the StoP network
against a list of Random opponents.
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In order to gain a further understanding of the behaviour of the LSTM strategies
produced by the training, the top performing LSTM strategies are put against a list of
manually selected opponents. These are:
1. Tit For Tat. A strategy that retaliates a defection but also forgives if the opponent
apologises. The strategy was selected to explore whether the LSTM strategies
try to exploit the strategy, and whether they apologise after being in DD.
2. Gradual. Plays in a similar fashion as Tit For Tat but retaliates with a growing
number of defection. Gradual was selected for the same reason as Tit For Tat.
3. Cooperator. A strategy that can been taken advantage of. The strategy was
selected to explore whether the LSTM strategies do exploit the strategy.
4. Alternator. Another strategy that does not react to the history and can be taken
advantage of.
5. Defector. A strategy that just defects. It was selected to inspect whether the
LSTM strategies defend themselves from unconditional defections.
6. ZDExtort2. A strategy that exploits its opponents. The strategy was chosen to
see if the LSTM players protect themselves from being exploited.
7. TF1. The strategy was presented in section 6.4. The strategy includes a hand-
shake. The strategies are matched against TF1 to investigate whether they have
developed the handshake.
8. Adaptive. A strategy discussed in Chapter 6. The strategy has a unique set
of best responses. It can be exploited to unconditionally cooperate while the
opponent defects.
Three LSTM players are matched against these strategies in a tournament of 200 turns
and 50 repetitions:
• The StoS based strategy, trained against all strategies with po = 1.
• The StoP based strategy, trained against the representative strategies with po =
1.
• The StoP based strategy, trained against the basic strategies with po = 1.
The median scores of each tournament are given by Tables 7.7- 7.9 and the transitive
fingerprints of the three LSTM strategies against the selected opponents are given by
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Figure 7.28.
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(a) StoS network trained
against all strategies with
po = 1.
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(b) StoP network trained
against the representative
strategies with po = 1.
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(c) StoP network trained
against the basic strategies
with po = 1.
Figure 7.28: Transitive fingerprints for the top performing LSTM strategies against a
list of manually selected strategies.
LSTM strategy Tit For Tat Gradual Cooperator Defector Alternator ZD-Extort-2 TF1 Adaptive
LSTM strategy 3.0000 3.0000 3.000 3.0000 0.9900 2.9800 1.8221 0.8950 0.670
Tit For Tat 3.0000 3.0000 3.000 3.0000 0.9950 2.4900 1.0893 1.0400 2.955
Gradual 3.0000 3.0000 3.000 3.0000 0.8250 2.6850 1.5835 0.8800 2.945
Cooperator 3.0000 3.0000 3.000 3.0000 0.0000 1.5000 2.2146 1.5150 0.090
Defector 1.0400 1.0200 1.700 5.0000 1.0000 3.0000 1.0408 1.0400 1.120
Alternator 0.5550 2.5150 1.310 4.0000 0.5000 2.0000 1.7567 1.1750 0.605
ZD-Extort-2 2.3981 1.1143 2.087 3.5236 0.9898 2.5437 1.0824 1.0586 2.953
TF1 2.5950 1.0650 1.705 3.9900 0.9900 2.8250 1.0976 2.9900 1.080
Adaptive 2.6200 2.9550 2.995 4.9400 0.9700 2.9550 2.0210 1.0550 2.950
Table 7.7: Median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns that was repeated
50 times. The LSTM strategy corresponds to the strategy based on the StoS network
trained against all strategies with po = 1.
LSTM strategy Tit For Tat Gradual Cooperator Defector Alternator ZD-Extort-2 TF1 Adaptive
LSTM strategy 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.9950 2.9600 1.1189 1.0250 4.8300
Tit For Tat 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.9950 2.4900 1.0954 1.0400 2.9550
Gradual 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.8250 2.6850 1.5264 0.8800 2.9450
Cooperator 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.0000 1.5000 2.2989 1.5150 0.0900
Defector 1.0200 1.0200 1.7000 5.0000 1.0000 3.0000 1.0384 1.0400 1.1200
Alternator 0.5850 2.5150 1.3100 4.0000 0.5000 2.0000 1.7972 1.1750 0.6050
ZD-Extort-2 1.1484 1.1204 2.0449 3.4674 0.9904 2.5247 1.0793 1.0604 2.8963
TF1 1.0500 1.0650 1.7050 3.9900 0.9900 2.8250 1.0659 2.9900 1.0800
Adaptive 0.1550 2.9550 2.9950 4.9400 0.9700 2.9550 1.9138 1.0550 2.9500
Table 7.8: Median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns that was repeated 50
times. The LSTM strategy corresponds to the strategy based on the StoP network
trained against the representative strategies with po = 1.
It is demonstrated that all three LSTM strategies achieve mutual cooperation for all
200 turns when matched against Tit For Tat, Gradual and Cooperator. The LSTM
strategies open with cooperation and are never the first ones to defect. However, they
quickly defend themselves against unconditional defections made by Defector, and
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LSTM strategy Tit For Tat Gradual Cooperator Defector Alternator ZD-Extort-2 TF1 Adaptive
LSTM strategy 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.00 0.995 2.9850 1.0919 1.0400 2.9750
Tit For Tat 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.00 0.995 2.4900 1.1134 1.0400 2.9550
Gradual 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.00 0.825 2.6850 1.5399 0.8800 2.9450
Cooperator 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.00 0.000 1.5000 2.2650 1.5150 0.0900
Defector 1.0200 1.0200 1.7000 5.00 1.000 3.0000 1.0400 1.0400 1.1200
Alternator 0.5350 2.5150 1.3100 4.00 0.500 2.0000 1.8194 1.1750 0.6050
ZD-Extort-2 1.1109 1.1384 2.0329 3.49 0.990 2.5149 1.0909 1.0598 2.9747
TF1 1.0650 1.0650 1.7050 3.99 0.990 2.8250 1.0823 2.9900 1.0800
Adaptive 2.9250 2.9550 2.9950 4.94 0.970 2.9550 1.9897 1.0550 2.9500
Table 7.9: Median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns that was repeated 50
times. The LSTM strategy corresponds to the strategy based on the StoP network
trained against the basic strategies with po = 1.
quickly learn to exploit Alternator. Following the opening 2 to 4 moves the LSTM
strategies decide on unconditional defections against Alternator.
The StoP based strategy trained against the basic strategies with po = 1, is the strategy
that reacts quickest to Alternator’s alternate defections. In fact, against Alternator
the strategy demonstrates a Grudger like behaviour. However, this is not true for every
opponent the strategy is matched against. Figure 7.28 shows that strategy manages
mutual cooperation with Adaptive following a series of mutual defections. Thus, the
LSTM strategy exhibits more adaptable behaviour than Grudger.
The biggest difference between the three LSTM strategies behaviours are when matched
with ZDExtort2, TF1 and Adaptive.
Initially, against TF1 none of the three strategies carry out TF1’s specific handshake.
The StoP strategies have a Grudger behaviour against the strategy, and go into mutual
defections following the opening moves. The StoS strategy demonstrates a more varying
behaviour against the strategy, which includes a series of cooperations and defections.
Amongst the three strategies, the StoS strategy achieves the highest score per turn
against TF1. The two StoP strategies also demonstrate a more aggressive behaviour
against ZDExtort2. In comparison, the StoS sequence manages to achieve a higher
cooperation rate against ZDExtort2 which subsequently results in a better score.
Amongst the three strategy the most aggressive appears to be the StoP based strategy
trained against the representative strategies. Even against Adaptive the strategy goes
into mutual defection. The strategy does exhibit a more Grudger behaviour than
the rest of the LSTM strategies. However, as it can be seen against ZDExtort2 the
strategy is not as provocable as Grudger. The StoP based strategy trained against the
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basic strategies also exhibited a more adaptable behaviour, however, it is still a quite
aggressive strategy. The LSTM strategy based on the StoS network trained against the
entire data set is less aggressive, appears to achieve series of both mutual cooperation
and defection and it is the best performing strategy amongst the LSTMs.
The three LSTM strategies when matched against each other achieve mutual cooper-
ation. The median scores of a standard tournament of 200 turns and 50 repetitions
with the three best performing LSTM strategies are given by Table 7.10. Being able
to achieve mutual cooperation when competing against each other is a strong property
of the LSTM strategies. As was discussed in Chapter 5, self interactions are important
in evolutionary dynamic settings.
StoS strategy trained
against all
StoP strategy trained
against the
representative
strategies
StoP strategy trained
against basic strategies
StoS strategy trained against all 3.0 3.0 3.0
StoP strategy trained against the representative strategies 3.0 3.0 3.0
StoP strategy trained against basic strategies 3.0 3.0 3.0
Table 7.10: Median scores of a standard tournament with the three best performing
LSTM strategies. The tournament is of 200 turns and of 50 repetitions.
On the whole, the high performing LSTM strategies appear to have the following
properties:
1. Never defect first.
2. Are complex by design.
3. Use the opening moves to make up their mind about their opponents and decide
on a play.
4. Can achieve mutual cooperation following mutual defections.
7.4.2 Stochastic LSTM strategies
The LSTM strategies that have been considered so far make a deterministic decision
based on the networks predictions. Another variation of the LSTM strategies that has
been considered are strategies that make a probabilistic choice based on the prediction.
A strategy class called the StochasticLSTMPlayer has been implemented to simulate
the behaviour of these strategies. The source code for the StochasticLSTMPlayer is
given by Figure 7.29.
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1 import numpy as np
2
3 import axelrod as axl
4 from axelrod.random_ import random_choice
5 from keras.layers import LSTM, Dense, Dropout
6 from keras.models import Sequential
7
8 C, D = axl.Action.C, axl.Action.D
9
10
11 class StochasticLSTMPlayer(axl.Player):
12 name = "Stochastic LSTM Player"
13 classifier = {
14 "memory_depth": float("inf"),
15 "stochastic": True,
16 "inspects_source": False,
17 "manipulates_source": False,
18 "manipulates_state": False,
19 }
20
21 def __init__(self, model, reshape_history_funct, opening_probability=0.78):
22 self.model = model
23 self.opening_probability = opening_probability
24 self.reshape_history_function = reshape_history_funct
25 super().__init__()
26
27 def strategy(self, opponent):
28 if len(self.history) == 0:
29 return random_choice(self.opening_probability)
30
31 history = [action.value for action in opponent.history]
32 prediction = float(
33 self.model.predict(self.reshape_history_function(history))[0][-1]
34 )
35
36 return random_choice(prediction)
37
38 def __repr__(self):
39 return self.name
Figure 7.29: Implementation of the StochasticLSTMPlayer class.
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The 24 strategies that make a probabilistic decision at each turn are evaluated on the
same 300 tournaments as the strategies in section 7.4. The r¯ for the strategies are
given by Table 7.11.
sequence to sequence sequence to probability
po = 0 po = 1 po = 0.78 po = 0 po = 1 po = 0.78
All strategies 0.833 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.778
Top strategies 0.800 0.800 0.789 0.778 0.714 0.714
Representative strategies 0.750 0.700 0.707 0.667 0.600 0.600
Basic strategies 0.833 0.700 0.714 0.857 0.700 0.714
Table 7.11: The median normalised ranks of the 24 LSTM strategies that make stochas-
tic decisions. A r¯ closer to 0 indicates a more successful performance.
The results of Table 7.11 demonstrate that the strategies that make a probabilistic
decision instead of a deterministic one (following the opening turn) performed very
poorly. The smallest r¯ has a value of 0.6. Thus, the most successful strategy on
average performs on the bottom half of the tournaments it participated in.
7.5 Chapter summary
This Chapter has introduced a total of 24 new IPD strategies based on LSTM networks.
The advantage of using LSTMs, contrary to feed forward networks, is that LSTMs
incorporate a mechanism of memory. This allows the networks to learn to using the
history of an opponent in order to decide their next move. The collection of best
response sequences of Chapter 6 was purposely generated so that LSTMs could be
trained to play successfully against a list of known IPD strategies.
Two types of LSTM networks have been trained in this Chapter. Presented in sec-
tion 7.3, there were referred to as the sequence to sequence (StoS) network and the
sequence to probability (StoP) network. The two networks were trained on a train-
ing data set generated by the collection of best response strategies, but also on three
subsets of that training data set. This was done in order to understand the effect of
the training samples on the network’s performance in a IPD tournament. The subsets
included the best response sequences to top performing strategies, to representative
strategies with ranks across a standard tournament and a set of basic strategies. The
networks were developed and trained using the open source package Keras, and the
training process was carried out on a GPU.
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A total of 8 LSTM networks were trained, and those corresponded to 24 strategies when
the opening move was taken into account. The opening move of an LSTM strategy
had to be manually defined, and three different values were chosen to carry out the
evaluation analysis. These were po = 0, po = 1 and po = 0.78.
The performance of the 24 LSTM strategies was evaluated in 300 standard tourna-
ments. The results of the meta tournament analysis demonstrated that the strategies
trained on the entire data set performed well in the 300 standard tournaments regard-
less the LSTM network type. Moreover, the strategies trained on the subsets performed
well only when they were trained using the StoP network. Finally, it was shown that
the strategies that performed well in the analysis of this Chapter have a high proba-
bility of ranking in the top half of any standard tournament. This demonstrates that
LSTM strategies trained on a collection of sequences can lead to successful behaviours
in the IPD. This unsupervised approach is the first contribution of this type at the
intersection of deep learning and game theory.
An interesting result demonstrated by the analysis was the effect of opening with a
cooperation. The most successful strategies of this Chapter have been the strategies
that cooperated on the first turn. The transitive fingerprints demonstrated that it was
because these strategies achieve a higher cooperation rate compared to the rest of the
trained strategies. This result reinforces the discussion started by Axelrod: opening
with a cooperation is a property that successful strategies in a IPD competition need
to have.
CHAPTER 7. TRAINING LONG SHORT-TERM MEMORY NETWORKS
PRODUCES SUCCESSFUL PRISONER’S DILEMMA STRATEGIES 188
189
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This Chapter serves to summarise the work and contributions of this thesis. Each
chapter contains a detailed chapter summary section, and so the summary here will be
brief.
8.1 Research summary
The fundamental research question of this thesis has been the same question that has
troubled the scientific community since the formulation of the IPD in 1950. Namely,
what behaviour an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) strategy should adapt as a
response to different environments.
Chapter 1 introduced the IPD, carried out an initial literature review and outlined
the research tasks of this thesis. A more detailed literature review was presented in
Chapter 2. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 was divided into different research
topics. These included evolutionary dynamics, intelligently designed strategies, struc-
tured strategies and training, and software that has been developed specifically for the
game.
In Chapter 3 a bespoke research software tool called Arcas was developed and used to
collect a data set of articles’ metadata on the IPD. A topic modelling technique, called
Latent Dirichlet Allocation, was applied to the abstracts of these articles and allocated
them into five different research topics. These were human subject research, biological
studies, strategies, evolutionary dynamics on networks and modelling problems as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).
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The bespoke data set was further analysed to explore whether the academic field of
the PD is cooperative and whether there is influence between the authors. It was
shown that the field of the IPD is a collaborative field, yet it is not necessarily more
collaborative than other fields. Many authors tend to collaborate with authors from
one community and are not involved in multiple communities. The collaborativeness
was also explored over time, and it was shown that since the first publications authors
tended to write only with a single community and that it is not an effect of a specific
time period. Exploring the influence of authors in the field based on the specific
publications showed that authors do not gain much influence, and the only ones with
influence are the ones connected to a “main” group.
Chapter 4 examined the performance of a collection of 195 strategies in the largest
collection of computer tournaments in the field. The results across the 45,600 tourna-
ments of various tournaments types deduced that there was not a single strategy that
performs well in diverse IPD scenarios. The later parts of the Chapter analysed and
extracted the salient features of the best performing strategies across the various tour-
nament types and established that there are several properties that heavily influence
the best performing strategies. There were: be nice, be provocable and forgiving, be a
little envious, be clever, and adapt to the environment.
Chapter 5 investigated best response memory-one strategies with a theory of mind.
It presented several theoretical and numerical results. More specifically, it proved
that:
• The utility of a memory-one strategy against a set of memory-one opponents can
be written as a sum of ratios of quadratic forms.
• There is a compact way of identifying a memory-one best response to a group of
opponents through a search over a discrete set.
• There is a condition for which in an environment of memory-one opponents de-
fection is the stable choice, based only on the coefficients of the opponents.
Additionally, the numerical results of Chapter 5 reinforced established result of the
literature. Namely, they showed that extortionate play is not always optimal by show-
ing that optimal play is often not extortionate, and that memory-one strategies suffer
from their limited memory in multi agent interactions and can be out performed by
optimised strategies with longer memory.
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Chapter 6 also investigated best responses but in the form of sequences. It defined an
IPD strategy in a finite match as a sequence, and it defined the best response sequence
against a given opponent. It introduced an evolutionary algorithm which demonstrated
that it can successfully identify best response sequences, and which was used to estimate
best response sequences to 192 strategies. A total of 5,258 best responses sequences
were obtained as result of Chapter 6.
The purpose of this collection of best response sequences was to be used in Chapter 7
to train a series of long short-term memory (LSTM) networks. These networks were
trained on the collection, and on three subsets of the collection, to predict best response
sequences. A total of 8 LSTMs were trained, and these were used to introduce a total of
24 distinct IPD strategies. The results of 300 standard tournaments demonstrated that
a set of these LSTM strategies can successfully be on the top ranks of any given stan-
dard tournament. The top performing LSTM strategies exhibited distinct behaviours
against the same opponents, demonstrated that they are adaptable and that opening
with a cooperation is crucial to a successful performance.
8.2 Contributions
This thesis has made novel contributions across various themes. Numerous research
software packages have been implemented as part of this thesis. These packages have
been written following the highest standards of software development, and have been
made available so that other researchers can contribute to and use them. The packages
include Arcas a tool designed for scraping academic articles from various APIs and
sequences-sensei a project for performing genetic algorithms. Additionally, software
contributions were made to well established Python libraries such as SymPy [202] and
Axelrod-Python Library [7].
A total of six accompanying data sets have been generated as a result of this thesis,
which include one of the largest collection of IPD tournaments known to the field:
1. Articles’ meta data on the Prisoner’s Dilemma [103].
2. Articles’ meta data on the Price of Anarchy [102].
3. Articles’ meta data on Auction Games [101].
4. Raw data for: “Stability of defection, optimisation of strategies and the limits of
memory in the Prisoner’s Dilemma” [104].
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5. A data set of 45686 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments’ results [100,105]
6. Best response sequences in the Prisoner’s Dilemma [106].
These have been archived and made available via Zenodo, and likewise, are available
to other researchers. They can be used to conduct further analysis and provide new
insights to the field.
A total of four scientific manuscripts presenting the methodology, analysis and results
of this thesis have been prepared and three of them are currently under submission to
respective academic journals. The title of these manuscripts are:
1. A bibliometric study of research topics, collaboration and influence in the field
of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [114].
2. Properties of winning Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies [116].
3. Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma [166].
4. A theory of mind: Best responses to memory-one strategies. The limitations of
extortion and restricted memory [115].
These manuscripts have been uploaded on the pre print server arXiv and are currently
available and accessible to the scientific community.
Designing new strategies is an important type of research for the field. This thesis has
introduced an abundant number of properties of successful strategies which can be of
interest to researchers designing a new strategy for new environments, or just to un-
derstand the reasons behind some strategies being better than others. Complementing
this, a new mathematical framework has been developed for the better understand-
ing of memory-one strategies and an initial understanding of using recurrent neural
networks to train IPD strategies has been presented.
This thesis has contributed to the continuous understanding of the emergence of coop-
eration by providing a condition for which cooperation can not occur in memory-one
environments. It has also has proven that constrained quadratic ratio optimisation
problems that are non concave can be solved explicitly by using resultant theory.
Finally, compared to conventional works where a strategy is trained against a specific
set of opponents and its performance is then validated against that same set, this thesis
has trained LSTM networks on data sets of best response sequences and then validated
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 193
their performance as IPD strategies is 300 different tournaments. This has shown the
potential for an unsupervised learning approach to training a recurrent neural network
to compete in IPD competitions.
8.3 Complementary research
The results of this thesis are not the only scientific results to which I contributed
during this doctoral research. The publications that will be discussed in this section
are publications to which I am an author.
Two other projects which focused on the IPD have been [125,163]. The works of [125,
163] focused on the usage of reinforcement learning algorithms (genetic algorithms
and particle swarm optimisation algorithms) in training a series of strategies based on
different structures such as finite state machines, hidden Markov models and neural
networks. These strategies were trained in two settings:
• A Moran process which is an evolutionary model of invasion and resistance across
time during which high performing individuals are more likely to be replicated.
• A standard tournament.
The results of [125] were confirmed in Chapter 4. The trained strategies performed at
the top of the standard tournament surpassing well established strategies such as Tit
For Tat, Pavlov, Gradual and zero-determinant strategies. In [163] it was observed
that the trained strategies (with no manual input) evolved the ability to have a hand-
shake, to recognise themselves. This was particularly important in a Moran process
of resisting invasion where a single individual of another type is introduced and the
strategies need to resist the invasion.
Another undertaken project included exploring rhino poaching behaviour using evo-
lutionary game theory [112]. Rhino populations are at critical level today and in
protected areas devaluation approaches are used to secure the life of the animals. The
effectiveness of these approaches, however, relies on poacher’s behaviour as they can
be selective or indiscriminate. Selective poachers do not kill devalued rhinos where
indiscriminate do. Populations of differently behaving poachers were modelled using
evolutionary game theory. The results demonstrated that full devaluation of all rhinos
is likely to lead to indiscriminate poaching and that devaluating of rhinos can only
be effective when implemented along with a strong disincentive framework. The paper
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aimed to contribute to the necessary research required for an informed discussion about
the lively debate on legalising rhino horn trade.
Finally, delivering science outreach workshops is a great way to gain a deeper under-
standing of science and its applications, and enhancing students interest in science.
With that in mind I created an open source educational tutorial, called Game The-
ory and Python [113], aimed at introducing participants to game theory and more
specifically to repeated games. The tutorial is aimed at two groups of individuals: in-
dividuals familiar with Python (programmers) who want to start to learn game theory
and mathematicians with little or no programming knowledge as a pathway to pro-
gramming through the interesting subject. The tutorial has gained much interest and
is currently under submission at the Journal of Open Source Education.
A full list of the publications produced during the research presented in this section
is:
1. Reinforcement Learning Produces Dominant Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma [125].
2. Evolution Reinforces Cooperation with the Emergence of Self-Recognition Mech-
anisms: an empirical study of the Moran process for the iterated Prisoner’s
dilemma [163].
3. An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Model of Rhino Horn Devaluation [112].
4. Game Theory and Python [113].
8.4 Future research directions
Each part of this thesis has given rise to further interesting questions and research
directions that, although not in the scope of the current work, would improve or com-
pliment it.
Future research - Meta tournament Analysis
In Chapter 4 during the data collection the probability of noise was allowed to vary
between values of 0 and 1. However, it was established that large values of noise (> 0.1)
caused an impactful variation to the environment. From the collection of 195 strategies
considered in the Chapter there was not a single strategy that performed well in that
spectrum of noise.
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Strategies that have been trained specifically for noisy environments such as DBS,
Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05, Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05, PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise
05 and Omega Tit For Tat, performed adequately only in tournaments with restricted
noise. This indicates that possibly there is not a strategy in the literature trained to
be effective for a broad spectrum of noise values. Training such a strategy would be
an interesting avenue of further research. The analysis of the top performances would
then be reproduced whilst including the new trained strategy.
Future research - Memory-one strategies
In Chapter 5 the empirical results supported that extortionate play is not always op-
timal and that memory-one strategies suffer from their limited memory in multi agent
interactions. All the empirical results presented have been for the case of two oppo-
nents (N = 2). A future research direction would be to validate the empirical results
of the Chapter for larger values of N .
Another restricted set of strategies on memory that have been studied in the literature
are memory-two strategies. These are strategies that take into account the past two
turns of the match. A compelling research question that arises is whether the cur-
rent formulation of Chapter 5 can be expanded to include memory-two strategies, and
whether the results still hold.
Future research - Training an LSTM strategy
An interesting question that was raised in Chapter 7 was whether the sequence to
probability based strategy trained on the entire data set would perform even better if
it was trained for longer. An interesting avenue of further research would be to train
the specific strategy for more epochs, and to evaluate its performance again in the
meta tournament analysis presented in Chapter 7. Finally, another avenue of further
research would be to explore the effect of the dimensionality of the hidden layers in the
performance of the LSTM networks as IPD strategies.
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Appendix A
Centrality measures
distributions
A.1 Distributions for G and G¯
Betweeness and closeness centralities distributions for G and G¯.
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Figure A.1: Distributions of betweenness centrality in G and G¯
A.2 Distributions for topic networks
Betweeness and closeness centralities distributions for graphs of topics A to E.
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Figure A.2: Distributions of closeness centrality in G and G¯
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Figure A.3: Distributions of betweenness centrality in topics’ networks.
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Figure A.4: Distributions of closeness centrality in topics’ networks.
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Appendix B
List of strategies
B.1 List of strategies considered in Chapter 4
The strategies considered in Chapter 4, which are from APL version 3.0.0.
1. φ [7]
2. pi [7]
3. e [7]
4. ALLCorALLD [7]
5. Adaptive [178]
6. Adaptive Pavlov
2006 [159]
7. Adaptive Pavlov
2011 [178]
8. Adaptive Tit For Tat:
0.5 [283]
9. Aggravater [7]
10. Alexei [233]
11. Alternator [35,207]
12. Alternator Hunter [7]
13. Anti Tit For Tat [135]
14. AntiCycler [7]
15. Appeaser [7]
16. Arrogant QLearner [7]
17. Average Copier [7]
18. Backstabber [7]
19. Better and Better [4]
20. Bully [212]
21. Calculator [4]
22. Cautious QLearner [7]
23. Champion [34]
24. CollectiveStrategy [179]
25. Contrite Tit For
Tat [294]
26. Cooperator [35, 207,
234]
27. Cooperator
Hunter [7]
28. Cycle Hunter [7]
29. Cycler CCCCCD [7]
30. Cycler CCCD [7]
31. Cycler CCCDCD [7]
32. Cycler CCD [207]
33. Cycler DC [7]
34. Cycler DDC [207]
35. DBS [32]
36. Davis [33]
37. Defector [35,207,234]
38. Defector Hunter [7]
39. Double Crosser [7]
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40. Desperate [285]
41. DoubleResurrection [8]
42. Doubler [4]
43. Dynamic Two Tits
For Tat [7]
44. EasyGo [4,178]
45. Eatherley [34]
46. Eventual Cycle
Hunter [7]
47. Evolved ANN [7]
48. Evolved ANN 5 [7]
49. Evolved ANN 5 Noise
05 [7]
50. Evolved FSM 16 [7]
51. Evolved FSM 16
Noise 05 [7]
52. Evolved FSM 4 [7]
53. Evolved HMM 5 [7]
54. EvolvedLookerUp1 1
1 [7]
55. EvolvedLookerUp2 2
2 [7]
56. Eugine Nier [233]
57. Feld [33]
58. Firm But Fair [88]
59. Fool Me Forever [7]
60. Fool Me Once [7]
61. Forgetful Fool Me
Once [7]
62. Forgetful Grudger [7]
63. Forgiver [7]
64. Forgiving Tit For
Tat [7]
65. Fortress3 [28]
66. Fortress4 [28]
67. GTFT [92,218]
68. General Soft
Grudger [7]
69. Gradual [44]
70. Gradual Killer [4]
71. Grofman [33]
72. Grudger [33, 42, 44,
178,285]
73. GrudgerAlternator [4]
74. Grumpy [7]
75. Handshake [243]
76. Hard Go By Major-
ity [207]
77. Hard Go By Major-
ity: 10 [7]
78. Hard Go By Major-
ity: 20 [7]
79. Hard Go By Major-
ity: 40 [7]
80. Hard Go By Major-
ity: 5 [7]
81. Hard Prober [4]
82. Hard Tit For 2
Tats [271]
83. Hard Tit For Tat [6]
84. Hesitant QLearner [7]
85. Hopeless [285]
86. Inverse [7]
87. Inverse Punisher [7]
88. Joss [33,271]
89. Knowledgeable
Worse and Worse [7]
90. Level Punisher [8]
91. Limited Retaliate
2 [7]
92. Limited Retaliate
3 [7]
93. Limited Retaliate [7]
94. MEM2 [180]
95. Math Constant
Hunter [7]
96. Meta Hunter Aggres-
sive [7]
97. Meta Hunter [7]
98. Meta Majority [7]
99. Meta Majority Finite
Memory [7]
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100. Meta Majority Long
Memory [7]
101. Meta Majority Mem-
ory One [7]
102. Meta Minority [7]
103. Meta Mixer [7]
104. Meta Winner [7]
105. Meta Winner Deter-
ministic [7]
106. Meta Winner Ensem-
ble [7]
107. Meta Winner Finite
Memory [7]
108. Meta Winner Long
Memory [7]
109. Meta Winner Mem-
ory One [7]
110. Meta Winner
Stochastic [7]
111. NMWE Determinis-
tic [7]
112. NMWE Finite Mem-
ory [7]
113. NMWE Long Mem-
ory [7]
114. NMWE Memory
One [7]
115. NMWE Stochastic [7]
116. Naive Prober [178]
117. Negation [6]
118. Nice Average
Copier [7]
119. Nice Meta Winner [7]
120. Nice Meta Winner
Ensemble [7]
121. Nydegger [33]
122. Omega TFT [159]
123. Once Bitten [7]
124. Opposite Grudger [7]
125. PSO Gambler 1 1
1 [7]
126. PSO Gambler 2 2
2 [7]
127. PSO Gambler 2 2 2
Noise 05 [7]
128. PSO Gambler Mem1
[7]
129. Predator [28]
130. Prober [178]
131. Prober 2 [4]
132. Prober 3 [4]
133. Prober 4 [4]
134. Pun1 [28]
135. Punisher [7]
136. Raider [30]
137. Random Hunter [7]
138. Random: 0.5 [33,283]
139. Remorseful
Prober [178]
140. Resurrection [8]
141. Retaliate 2 [7]
142. Retaliate 3 [7]
143. Retaliate [7]
144. Revised Downing [33]
145. Ripoff [24]
146. Risky QLearner [7]
147. SelfSteem [57]
148. ShortMem [57]
149. Shubik [33]
150. Slow Tit For Two
Tats [7]
151. Slow Tit For Two
Tats 2 [4]
152. Sneaky Tit For
Tat [7]
153. Soft Go By Major-
ity [35,207]
154. Soft Go By Majority
10 [7]
155. Soft Go By Majority
20 [7]
156. Soft Go By Majority
40 [7]
APPENDIX B. LIST OF STRATEGIES 228
157. Soft Go By Majority
5 [7]
158. Soft Grudger [178]
159. Soft Joss [4]
160. SolutionB1 [22]
161. SolutionB5 [22]
162. Spiteful Tit For
Tat [4]
163. Stalker [57]
164. Stein and
Rapoport [33]
165. Stochastic Coopera-
tor [13]
166. Stochastic WSLS [7]
167. Suspicious Tit For
Tat [44,135]
168. TF1 [7]
169. TF2 [7]
170. TF3 [7]
171. Tester [34]
172. ThueMorse [7]
173. ThueMorseInverse [7]
174. Thumper [24]
175. Tit For 2 Tats [35]
176. Tit For Tat [33]
177. Tricky Cooperator [7]
178. Tricky Defector [7]
179. Tullock [33]
180. Two Tits For Tat [35]
181. VeryBad [57]
182. Willing [285]
183. Win-Shift Lose-
Stay [178]
184. Win-Stay Lose-
Shift [169,218,271]
185. Winner12 [193]
186. Winner21 [193]
187. Worse and Worse [4]
188. Worse and Worse 2 [4]
189. Worse and Worse 3 [4]
190. ZD-Extort-2 v2 [172]
191. ZD-Extort-2 [271]
192. ZD-Extort-4 [7]
193. ZD-GEN-2 [172]
194. ZD-GTFT-2 [271]
195. ZD-SET-2 [172]
B.2 List of strategies considered in Chapter 6
The strategies considered in Chapter 6, which are from APL version 4.2.0.
1. e [7]
2. ALLCorALLD [7]
3. AON2 [133]
4. Adaptive [178]
5. Adaptive Pavlov
2006 [159]
6. Adaptive Pavlov
2011 [178]
7. Adaptive Tit For
Tat [283]
8. Aggravater [7]
9. Alexei [233]
10. Alternator [35,207]
11. Alternator Hunter [7]
12. Anti Tit For Tat [135]
13. AntiCycler [7]
14. Appeaser [7]
15. Arrogant QLearner [7]
16. Average Copier [7]
17. Backstabber [7]
18. Better and Better [4]
19. Black [34]
20. Borufsen [34]
21. Bully [212]
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22. Bush Mosteller [145]
23. Calculator [4]
24. Cautious QLearner [7]
25. Cave [34]
26. Champion [34]
27. Colbert [34]
28. CollectiveStrategy [179]
29. Contrite Tit For
Tat [294]
30. Cooperator [35, 207,
234]
31. Cooperator
Hunter [7]
32. Cycle Hunter [7]
33. Cycler CCCCCD [7]
34. Cycler CCCD [7]
35. Cycler CCCDCD [7]
36. Cycler CCD [207]
37. Cycler DC [7]
38. Cycler DDC [207]
39. Davis [33]
40. Defector [35,207,234]
41. Defector Hunter [7]
42. Delayed AON1 [133]
43. Double Crosser [7]
44. Desperate [285]
45. DoubleResurrection [8]
46. Doubler [4]
47. Dynamic Two Tits
For Tat [7]
48. EasyGo [4,178]
49. Eatherley [34]
50. Eventual Cycle
Hunter [7]
51. Evolved ANN [7]
52. Evolved ANN 5 [7]
53. Evolved ANN 5 Noise
05 [7]
54. Evolved FSM 16 [7]
55. Evolved FSM 16
Noise 05 [7]
56. Evolved FSM 4 [7]
57. Evolved HMM 5 [7]
58. EvolvedLookerUp1 1
1 [7]
59. EvolvedLookerUp2 2
2 [7]
60. Eugine Nier [233]
61. Feld [33]
62. Firm But Fair [88]
63. Fool Me Forever [7]
64. Fool Me Once [7]
65. Forgetful Fool Me
Once [7]
66. Forgetful Grudger [7]
67. Forgiver [7]
68. Forgiving Tit For
Tat [7]
69. Fortress3 [28]
70. Fortress4 [28]
71. GTFT [92,218]
72. General Soft
Grudger [7]
73. Getzler [34]
74. Gladstein [34]
75. GraaskampKatzen [34]
76. Gradual [44]
77. Gradual Killer [4]
78. Grofman [33]
79. Grudger [33, 42, 44,
178,285]
80. GrudgerAlternator [4]
81. Grumpy [7]
82. Handshake [243]
83. Hard Prober [4]
84. Hard Tit For 2
Tats [271]
85. Hard Tit For Tat [6]
86. Harrington [34]
87. Hesitant QLearner [7]
88. Hopeless [285]
89. Inverse [7]
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90. Inverse Punisher [7]
91. Joss [33,271]
92. Kluepfel [34]
93. Knowledgeable
Worse and Worse [7]
94. Level Punisher [8]
95. Leyvraz [34]
96. Limited Retaliate
2 [7]
97. Limited Retaliate
3 [7]
98. Limited Retaliate [7]
99. MEM2 [180]
100. Math Constant
Hunter [7]
101. Meta Hunter Aggres-
sive [7]
102. Meta Hunter [7]
103. Michaelos [176]
104. Mikkelson [34]
105. More Tideman and
Chieruzzi [34]
106. Grofman [34]
107. N Tit(s) For M
Tat(s) [7]
108. Naive Prober [178]
109. Negation [6]
110. Nice Average
Copier [7]
111. Nydegger [33]
112. Omega TFT [159]
113. Once Bitten [7]
114. Opposite Grudger [7]
115. PSO Gambler 1 1
1 [7]
116. PSO Gambler 2 2
2 [7]
117. PSO Gambler 2 2 2
Noise 05 [7]
118. PSO Gambler Mem1
[7]
119. Predator [28]
120. Prober [178]
121. Prober 2 [4]
122. Prober 3 [4]
123. Prober 4 [4]
124. Pun1 [28]
125. Punisher [7]
126. Raider [30]
127. Random Hunter [7]
128. Random Tit for
Tat [7]
129. Random: 0.5 [33,283]
130. Remorseful
Prober [178]
131. Resurrection [8]
132. Retaliate 2 [7]
133. Retaliate 3 [7]
134. Retaliate [7]
135. Revised Downing [33]
136. Richard Hufford [34]
137. Ripoff [24]
138. Risky QLearner [7]
139. SelfSteem [57]
140. ShortMem [57]
141. Shubik [33]
142. Slow Tit For Two
Tats 2 [4]
143. Sneaky Tit For
Tat [7]
144. Soft Grudger [178]
145. Soft Joss [4]
146. SolutionB1 [22]
147. SolutionB5 [22]
148. Spiteful Tit For
Tat [4]
149. Stalker [57]
150. Stein and
Rapoport [33]
151. Stochastic Coopera-
tor [13]
152. Stochastic WSLS [7]
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153. Suspicious Tit For
Tat [44,135]
154. TF1 [7]
155. TF2 [7]
156. TF3 [7]
157. Tester [34]
158. ThueMorse [7]
159. ThueMorseInverse [7]
160. Thumper [24]
161. Tideman and
Chieruzzi
162. Tit For 2 Tats [35]
163. Tit For Tat [33]
164. Tranquilizer [33]
165. Tricky Cooperator [7]
166. Tricky Defector [7]
167. Tricky Level Punisher
168. Tullock [33]
169. Two Tits For Tat [35]
170. VeryBad [57]
171. Weiner [34]
172. White [34]
173. Willing [285]
174. Win-Shift Lose-
Stay [178]
175. Win-Stay Lose-
Shift [169,218,271]
176. Winner12 [193]
177. Winner21 [193]
178. WmAdams [34]
179. Worse and Worse [4]
180. Worse and Worse 2 [4]
181. Worse and Worse 3 [4]
182. Yamachi [34]
183. ZD-Extort-2 v2 [172]
184. ZD-Extort-2 [271]
185. ZD-Extort-4 [7]
186. ZD-Extort3 [7]
187. ZD-Extortion [245]
188. ZD-GEN-2 [172]
189. ZD-GTFT-2 [271]
190. ZD-Mem2 [7]
191. ZD-Mischief [245]
192. ZD-SET-2 [172]
B.3 List of strategies considered in Chapter 7
The strategies considered in Chapter 7 for the training subsets.
The top 18 performing strategies of the 218 opponents standard tournament [107]:
1. PSOGambler Mem 1
2. Evolved ANN 5
3. Double Crosser
4. OmegaTFT
5. EvolvedLookerUp 2 2
2
6. Fool Me Once
7. Gradual
8. PSOGambler 2 2 2
Noise 05
9. Evolved HMM 5
10. PSOGambler 1 1 1
11. PSOGambler 2 2 2
12. Evolved ANN
13. Evolved FSM 16
14. Winner 12
15. Back Stabber
16. Evolved FSM 16
Noise 05
17. Evolved ANN Noise
05
18. Evolved FSM 4
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The 15 representative strategies whose ranks are across the 218 ranks of the standard
tournament:
1. Eatherley
2. Cautious Q Learner
3. Forgiver
4. Gladstein
5. Punisher
6. Easy Go
7. Tricky Cooperator
8. Anti Tit For Tat
9. Tit For Tat
10. PSO Gambler 2 2 2
Noise 05
11. Evolved HMM 5
12. e
13. Pun1
14. A Pavlov 2006
15. GraaskampKatzen
16. Hard Tit For Tat
The 11 strategies which are classified as a set of basic strategies in the APL:
1. Alternator
2. AntiTitForTat
3. Bully
4. Cooperator
5. Cycler DC
6. Defector
7. Grudger
8. Suspicious Tit For
Tat
9. Tit For Tat
10. Win Shift Lose Stay
11. Win Stay Lose Shift
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Appendix C
Further analysis on features
importance
C.1 Correlation coefficients of strategies features
A graphical representation of the correlation coefficients for the features of Table 4.5,
Chapter 4.
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1 0.06 0.16 -0.29 -0.44 -0.16 -0.18 -0.12 0.54 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.54 -0.26 0.55 0.55 -0 0 0.03 0.01 -0.5 0.5
0.06 1 0.04 0.29 0.29 -0.16 -0.23 -0.16 0.45 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0 0.45 -0.13 0.46 0.45 -0 -0 0.01 -0.01 0.23 -0.2
0.16 0.04 1 0.09 0.1 -0.09 -0.17 0.02 0.28 0 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.28 -0.14 0.29 0.29 0.01 -0 0 -0.06 0.13 -0.1
-0.29 0.29 0.09 1 0.88 -0.12 -0.21 -0.01 0.19 -0 0.01 -0.02 -0 0.19 -0.07 0.2 0.19 -0 -0 -0.01 -0.07 0.41 -0.4
-0.44 0.29 0.1 0.88 1 -0.12 -0.16 -0.06 0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.05 0.15 0.15 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.08 0.47 -0.45
-0.16 -0.16 -0.09 -0.12 -0.12 1 0.64 0.57 -0.19 0 -0.01 -0 -0.01 -0.19 0.18 -0.19 -0.19 0 -0 0 0.04 -0 -0.02
-0.18 -0.23 -0.17 -0.21 -0.16 0.64 1 0.39 -0.21 -0 -0.01 -0 -0.01 -0.21 0.2 -0.21 -0.21 0 0 0 0.09 -0.16 0.12
-0.12 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.57 0.39 1 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 0 -0 -0.09 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 -0 0 0.02 0.01 -0.02
0.54 0.45 0.28 0.19 0.15 -0.19 -0.21 -0.09 1 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.16 1 -0.29 0.98 0.99 -0 -0 -0.08 0.02 -0.32 0.38
0.01 0.01 0 -0 -0.01 0 -0 0.01 0.04 1 -0.15 0.21 0.23 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0 0.46 -0 -0.02 0.01 -0 0.05
0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.15 1 0.21 0.38 0.07 0.5 0.02 -0 -0.32 0.01 -0.09 0 -0 0.08
-0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0 -0 0 0.14 0.21 0.21 1 0.92 0.13 0.07 -0.05 0 0.05 -0.02 -0.47 0.11 -0 0.21
-0.01 -0 -0.02 -0 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0 0.16 0.23 0.38 0.92 1 0.15 0.15 -0.02 0 -0.03 -0.01 -0.48 0.09 -0 0.23
0.54 0.45 0.28 0.19 0.15 -0.19 -0.21 -0.09 1 -0.02 0.07 0.13 0.15 1 -0.28 0.98 0.99 -0.03 -0 -0.07 0.02 -0.32 0.38
-0.26 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 -0.05 0.18 0.2 0.08 -0.29 -0.13 0.5 0.07 0.15 -0.28 1 -0.3 -0.31 -0.24 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.08
0.55 0.46 0.29 0.2 0.15 -0.19 -0.21 -0.09 0.98 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.98 -0.3 1 1 -0.02 0 0.02 -0 -0.33 0.35
0.55 0.45 0.29 0.19 0.15 -0.19 -0.21 -0.09 0.99 0 -0 0 0 0.99 -0.31 1 1 0 0 -0 0.01 -0.33 0.36
-0 -0 0.01 -0 -0.01 0 0 0.01 -0 0.46 -0.32 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.24 -0.02 0 1 -0.01 0.06 -0 0 -0.01
0 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0 0.01 0 0 -0.01 1 0 -0 0 -0
0.03 0.01 0 -0.01 -0.02 0 0 0 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.47 -0.48 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0 0.06 0 1 -0.07 -0 -0.13
0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.02 -0 0.01 -0 -0 -0.07 1 -0.1 0.11
-0.5 0.23 0.13 0.41 0.47 -0 -0.16 0.01 -0.32 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0.32 0.11 -0.33 -0.33 0 0 -0 -0.1 1 -0.94
0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.45 -0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.38 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.38 -0.08 0.35 0.36 -0.01 -0 -0.13 0.11 -0.94 1
0.8
0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
Figure C.1: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for standard tournaments
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1 0.12 0.49 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.56 0.18 -0.18 -0.01 -0.04 0.36 -0.42 0.5 0.58 -0 -0 -0.29 0 0.01 0.41 -0.5
0.12 1 0.13 0.66 0.66 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.65 0.09 -0.09 0.19 0.27 0.48 -0.38 0.54 0.61 0 0.01 0.46 0 0 0.46 -0.33
0.49 0.13 1 0.2 0.19 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.65 -0.14 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.6 -0.16 0.58 0.67 0 -0.01 -0.16 0 -0.03 0.51 -0.5
-0.01 0.66 0.2 1 0.9 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.66 -0.07 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.57 -0.23 0.55 0.62 0 0 0.38 0 -0.03 0.53 -0.44
-0.18 0.66 0.19 0.9 1 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.55 0.12 -0.12 0.19 0.26 0.38 -0.35 0.46 0.51 0.01 0 0.41 0 -0.03 0.46 -0.34
-0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 1 0.64 0.57 0.01 -0 0 -0 -0 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 -0 -0 0 0.04 0.03 -0.08
0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.64 1 0.39 0.02 0 -0 -0 -0 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0 -0 0 0.09 0.01 -0.12
-0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.57 0.39 1 0.01 0 -0 0 0 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0 0 0 0.02 0.02 -0.03
0.56 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.55 0.01 0.02 0.01 1 0.03 -0.02 0.23 0.24 0.79 -0.44 0.86 0.96 0 0 0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.71 -0.68
0.18 0.09 -0.14 -0.07 0.12 -0 0 0 0.03 1 -0.99 0.11 0.12 -0.57 -0.85 0.01 0 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0 0.02
-0.18 -0.09 0.14 0.07 -0.12 0 -0 -0 -0.02 -0.99 1 -0.09 -0.1 0.57 0.85 -0.01 -0 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0 0 -0.02
-0.01 0.19 0.01 0.15 0.19 -0 -0 0 0.23 0.11 -0.09 1 0.93 0.13 -0.18 -0.06 0 0.01 -0 0.28 -0.19 0.02 -0 0.24
-0.04 0.27 -0.01 0.22 0.26 -0 -0 0 0.24 0.12 -0.1 0.93 1 0.14 -0.19 -0.02 0 0.01 0 0.46 -0.11 0.01 0 0.27
0.36 0.48 0.6 0.57 0.38 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.79 -0.57 0.57 0.13 0.14 1 0.13 0.69 0.78 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.62 -0.55
-0.42 -0.38 -0.16 -0.23 -0.35 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.44 -0.85 0.85 -0.18 -0.19 0.13 1 -0.37 -0.41 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0 0.02 -0.36 0.25
0.5 0.54 0.58 0.55 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.69 -0.37 1 0.91 -0 0 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.65 -0.67
0.58 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.51 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.96 0 -0 0 0 0.78 -0.41 0.91 1 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0.73 -0.74
-0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0 -0 1 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0 -0 0
-0 0.01 -0.01 0 0 -0 0 -0 0 0.02 -0.01 -0 0 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0 -0.01 1 0.01 0 -0 -0 0
-0.29 0.46 -0.16 0.38 0.41 -0 -0 0 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.28 0.46 0.09 -0.07 0.04 -0 0.01 0.01 1 -0 0 -0 0.21
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Figure C.2: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for noisy tournaments
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Figure C.3: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for probabilistic ending
tournaments
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Figure C.4: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for noisy probabilistic
ending tournaments
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Figure C.5: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 4.5 for data set
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C.2 Multivariate linear regressions on median score
A multivariate linear regression has also been fitted to model the relationship between
the features and the median score. The features included are given by Table C.1
alongside their corresponding p values in the distinct tournaments and their regression
coefficients.
Standard Noisy Probabilistic ending Noisy probabilistic ending Overall
R adjusted: 0.576 R adjusted: 0.679 R adjusted: 0.816 R adjusted: 0.930 R adjusted: 0.318
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
CC to C rate 0.043 0.000 -0.380 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.078 0.0 0.308 0.0
CD to C rate -0.325 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.073 0.0 -0.014 0.0
Cr / Cmax - - -1.044 0.000 - - -1.251 0.0 - -
Cr / Cmean 0.553 0.000 -0.101 0.000 -1.136 0.000 -0.089 0.0 -0.665 0.0
Cmax 0.059 0.000 - - -0.044 0.086 -1.396 0.0 - -
Cmean 1.837 0.000 3.078 0.000 1.506 0.000 3.645 0.0 - -
Cmin 0.156 0.000 1.528 0.000 0.311 0.000 - - - -
Cmin / Cr -0.049 0.000 -0.378 0.000 -0.204 0.000 - - -0.257 0.0
DC to C rate -0.204 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.066 0.0 0.007 0.0
k -0.000 0.853 -0.000 0.987 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.0 - -
n -0.000 0.000 - - - - - - - -
pe - - - - 0.025 0.000 -0.095 0.0 - -
pn - - 0.124 0.000 - - - - - -
SSE -0.294 0.000 -0.319 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.010 0.0 -0.015 0.0
constant 0.925 0.000 1.536 0.000 2.466 0.000 2.299 0.0 2.924 0.0
memory usage 0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.000 - - - - - -
Table C.1: Results of multivariate linear regressions with the median score as the
dependent variable. R squared is reported for each model.
C.3 Evaluation based on clustering and random forest.
The final method to evaluate the features importance in a strategy’s success is a com-
bination of a clustering task and a random forest algorithm. Initially the performances
are clustered into different clusters based on them being successful or not. The per-
formances are clustered into successful and unsuccessful clusters based on 4 different
approaches. More specifically:
• Approach 1: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether
their performance was in the top 5% of their respective tournaments. Thus,
whether r was smaller or larger than 0.05.
• Approach 2: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether
their performance was in the top 25% of their respective tournaments. Thus,
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whether r was smaller or larger than 0.25.
• Approach 3: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether
their performance was in the top 50% of their respective tournaments. Thus,
whether r was smaller or larger than 0.50.
• Approach 4: The performances are clustered based on their normalised rank
and their median score by a k−means algorithm [21]. The number of clusters is
not deterministically chosen but it is based on the silhouette coefficients [248].
Once the performances have been assigned to a cluster for each approach a random
forest algorithm [56] is applied. The problem is a supervised problem where the random
forest algorithm predicts the cluster to which a performance has been assigned to using
the features of Table 4.5. The random forest models are trained on a training set of
70% of the tournaments results. The accuracy of each model based on R2 and the
number of clusters for each tournament type (because in the case of Approach 4 it
is not deterministically chosen) are given by Table C.2. The out of the bag error
(OOB) [128] has also been calculated. The models fit well, and a high value of both
the accuracy measures on the test data and the OOB error indicate that the model is
not over fitting.
Tournament type Clustering Approach Number of clusters R2 training data R2 test data R2 OOB score
standard Approach 1 2 0.998831 0.987041 0.983708
Approach 2 2 0.998643 0.978626 0.969202
Approach 3 2 0.998417 0.985217 0.976538
Approach 4 2 0.998794 0.990677 0.982959
noisy Approach 1 2 0.997786 0.972229 0.968332
Approach 2 2 0.997442 0.963254 0.955219
Approach 3 2 0.997152 0.953164 0.940528
Approach 4 3 0.996923 0.950728 0.935444
probabilistic ending Approach 1 2 0.997909 0.981490 0.978120
Approach 2 2 0.997883 0.973492 0.967150
Approach 3 2 0.990448 0.890068 0.875822
Approach 4 2 0.999636 0.995183 0.992809
noisy probabilistic ending Approach 1 2 0.995347 0.957846 0.952353
Approach 2 2 0.992813 0.909346 0.898613
Approach 3 2 0.990579 0.824794 0.806540
Approach 4 4 0.989465 0.841652 0.824052
over 45,600 tournaments Approach 1 2 0.997271 0.972914 0.969198
Approach 2 2 0.996323 0.951194 0.940563
Approach 3 2 0.993707 0.906941 0.891532
Approach 4 3 0.993556 0.913335 0.898453
Table C.2: Accuracy metrics for random forest models.
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The importance that the features of Table 4.5 had on each random forest model are
given by Figures C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9 and C.10. These show that the classifiers stochastic,
make use of game and make use of length have no significant effect, and several of the
features that are highlighted by the importance are inline with the correlation results.
Moreover, the smoothing parameter k appears to no have a significant effect either.
The most important features based on the random forest analysis were Cr/Cmedian and
Cr/Cmean.
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Figure C.6: Importance of features in standard tournaments for different clustering
methods.
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Figure C.7: Importance of features in noisy tournaments for different clustering meth-
ods.
APPENDIX C. FURTHER ANALYSIS ON FEATURES IMPORTANCE 240
C r
C r
 / 
C m
ax
 
C r
 / 
C m
ea
n
C r
 / 
C m
ed
ia
n p e
D
C 
to
 C
 ra
te
D
D
 to
 C
 ra
te
CC
 to
 C
 ra
te
C m
ed
ia
n
SS
E
C m
ea
n N
CD
 to
 C
 ra
te
C r
 / 
C m
in k
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 le
ng
th
C m
in
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 g
am
e
C m
ax
st
oc
ha
st
ic
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Feature importances on 5%
(a) Importance of features for clusters on 5%
performance.
C r
 / 
C m
ea
n
C r
 / 
C m
ax
 
C r
 / 
C m
ed
ia
n p e
CC
 to
 C
 ra
te
C m
ed
ia
n
C m
ea
n C r SS
E
D
C 
to
 C
 ra
te
D
D
 to
 C
 ra
te
CD
 to
 C
 ra
te N k
C r
 / 
C m
in
C m
in
st
oc
ha
st
ic
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 le
ng
th
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 g
am
e
C m
ax
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Feature importances on 25%
(b) Importance of features for clusters on 25%
performance.
C r
 / 
C m
ea
n
C r
 / 
C m
ed
ia
n
C r
 / 
C m
ax
 
p e
CC
 to
 C
 ra
te C r
C m
ed
ia
n
CD
 to
 C
 ra
te SS
E
C m
ea
n
D
C 
to
 C
 ra
te
D
D
 to
 C
 ra
te N k
C r
 / 
C m
in
C m
in
st
oc
ha
st
ic
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 g
am
e
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 le
ng
th
C m
ax
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Feature importances on 50%
(c) Importance of features for clusters on 50%
performance.
C r
 / 
C m
ea
n
C r
 / 
C m
ed
ia
n
C m
ed
ia
n
C r
 / 
C m
ax
 e
CC
 to
 C
 ra
te
C m
ea
n
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 g
am
e
D
C 
to
 C
 ra
te
D
D
 to
 C
 ra
te
M
ak
e 
us
e 
of
 le
ng
th
SS
E
CD
 to
 C
 ra
te C r
st
oc
ha
st
ic N
C m
in
C r
 / 
C m
in k
C m
ax
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Feature importances
(d) Importance of features for clusters based on
kmeans algorithm.
Figure C.8: Importance of features in probabilistic ending tournaments for different
clustering methods.
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(d) Importance of features for clusters based on
kmeans algorithm.
Figure C.9: Importance of features in noisy probabilistic ending tournaments for dif-
ferent clustering methods.
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kmeans algorithm.
Figure C.10: Importance of features over all the tournaments for different clustering
methods.
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Appendix D
Table of parameters (per
Chapter)
The parameters used throughout the thesis. There are given by Table D.1 alongside a
brief explanation. Note that they are reported by Chapter.
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Parameter Explanation
Chapter 3 N number of abstracts
n number of topics
cji the percentage contributions of the i
th topic for the jth abstract
c∗ the highest percentage contribution
Chapter 4 N number of strategies
k number of tournament repetitions
n number of turns per match
pn the probability of noise
pe the probability of the match ending in the next turn
Cr the cooperation rate of a strategy
R the rank of a strategy
r the normalised rank of strategy calculated as R/N − 1
r¯ the median normalised rank of a strategy
Cmax the maximum cooperation rate of a given tournament
Cmin the minimum cooperation rate of a given tournament
Cmean the mean cooperation rate of a given tournament
Cmedian the median cooperation rate of a given tournament
Cr / Cmax a strategy’s cooperation rate divided by Cmax
Cmin / Cr Cmin divided by a strategy’s cooperation rate
Cr / Cmedian a strategy’s cooperation rate divided by Cmedian
Cr / Cmean a strategy’s cooperation rate divided by Cmean
Chapter 5 N number of opponents
p a vector describing a given memory-one/reactive player
q a vector describing a given memory-one opponent
K the number of self interactions
Chapter 6 N number of turns
S a sequence player
Q an given opponent which can be any IPD strategy
P a population of potential best response sequences
b the bottleneck
G a number of genetic algorithm generations
pm the probability that each gene of an sequence being flipped
K maximum size of a population
Chapter 7 x input
y expected output
yˆ predicted output
φ activation function
N number of turns in a sequence
po the probability of opening with a cooperation
t the number of time steps in a sequence
s the size of a tournament
k number of tournament repetitions
n number of turns per match
R the rank of a strategy
r the normalised rank of strategy calculated as R/N − 1
r¯ the median normalised rank of a strategy
p the probability of cooperating at each turn
Table D.1: The parameters used throughout the thesis per Chapter.
